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Abstract 
In this extensive report, we assess how a European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS) could be 
designed. To this end, we examine 18 EUBS variants, 4 equivalent and 14 genuine schemes, and their 
key features. Some of these features can also be found in national unemployment benefit schemes, 
while others are more related to the EUBS context. We analyse the design of a common EUBS in previous 
literature and combine these insights with results for the legal and operational options as well as 
constraints and the economic value added obtained as part of our study on the “Feasibility and Added 
Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”. All this information is integrated into a summary 
fiche for each of the 18 EUBS variants studied. In addition, the report deals with a range of policy issues 
including convergence, minimum requirements and accession criteria. 
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Design of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme 
Miroslav Beblavý, Karolien Lenaerts and Ilaria Maselli* 
CEPS Research Report No 2017/04, February 2017 
1. Introduction 
While the European economic and monetary union (EMU) is still recovering from the Great Recession 
and its consequences for EMU member state economies, labour markets and citizens, the crisis has 
revived a longstanding debate on the EMU’s institutional architecture. Especially in the aftermath of the 
crisis, there has been a widespread call to reform the EMU, after it became clear that its stabilisation 
mechanisms were insufficient to prevent economic shocks and mitigate their effects. The 2015 Five 
Presidents’ Report, for example, has put forward a proposal to establish a common fiscal capacity to 
deal with economic shocks (Juncker et al., 2015). A European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS) 
has long been discussed as a potential stabiliser, among other options. 
In this report, we examine how an EUBS could be designed. To this end, we explore 18 different variants 
(drawing inspiration from the terms of reference (ToR) guiding our study on the “Feasibility and Added 
Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, which was initiated by the European Parliament 
and commissioned by the European Commission). Building on the literature and other work that has 
been carried out in light of the project, the report thoroughly analyses the potential design of the 18 
variants and their main features. Two types of EUBS variants are distinguished throughout this report: 
equivalent and genuine schemes (representing 4 and 14 out of the 18 options respectively). For both 
types, an in-depth analysis of the features of the different options is undertaken. In the report, we focus 
on issues related to the design of a potential EUBS and the policy challenges that this brings. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. The second section of the report comprises a 
general presentation of the 18 policy options. The section clarifies the difference between equivalent 
and genuine schemes and points out the key features through which both types, and the different 
options within these types, can be differentiated. The section also presents a preview of the key policy 
features of an EUBS and what they look like in our work. 
Section 3 consists of a comparison of the 18 policy options for an EUBS with the experiences of other 
countries. The section builds upon an earlier literature review of the existing unemployment insurance 
schemes in federations within and outside the EU. This review comprised eight case studies (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and the US). We indicate in section 3 which 
of the different options best matches each of the case studies.  
In section 4, we analyse the distribution of unemployment shocks (for short-term and total 
unemployment rates) across Europe. To this end, we first take a graphical approach and then continue 
by performing normality tests. The analysis of the distribution of shocks is motivated by the fact that if 
such shocks are normally distributed, then all countries have the same probability of being a beneficiary 
                                                          
* Miroslav Beblavý is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Karolien Lenaerts is Researcher at CEPS. Ilaria Maselli is 
Senior Economist at The Conference Board. The authors are grateful to the consortium partners for their feedback 
and input. The authors are also grateful to Gabriele Marconi for his contribution in the early stages of the project. 
This report was prepared for the study entitled “Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment 
Benefits Scheme” commissioned by DG EMPL and carried out by a Consortium led by CEPS. 
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of an equivalent EUBS (over a sufficiently long period of time). In addition, this would also provide 
support for the political acceptability of the genuine EUBS. This analysis provides us with more insight 
into the types of shocks that generally affect countries.  
Section 5 then presents an analysis of the 18 policy options and their main features, one by one. This 
section is at the heart of the study because it outlines the features that make up each of the 18 options. 
The section further summarises – for each feature – the related literature, the most important trade-
offs that the selection of the feature involves and the choices that were made to come up with 
operational definitions to be used in the micro- and macro simulations of the EUBS in a later phase of 
the project. To be more precise, the section first introduces the trigger, a feature that is only applicable 
to the equivalent EUBS. The subsequent parts of the section address the pay-in, experience rating and 
claw-back, along with the possibility of the supranational fund to issue debt. These features are relevant 
to both types of EUBS. The final parts of section 5 cover all the other features. These features are 
especially relevant to the genuine schemes, as they differ across options 5-18. In the equivalent schemes 
these features are also relevant, but they are identical in each of the four cases.  
In section 6, the issue of minimum requirements is addressed. Both equivalent and genuine EUBS can 
be linked to minimum requirements for national unemployment benefit schemes (NUBS) and activation 
policies. More specifically, the section deals with the potential risks of moral hazard on the one hand 
and of ineffectiveness of the scheme due to low coverage on the other hand. These risks may result 
from a substantial decentralisation of eligibility conditions to member states. Section 6 is further 
devoted to issues such as accession criteria, voluntary and involuntary opt-outs, opt-ins and 
convergence. 
Section 7 presents a fiche for each of the 18 policy options. Each fiche comprises an overview table of 
the main features, the economic impacts, the legal and operational impacts of the option, and some 
general remarks. The economic impacts include the results of the micro- and macro simulations 
(stabilisation, redistribution and transfers), the value added of the scheme (labour mobility, structural 
reforms, and confidence on the part of markets and agents) and the risk of moral hazard. The legal and 
operational impacts refer to the compatibility with national laws and practices of member states and 
with the EU legal framework. In each fiche, countries or cases that require further attention are 
highlighted. 
In section 8, the final section of the report, we present some concluding remarks to reflect on the work 
that has been carried out in light of this report and in the project at large. As European policy-makers 
are still searching for an automatic stabiliser to complete EMU and the EUBS has long been discussed 
as a potential stabiliser, this report has strived to inform policy-makers on the factors they need to take 
into consideration when designing a common, European unemployment insurance scheme. 
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2. Presentation of 18 policy options for an EUBS 
This section presents an in-depth analysis of 18 policy options for the EUBS. The 18 options can be 
divided into two groups, equivalent and genuine schemes, which are further characterised by a range 
of features or parameters. The section first clarifies the distinction between these two types of schemes 
and then describes each of the features in detail. Specifically, for each of the features we provide a 
conceptual and an operational definition, discuss in detail why specific parameters were chosen, 
compare the definitions of these features with those in the current literature and, when possible, give 
an overview of related empirical or simulation results. In each case, baseline and alternative variants of 
the features are explored. The operational definitions of the various features will be used to construct 
the different EUBS for the micro- and macro simulations of their impact. These simulations will be 
carried out in a later stage of the project. To better embed this section in the literature, we also draw 
on the review of the existing realities in federations within and outside the EU (Vandenbroucke and 
Luigjes, 2017) as well as the review of current proposals for a supranational unemployment benefit 
scheme (Beblavý et al., 2015b). 
The 18 policy options are closely related to each other, because each one is a combination of different 
variants of the features described in this section. Some of these features have been comprehensively 
defined in the ToR for the project. In these cases, we carefully describe the features and review the 
relevant literature. For other features, we have chosen some aspects of the definition (particularly the 
operational definition, which is used in the simulation exercises). In such cases, our analysis extends 
beyond a description of the feature and a literature review, and also makes explicit our choices for the 
operational definitions of the features and the reasoning that led to these choices. In these cases, we 
present an overview of the different options that we explored and a detailed explanation as to why we 
prefer specific parameters or variables to their alternatives. We also consider the implications of these 
choices. We rely on related empirical work to verify our feature definitions and to provide support for 
these choices, which are also validated by the simulations performed in other tasks of the project. 
A European unemployment benefit scheme is one form of a supranational automatic stabiliser that 
could be introduced in Europe. An EUBS would contribute to the welfare of European citizens in times 
of crisis and, by reinforcing fiscal capacity, to crisis prevention by breaking the vicious circle of economic 
and financial crises. Besides stabilisation and crisis prevention, an EUBS would also act as a mechanism 
for redistribution. Stabilisation and (re)distribution reinforce each other. It can be argued that a 
downturn will affect primarily the more vulnerable workers (e.g. the low-skilled, who have the lowest 
hiring and firing costs). An uneven distribution of the adjustment burden may strengthen the intensity 
and persistence of the downturn (e.g. as low-income earners typically have a higher propensity to 
consume – adversely affecting aggregate demand). 
2.1. Genuine versus equivalent schemes 
A key distinction that is made in this study is that between equivalent and genuine schemes. Out of the 
18 options that we explore, four are equivalent EUBS. These schemes involve financial transfers 
between the supranational fund, which manages the EUBS, and the member states. In these schemes, 
there are no direct transfers between the supranational fund and unemployed individuals. Note that 
transfers may still reach unemployed individuals indirectly, if the supranational fund pays the national 
state which in turn directs the funds towards its unemployed citizens.  
Table 1 presents an overview of the four equivalent schemes and the features that differentiate them. 
The main difference between the equivalent schemes is the design of the trigger (i.e. the threshold level 
that determines when the funds are disbursed). This is a rather different situation in comparison with 
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the genuine schemes, in which a number of other features come into play as well. Table 1 lists the main 
characteristics of the four equivalent schemes through which they can be distinguished from each 
other. These are, apart from the trigger, the presence of experience rating, the presence of a claw-back 
mechanism, and the possibility for the supranational fund to issue debt. Note that the definitions of the 
features can be found in the glossary in appendix I.  
As is clear from Table 1, the trigger is defined in a similar way for each of the variant (V) options, but the 
cut-off level differs. In the ‘rainy day’ scenario (options V2 and V3), the cut-off is set at 0.1%, which 
means that the trigger is pulled very frequently. In this scenario, the trigger is activated when the 
recorded short-term unemployment rate at quarter t minus its average in the last 40 quarters (t–40,…, 
t–1) exceeds 0.1%. This scenario covers nearly all shocks. The cut-off is set at 1% in the ‘stormy day’ 
scenario (V1) and at 2% in the case of ‘reinsurance of national UBS’ (V4). The latter only covers very 
severe recessions. The selection of these three cut-off values is documented in the following sections. 
Note that experience rating is not implemented in the ‘stormy day’ scenario, while claw-back is not 
present in the ‘reinsurance’ scenario. In two of the options, the supranational fund can issue debt to 
deal with short-term imbalances.  
Table 1. An overview of the equivalent systems 
  V1/18 V2/18 V3/18 V4/18 
  
Stormy day Rainy day with debt 
Rainy day without 
debt 
Reinsurance of national 
UBS   
Trigger 
 𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40 … 𝑡−1 
> 1% 
  𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40… 𝑡−1 
> 0.1% 
   𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 −
𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40 … 𝑡−1 
> 0.1% 
𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1 
> 2%  
Experience 
rating 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Claw-back Yes Yes Yes No 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes Yes No No 
Source: Authors’ re-elaboration based on the ToR. 
The remaining 14 options are genuine EUBS, which do involve direct transfers from the supranational 
fund to unemployed citizens. In genuine schemes no trigger is required, as these schemes are activated 
for any eligible worker who becomes unemployed.  
An overview of the 14 options and the features that are particularly relevant in these cases is provided 
in Table 2. These features are a basic or top-up scheme (V6); the duration of the benefits (V7 and V8); 
the replacement rate of the benefits (V9 and V10); the eligibility criteria (the minimum requirements to 
be able to qualify for the scheme, V11 and V12);1 capping (with benefits that are capped upwards, such 
that beneficiaries do not receive more than a certain amount, V13 and V14); cyclical variability (with 
features that are affected by the economic cycle, e.g. the duration of benefits, V15); the presence of 
experience rating (V16); the presence of a claw-back mechanism (V17); and the possibility for the 
supranational fund to issue debt (V18). For the exact definitions of each of these features we again refer 
to the following sections and the glossary in appendix I. In its most basic form as represented in V5, the 
                                                          
1 Note that in the modelling exercises, V11 and V12 are operationalised as follows: V11 has an eligibility of 6 
months (M) out of 12M, while V12 has an eligibility of 9M out of 12M. 
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genuine EUBS is a basic scheme that provides benefits from the beginning of the fourth month until the 
end of the twelfth month to all unemployed individuals who have worked at least three out of the last 
twelve months. The replacement rate is set at 50% of the reference wage and capped at 150% of the 
average national reference wage. The scheme is further characterised by experience rating, claw-back 
and the possibility of the supranational fund to issue debt. There is no cyclical variability in this baseline 
scheme. For the duration, the replacement rate, the eligibility and the capping features, the alternative 
variants include both an extension (e.g. a replacement rate of 60% instead of 50%) and a reduction (e.g. 
35% instead of 50%).  
Table 2. An overview of the genuine systems 
 
Basic 
or  
top-up 
Duration 
Replacement 
rate (%) 
Eligibility 
Capping 
(%) 
Cyclical 
variability 
Experience 
rating 
Claw-
back 
Debt 
V5/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V6/18 Top-up M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V7/18 Basic M0-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V8/18 Basic M3-M6 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V9/18 Basic M3-M12 35 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V10/18 Basic M3-M12 60 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V11/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
6M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V12/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
12M out of 
24M 
150 No Yes Yes Yes 
V13/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
100 No Yes Yes Yes 
V14/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
50 No Yes Yes Yes 
V15/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
V16/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No No Yes Yes 
V17/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes No Yes 
V18/18 Basic M3-M12 50 
3M out of 
12M 
150 No Yes Yes No 
Source: Authors’ re-elaboration based on the ToR. 
From the discussion above, one may derive that equivalent and genuine schemes differ in two important 
dimensions: the trigger (necessary to activate equivalent schemes, but irrelevant for genuine schemes) 
and the way in which funds are collected and disbursed (directly from/to the unemployed individuals in 
genuine schemes and from/to countries for equivalent ones). While these dimensions are clear in 
theory, the distinction between the two types of EUBS in the real world is less clear-cut and 
straightforward than one may initially expect. As became clear earlier in the project, the existing multi-
tiered schemes are often complex and difficult to classify as either equivalent or genuine based on these 
two dimensions. An example that illustrates this is the American system of Extended and Emergency 
Benefits. These benefits are considered ‘federal’ and are conditioned by triggers. However, the 
Extended and Emergency Benefits are cashed out directly to unemployed individuals; this suggests that 
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they are genuine in nature. Reality thus seems much more complex than a theoretical framework could 
capture. A more nuanced way to think of it is that the two ideal types move, according to the 
specifications in each variant, in a continuous space (as illustrated in Figure 1). The horizontal axis in the 
figure represents the values of the trigger (with a cut-off of ‘0’ for the genuine schemes and different 
options for the equivalent ones); the vertical axis represents the flexibility that governments have to 
operate their own unemployment benefit scheme (UBS; flexibility here captures the level of 
harmonisation – or the lack thereof – across the various UBS). Moving more towards the 0 on the 
vertical axis implies a higher level of harmonisation across the member states. 
Figure 1. Stylised representation of the continuum of EUBS 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
As indicated above, equivalent schemes leave much more flexibility to member states to run their own 
schemes and are therefore much less problematic than genuine EUBS from the administrative point of 
view. When it comes to the equivalent schemes, however, there are other complications. In genuine 
EUBS, the flow of transfers is clear: the supranational fund directly cashes out benefits to any eligible 
unemployed person. In equivalent EUBS, funds are transferred to national governments. In this case, it 
is crucial to distinguish between the rules and formulas used to calculate how much a government 
receives when the trigger is pulled and the rules that determine how a government can spend this sum 
through the national schemes (laid down in minimum requirements).  
If an equivalent EUBS were introduced, one could envisage a simplistic scenario in which no change is 
applied to the NUBS and the supranational fund transfers resources when the local schemes are under 
financial stress. This would imply an EUBS that simply finances the existing NUBS. This system would 
help countries to avoid cutting the expenditure on unemployment benefits in a time of crisis. Yet, it 
would not improve the stabilisation capacity of the national system in question (importantly, the 
research performed by Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017) as part of the project shows that 
national stabilisation capacity can be particularly low).  
The main question therefore is this: Where does one draw the line in the equivalent EUBS? To what 
extent should the funds transferred come with conditions that member states have to respect, and how 
specific should these conditions then be? One option is that the EUBS pays a lump sum to the country 
flexibility
0 1% 2% 3%
equivalent schemes
trigger
genuine schemes
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whose trigger is activated, with some rules attached. For example, a condition could be that the amount 
of money transferred is spent on at least 75% of the short-term unemployed, leaving the country free 
to design specific eligibility requirements. An alternative, more stringent possibility is that the lump sum 
is spent on the same unemployed workers who would qualify for the genuine scheme (as identified in 
the baseline scenario V5). This is what is simulated by Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017). In 
this case, the only distinction between an equivalent and a genuine scheme is the existence of the 
trigger. 
From this comparison, it follows that there exists a continuum of minimum requirements with regard to 
the regulation of NUBS, ranging from very flexible to rigid. If the EU determines exactly how the member 
states should spend the lump sum received in the equivalent EUBS, this would correspond to very rigid 
minimum requirements. If, on the other hand, the EU leaves it largely to the member states to decide 
how the money can be used, the minimum requirements can be regarded as highly flexible. The case of 
the genuine EUBS is rather different from that of the equivalent EUBS. For the genuine schemes, it is 
the EU that defines eligibility, generosity, duration, etc. (possibly allowing nation-specific adjustments, 
e.g. flat-rate benefits instead of earnings-related benefits in countries that already have such a system). 
This means that de facto there are no minimum requirements beyond the design of the scheme. 
2.2. Design features of the 18 EUBS 
To provide the reader with some more details on the design of the features presented above for both 
the genuine and the equivalent EUBS, we introduce Table 3 below. Table 3 is a summary table that 
comprises the operational definitions that we propose for each of the nine features: the trigger (when 
is the scheme activated), pay-in (the contributions requested from countries or individuals), experience 
rating (accounting for the country’s historical unemployment), claw-back (limiting long-term transfers 
from the system to a particular country), duration (number of months unemployment benefits are paid 
out), replacement rate (percentage of reference wage paid out as unemployment benefits), reference 
wage (last gross monthly wage), eligibility (who is entitled to unemployment benefits) and capping (the 
maximum unemployment benefits that one can receive). When applicable, both the baseline definitions 
and the alternative ones are provided (e.g. the baseline duration of the unemployment benefits 
corresponds to 9 months, from M3 to M12, while the alternatives are a longer duration, from M0 to 
M12 (in V7), and a short duration, from M3 to M6 (in V8)). In this way, the reader can easily compare 
the operational definitions of the key features that define the 18 EUBS. In Table 3, i generally refers to 
country i and t stands for quarter t. However, because Table 3 only serves as a summary table, we do 
not go into detail on the definitions and parameters here, but instead refer the reader to section 5. 
The remainder of this report presents each of the 18 EUBS variants in more detail, highlighting their key 
policy features. It further discusses issues related to convergence, minimum requirements and potential 
accession criteria, as well as the distribution of unemployment shocks. In the last part of the report, we 
present 18 fiches, one for each of the 18 variants, which summarises our main results.  
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Table 3. An overview of the specifications of the systems 
 Genuine Equivalent 
Trigger Not applicable 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1 >  𝜏 
where 𝑈𝑅 is the short-term unemployment rate, 𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  the average short-term 
unemployment rate in the last 40 quarters and τ the cut-off 
Pay-in (accounting 
for experience 
rating) 
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝑤 ∗ 𝐶 
where 𝑤 refers to gross salary and C is the coefficient that accounts for the 
experience rating; pay-in is equally divided between employers and 
employees (x = a/2, x ranges from 0.35 (0.36) in V8 to 1.36 (1.34) in V7 for 
the EA-19 (EU-27))  
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐶;  𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙 𝑧% 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑈 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 
where the pay-in is a function of the country’s GDP and C is the coefficient that accounts 
for the experience rating, with x equal to 0.1 and z equal to 0.5 
Experience rating 
𝐶 =  
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐸𝑈𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
 
where 𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  is the average short-term unemployment rate in the last 40 
quarters (i.e. the 10-year average of a country’s short-term unemployment 
over the 10-year average of the EU’s short-term unemployment; updated 
every 3 years) 
 
𝐶 = 1 +  0.025 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1   
where F is the number of times country i recurs to the supranational fund in the past 40 
quarters 
Claw-back A specific contribution by the national government of i if 
𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 > 1% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 > 20  
(0.2% of GDP, applies after 3 years of negative cumulative balance of more 
than 1% of GDP) 
𝐶 = 2 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 > 1% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 > 20 
(applies after 3 years of negative cumulative balance of more than 1% of GDP vis-à-vis the 
supranational fund until the balance declines below 1%) 
Duration M3 to M12 (baseline) except in 
V7 = M0 to M12 
V8 = M3 to M6 
 
M3 to M12 
Replacement rate 50% of reference wage (baseline), except in 
V9 = 35% 
V10 = 60% 
 
50% 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Last gross monthly wage 
Eligibility 3M out of 12 M (baseline), except in 
V11 = 3M out of 6M 
V12 = 12M out of 24M 
 
3M out of 12M 
Capping  150% of the average national gross wage (baseline), except in 
V13 = 100% 
V14 = 50% 
 
150% of the average national gross wage 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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3. Comparison of 18 EUBS policy options with experiences of other countries  
This section is meant to bridge the gap between the present report and the work of Vandenbroucke 
and Luigjes (2017). The idea is to understand whether any of the 18 ‘ideal types’ matches one or more 
features of the cases deeply analysed by Vandenbroucke and Luigjes (2017) and to understand if the 
lessons from these eight cases have been learned.  
Australia = Variant 9 and Variant 3. The system is organised centrally and it is financed by general 
revenue. As a result, there are no direct transfers across regions. Still, since different regions exhibit 
different unemployment rates, a form of redistribution exists determined by the fact that people living 
in more prosperous areas contribute more and people living in less prosperous areas recur more to the 
funds.  
The policy mix is the following: low eligibility conditions, high controls to promote activation and 
ungenerous benefits. The closest of the variants is V9 (genuine), where the replacement rate is 35%. 
One should mention that the central level also regulates and implements activation, which makes it very 
different from the idea of a genuine EUBS in the European context, at least if we keep activation as 
(predominantly) a member state responsibility.  
Canada = No specific matching variant. The Canadian system is organised at the federal level. Its origin 
dates back to the Great Depression, an interesting parallel with the current crisis and the debate on the 
EUBS. The system is financed by employee and employer contributions (respectively 40 and 60%) and 
its maximum duration is generally 52 weeks. The system does not match a specific variant, but can be 
classified as ‘genuine’.  
What makes it interesting is a feature not directly matched by any of the 18 variants analysed in this 
study. The benefit rates are not equal across the country, but higher in those regions where the 
unemployment rate is higher! Moreover, in regions facing a downturn, the eligibility criteria are eased 
and the duration is prolonged. As a result, the system is effective in terms of shock absorption and also 
highly redistributive. As such, it is organised in the opposite way of the EUBS, which always have 
correction mechanisms based on experience rating and claw-back.  
Austria = Variant 6. The Austrian labour market governance is relatively centralised. Like in all the 
genuine systems as a default option, the Austrian unemployment benefit system is financed by 
employee and employer contributions. Payments are granted for up to 52 weeks (like in most variants).  
An interesting feature is the equalisation payment. Austria has a history of low replacement rates. To 
avoid falling below a social minimum, the system foresees the possibility to top up the replacement 
rate, which can reach up to 80% for a wage earner below the median income (this applies to social 
assistance, not to the unemployment benefits). The goal of such provision in Austria is to force Länder 
to attain certain replacement rates for social assistance benefits. This feature contains similarities to V6.  
Belgium = Variant 16. The Belgian case is interesting because, among those analysed, it is the one where 
the issue of moral hazard emerges more aggressively. This is due to the combination of two factors: the 
generosity of the system and the substantial differences in terms of unemployment rates among the 
three regions. Such structural redistribution has led over time to political tensions among the different 
levels of government. This makes Belgium similar to the ‘missing variant’ in the list of 18, and precisely 
the one where neither the experience rating nor claw-back mechanisms are foreseen to correct the 
redistributive element of the system. As this variant is inexistent, the one closest to it is V16, where only 
the claw-back is present and by design it is pulled only in case of a negative balance of a country vis-à-
vis the supranational fund for more than three years.  
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Finally, Germany, Denmark and Switzerland have all put in place UBS that belong to the category of 
‘genuine’. However, their specificity does not match any of the 18 variants considered for the EUBS.  
 
US = Variant 15. It is difficult to clearly classify the American system under the equivalent/genuine 
dichotomy. Unemployment insurance, in normal times, is not redistributive as each state has its own 
account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. National funds can borrow from the central fund (Federal 
Unemployment Account, FUA) but have to restore the balance to zero in the long-term. If the outstanding 
loan is not repaid by that time, the state will face an effective federal tax increase (Whittaker, 2012).2  
Yet, the system introduces a distributive element in case of major recessions. If no sign of recovery is 
present in the economy and the unemployment rate stays high, Congress can approve extended benefits 
and emergency benefits. The presence of a trigger for the Extended and Emergency Benefits makes the 
system ‘mixed’. 
Among the 18 variants, V15 is the closest to the US system. In this option the opportunity to include ‘cyclical 
variability’ will be tested. As can be read in the project ToR (p. 8): “the values for one or more dimensions 
change during a ‘deep downturn’. One example would be a longer duration, such as in the case of 
‘extended benefits’ in the US.” This variant is interesting as it complements the ‘insurance’ aspect of the 
policy with a solidarity element across member states.  
One more feature is interesting about the US case: the existence of minimum requirements. Unlike in all 
other systems considered, where the parameters of the unemployment insurance are defined at the 
federal level, in the US only a floor is harmonised. States are then free to be more generous with the 
unemployed, which translates into higher contributions by employers.  
 
  
                                                          
2 In the US system, unemployment compensation benefits are financed through employer taxes (federal and state 
payroll taxes). With regard to the federal unemployment taxes, a gross tax rate of 6% is imposed. In states with 
programmes approved by the federal government and without any delinquent federal loans, this rate is reduced 
to only 0.6%. In times of economic downturn, state taxes and reserve balances may prove to be insufficient to 
cover the expenditure for unemployment benefits. If a state is unable to pay unemployment benefits, it does not 
have a programme that meets federal law and therefore employers will be subjected to a federal tax rate of 6%. 
Moreover, the state may need to borrow money from a dedicated loan account (FUA) or outside sources. Even in 
case of the former, interest rates are applied to the borrowed funds related to new loans when they have not 
been not repaid by the end of the fiscal year in which they were obtained. It is strictly regulated which funds may 
or may not be used to pay interest, as well as when this needs to happen. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 temporarily waived interest payments. In contrast to the US system, the EUBS would 
not apply interest. The idea of charging interest runs counter to the idea of an insurance and risk-sharing. 
Moreover, the system is already based on wage growth and GDP growth, so this is accounted for to some extent. 
Another point is that the current interest rates are very low and likely to remain low for an extended period of 
time. 
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4. Analysis of the distribution of unemployment shocks 
In this section, we investigate whether the short-term and total unemployment rates in various 
countries across Europe are normally distributed. This analysis is particularly relevant for equivalent 
schemes, where a trigger determines when the funds are disbursed. The main issue is the following: if 
ultimately unemployment shocks are normally distributed, then all countries have the same probability 
of being a beneficiary of the scheme (when a sufficiently long period of time is considered) (Beblavý et 
al., 2015a).  
This analysis is also useful as it helps to determine the types of shocks that generally affect each country 
(i.e. positive or negative, large or small shocks). Since we consider both the short-term and total 
unemployment rates in the design of the trigger, we examine the normality of both distributions. 
To obtain a sufficiently long period for our analysis, we extracted data from AMECO (total 
unemployment rates, covering 1980–2014) and Eurostat (short-term unemployment rates, covering 
1990–2014). As data were not available for several countries for this period, the analysis is limited to a 
subset of countries (of which the majority are EU-15 members). We thus examine the distribution of 
shocks in a range of countries that differ (substantially) as far as the structure and functioning of their 
economy is concerned. Even though AMECO offers data for an even longer period for some countries 
(i.e. covering also the 1960s and 1970s), we decided to exclude these years as unemployment in that 
period was at a different level and had a very different structure from later years. We further considered 
the impact of the recent crisis on the distribution of the unemployment rates by including or excluding 
the years 2009–14 in our analyses, of which the results are displayed in the top and bottom panels of 
the tables below, respectively.  
Our analysis of the distribution of shocks comprises two steps. As a first step, the distribution of shocks 
is explored graphically. The second step involves a more formal analysis, in which we make use of 
different normality tests. From the graphical analysis, it is immediately clear that in some countries 
unemployment is normally distributed (e.g. Belgium) while in other countries this is not the case (e.g. 
France). When the EU (EU-15) or the euro area as a whole is considered, however, distributions appear 
to be normal. Normality tests of the different distributions lead to a similar conclusion: in about half of 
the countries shocks are normally distributed. When the EU and the euro area are studied, the same 
result is found. Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain have normally distributed shocks in all cases, 
regardless of the period or the type of unemployment considered. The opposite applies to Ireland and 
Latvia, where normality is rejected every time. The period considered does seem to have a big impact 
on the distribution in some cases, though this does not apply to the EU and the euro area. A clear 
example of this result is the inclusion or exclusion of the recent crisis years (2009–14). For some 
countries, the result is also dependent on the unemployment measure used (total or short-term rates). 
How can these results be interpreted? A first important finding is that in many countries the normality 
of the distribution of shocks is confirmed, regardless of the period considered and the unemployment 
measure used. This finding also applies to the EU and the euro area, a result that provides clear support 
in favour of risk sharing across countries. Nevertheless, normality is difficult to reject, and therefore the 
fact that in the other half of the sample unemployment shocks are not normally distributed requires 
further analysis. In this regard, for a number of countries normality is rejected because of the small tails 
of their distributions (which are fairly symmetric) in comparison with the normal distribution, which 
indicates that large shocks are less frequent. Still, one should further keep in mind that our time series 
are relatively short, which can affect results, as illustrated by the test in which the period 2009–14 is 
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excluded. Additionally, our analysis covers unemployment rates (levels) at annual frequency. We do not 
consider changes in unemployment levels. We opted for this approach for two reasons. First, 
unemployment levels change drastically from one quarter to the next, which severely complicates and 
precludes an analysis based on changes. Second, the dynamics of unemployment rates reflect the cycle 
well, given the strong correlation with changes in GDP (despite the fact that unemployment rates have 
a structural component).  
4.1. Analysis 
In this section, we first perform a graphical analysis of the distributions of the short-term and total 
unemployment rates and then continue with more formal tests. To this end, we make use of two 
datasets. The first dataset holds data on total unemployment rates, which we collected from AMECO. 
This dataset covers 15 EU countries, for which data are available and complete since the 1980s. We use 
this dataset because it allows us to have a longer time series. The countries included are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,3 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. This implies that even though new member states are excluded, 
countries with (very) different labour markets and economies are still covered in our analysis. We 
further extract data on total unemployment rates from AMECO for the EU and the euro area as a whole 
(covering the period 1980–2014, when possible). The second dataset was obtained from Eurostat and 
covers short-term unemployment rates. Unfortunately, these data are only available for a subset of 
countries (eight countries) and for a shorter period. In this case, we study Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the period 1990–2014.  
4.1.1. Graphical analysis 
For the graphical analysis, we look at the distribution of unemployment shocks in the following way: we 
count how many times the unemployment rate is higher or lower than x times its standard deviation. In 
this exercise, x ranges from 0.5 to 3 and varies with steps of 0.5. As indicated above, we consider both 
the total and short-term unemployment rates, but only present graphs based on total unemployment 
here (i.e. the AMECO data, for which we have a longer time series). 
Some examples are pictured in Figure 2 below, in which each panel holds the graph of one country (i.e. 
for Belgium, France, Austria and Portugal). In each graph, the number of times the total unemployment 
rate exceeds the cut-off is depicted on the vertical axis, while the horizontal axis displays the cut-off 
values. The top right panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of the total unemployment rate in Belgium, 
which appears to be normal. In the other panels of Figure 2, the distribution of total unemployment 
does not appear to be normal (with Austria and Portugal showing an opposite pattern). For France, the 
distribution is strongly left-skewed, meaning that no large, negative unemployment shock is observed 
during the period.  
                                                          
3 The data series refer to West Germany during 1980–90 and to the full country from 1991 onwards. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of shocks in Belgium, France, Austria and Poland 
  
  
Note: Data are extracted from AMECO and cover total unemployment rates in the period 1980–2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
The distribution of unemployment shocks in the EU and the euro area is studied in a similar way as 
before. Figure 3 depicts the distributions for these regions. When the longest time series available is 
considered – for the euro area-12 during 1980–2014 – the distribution is normal (the last panel of Figure 
3). The chart for the EU-15 during this period also appears to be fairly normal (slightly left-skewed). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of shocks in the EU and the euro area 
  
  
  
Notes: Data are extracted from AMECO and cover total unemployment rates in the period 1980–2014. The bottom two panels 
of the figure (EU-15 1980–2014 and euro area-12 1980–2014) include a data series for Germany that refers to West Germany 
in 1980–90 and to the country as a whole in 1991–2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
4.1.2. Analysis based on normality tests 
The second step of the analysis is based on normality tests. As before, total as well as short-term 
unemployment rates are considered. In both cases, we use two tests, the skewness and kurtosis test for 
normality and the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, and consider two periods (with and without 2009–2014). 
We first discuss the results for total unemployment and then focus on short-term unemployment. For 
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total unemployment rates, we not only show results for individual countries but also for the EU and the 
euro area. 
Analysis of the total unemployment rates (AMECO data) for the period 1980–2014 
First test: To test the normality of the unemployment distributions, the skewness and kurtosis test for 
normality (sktest) was used (in the statistical package Stata). This test requires at least eight 
observations and entails a normality test based on the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution (which 
are combined into an overall test statistic). The null hypothesis for this test is that the variable under 
examination is normally distributed. Two periods are studied: 1980–2014 and 1980–2008 (to see the 
extent to which the crisis has an impact on the shape of the distribution). The results are presented in 
Table 4. The countries indicated in red and bold are countries where unemployment shocks are not 
normally distributed (p-value > 10%). When the period 1980–2014 is considered, for 7 out of the 15 
countries the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level (in the top panel of the table). This implies that 
total unemployment is not normally distributed in Ireland, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Sweden or the UK. The first two columns show whether the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution 
are significantly different from those of a normal distribution. This appears to be the case for Greece, 
whereas for the remaining countries either the skewness or the kurtosis differs significantly. The bottom 
panel of the table shows results for the period 1980–2008. The results do appear to be influenced by 
the Great Recession. In this case, for 4 out of 15 countries (Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK) the 
distribution is not normal, as the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level. This appears to be caused 
by the kurtosis of the distribution for these countries.4  
Second test: The results of the first test were verified with a second normality test – the Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test (swilk command in Stata). For the top panel of Table 5, it is clear that the results are fairly 
similar to those for the first test (with the exception of Finland, which now appears to have a non-normal 
distribution). A similar conclusion is reached when the period 1980–2008 is used instead (in the bottom 
panel of the table), with the exception of Finland and Luxembourg.5  
                                                          
4 When the tests are repeated for unemployment changes, normality is rejected at the 10% level for 8 countries 
in the top panel (Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and the UK) and 6 countries in 
the bottom panel (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK). 
5 Similarly, when changes are considered, normality is rejected at the 10% level in 7 countries in the top panel of 
the table (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and the UK) and in 5 countries in the bottom panel 
(Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK). 
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Table 4. Normality test using AMECO data on total unemployment (sktest), by country 
 1980-2014 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Belgium 0.510 0.175 2.45 0.2939 
Denmark 0.770 0.082 3.37 0.1856 
Germany* 0.778 0.970 0.08 0.9602 
Ireland 0.286 0.000 12.09 0.0024 
Greece 0.000 0.004 18.40 0.0001 
Spain 0.715 0.353 1.05 0.5908 
France 0.053 0.234 5.04 0.0803 
Italy 0.327 0.427 1.70 0.4273 
Luxembourg 0.105 0.136 4.82 0.0896 
Netherlands 0.123 0.437 3.24 0.1981 
Austria 0.899 0.913 0.03 0.9861 
Portugal 0.004 0.107 9.11 0.0105 
Finland 0.041 0.637 4.48 0.1064 
Sweden 0.473 0.001 9.96 0.0069 
United Kingdom 0.483 0.010 6.44 0.0399 
 1980-2008 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Belgium 0.901 0.056 3.92 0.1406 
Denmark 0.368 0.121 3.54 0.1706 
Germany* 0.336 0.685 1.17 0.5585 
Ireland 0.721 0.000 17.35 0.0002 
Greece 0.239 0.597 1.81 0.4053 
Spain 0.861 0.083 3.34 0.1881 
France 0.184 0.349 2.90 0.2346 
Italy 0.739 0.189 1.99 0.3688 
Luxembourg 0.033 0.784 4.65 0.0976 
Netherlands 0.227 0.629 1.84 0.3990 
Austria 0.695 0.239 1.66 0.4354 
Portugal 0.683 0.033 4.72 0.0943 
Finland 0.087 0.727 3.36 0.1860 
Sweden 0.806 0.005 7.10 0.0287 
United Kingdom 0.563 0.000 10.77 0.0046 
* Indicates that these data series refer to West Germany from 1980 to 1990 and to Germany from 1991 to 2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
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Table 5. Normality test using AMECO data on total unemployment (swilk), by country 
 1980-2014 (N=35) 
 W V z Prob>z 
Belgium 0.96588 1.218 0.411 0.34040 
Denmark 0.96852 1.124 0.243 0.40388 
Germany* 0.99394 0.216 -3.197 0.99931 
Ireland 0.88679 4.041 2.915 0.00178 
Greece 0.74385 9.143 4.619 0.00000 
Spain 0.97461 0.906 -0.205 0.58127 
France 0.94412 1.995 1.441 0.07475 
Italy 0.97057 1.050 0.103 0.45910 
Luxembourg 0.91243 3.126 2.379 0.00868 
Netherlands 0.96950 1.089 0.177 0.42964 
Austria 0.96627 1.204 0.387 0.34935 
Portugal 0.88226 4.202 2.997 0.00136 
Finland 0.92572 2.651 2.035 0.02091 
Sweden 0.91350 3.087 2.353 0.00931 
United Kingdom 0.94468 1.975 1.420 0.07776 
 1980-2008 (N=29) 
 W V z Prob>z 
Belgium 0.95785 1.306 0.552 0.29061 
Denmark 0.94726 1.635 1.014 0.15529 
Germany* 0.98780 0.378 -2.007 0.97764 
Ireland 0.88260 3.631 2.661 0.00390 
Greece 0.96597 1.055 0.110 0.45637 
Spain 0.96249 1.163 0.311 0.37788 
France 0.94928 1.572 0.933 0.17537 
Italy 0.96292 1.149 0.287 0.38708 
Luxembourg 0.89557 3.237 2.424 0.00769 
Netherlands 0.97348 0.822 -0.405 0.65720 
Austria 0.96461 1.097 0.191 0.42429 
Portugal 0.93682 1.958 1.387 0.08278 
Finland 0.91711 2.569 1.947 0.02577 
Sweden 0.92315 2.382 1.791 0.03667 
United Kingdom 0.91333 2.686 2.039 0.02073 
* Indicates that these data series refer to West Germany from 1980 to 1990 and to Germany from 1991 to 2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
We further present results for the EU and the euro area (EA) in Table 6 and Table 7. In both tables, the 
null hypothesis of normality is rejected in only 1 out of 12 cases (at the 10% level, for the EU-15 country 
group only when we use a data series that starts in 1991; note that normality is not rejected for a longer 
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series that relies on data for West Germany to complete the series before 1991). This is a particularly 
interesting finding, which provides support for risk sharing across the region.6, 7  
Table 6. Normality test using AMECO data on total unemployment (sktest), EU and euro area 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
EU (96-14) 0.194 0.340 2.96 0.2275 
EU-15 (91-14) 0.905 0.009 6.32 0.0425 
EA (98-14) 0.464 0.695 0.74 0.6909 
EA12 (91-14) 0.786 0.080 3.52 0.1718 
EU15 (80-14)* 0.635 0.942 0.23 0.8908 
EA12 (80-14)* 0.944 0.892 0.02 0.9883 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
EU (96-08) 0.093 0.433 3.84 0.1464 
EU15 (91-08) 0.384 0.068 4.29 0.1171 
EA (98-08) 0.788 0.851 0.11 0.9477 
EA12 (91-08) 0.579 0.043 4.53 0.1038 
EU15 (80-08)* 0.720 0.741 0.24 0.8879 
EA12 (80-08)* 0.817 0.598 0.33 0.8471 
* Indicates that these data series refer to West Germany from 1980 to 1990 and to Germany from 1991 to 2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
Table 7. Normality test using AMECO data on total unemployment (swilk), EU and euro area 
 W V z Prob>z 
EU (96-14) (N=19) 0.94721 1.205 0.375 0.35395 
EU15 (91-14) (N=24) 0.93436 1.771 1.165 0.12204 
EA (98-14) (N=17) 0.96264 0.789 -0.472 0.68155 
EA12 (91-14) (N=24) 0.96008 1.077 0.151 0.43996 
EU15 (80-14)* (N=35) 0.98013 0.709 -0.717 0.76327 
EA12 (80-14)* (N=35) 0.98484 0.541 -1.282 0.90015 
 W V z Prob>z 
EU (96-08) (N=13) 0.89385 1.870 1.226 0.11013 
EU15 (91-08) N=18) 0.89219 2.370 1.727 0.04208 
EA (98-08) (N=11) 0.97694 0.373 -1.614 0.94675 
EA12 (91-08) (N=18) 0.93713 1.382 0.648 0.25861 
EU15 (80-08)* (N=29) 0.97182 0.873 -0.279 0.60997 
EA12 (80-08)* (N=29) 0.96074 1.217 0.405 0.34281 
* Indicates that these data series refer to West Germany from 1980 to 1990 and to Germany from 1991 to 2014. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO data. 
 
                                                          
6 When unemployment changes are used, normality is still never rejected for the euro area (neither in Table 6 nor 
in Table 7). However, in Table 6 it is rejected for the EU (full period) and the EU-15 (without West Germany) (both 
samples). In Table 7, normality is rejected at the 10% level for the EU and the EU-15 (regardless of whether data 
on West Germany are added or removed), and the EU-15 including West Germany when the shorter sample is 
used. These results are likely due to volatility in unemployment changes. 
7 In addition to these tests, we also considered co-movement between the moments of the distributions across 
member states. To this end, we calculated the rolling mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of subsequent five-
year periods (e.g. 1980–84, 1981–82, etc.) and checked the correlations of these moving moments across the 
member states. Overall, no clear pattern can be detected for the mean and variance. Correlations vary from really 
low numbers (0.001) to rather high numbers (0.96), and are both positive and negative. When it comes to the 
skewness and kurtosis, correlations generally are low. It is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from these 
findings. 
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Analysis of the short-term unemployment rate (Eurostat data) for the period 1990–2014 
The tests discussed above are repeated, but in this case short-term unemployment is used and the 
period considered is limited to 1990–2014 for a set of eight countries. The results are presented in Table 
8 and Table 9 below. 
First test: For the period 1990–2014, short-term unemployment is normally distributed in seven out of 
eight countries when we use the 5% level as a cut-off for the skewness and kurtosis test for normality 
(it is not normally distributed in Latvia). When the 10% level is used as before, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg as well. When we consider the period 1990–2008 instead, 
for two countries the distribution is not normal at the 5% level: Denmark and Latvia. For France and 
Italy, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level. For the first two columns of Table 8, one can again 
derive whether the rejection of normality is driven by the skewness or kurtosis of the distribution (or 
both).8  
Second test: As before, these results were verified using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. In the top panel 
of Table 9, we reach the same conclusion for Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and 
Finland. For France, the null hypothesis of normality is rejected at the 10% level, whereas this no longer 
applies to Luxembourg. When only the period 1990–2008 is studied, the null hypothesis of normality is 
rejected for just two countries: Denmark and Latvia.9  
Table 8. Normality test using Eurostat data on short-term unemployment (sktest) 
 1990-2014 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Belgium 0.445 0.846 0.65 0.7218 
Denmark 0.037 0.186 5.75 0.0564 
France 0.288 0.220 2.93 0.2316 
Italy 0.814 0.018 5.42 0.0665 
Latvia 0.004 0.057 9.58 0.0083 
Luxembourg 0.665 0.104 5.87 0.0531 
Netherlands 0.186 0.769 2.02 0.3650 
Finland 0.726 0.110 2.98 0.2257 
 1990-2008 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Belgium 0.127 0.636 2.90 0.2341 
Denmark 0.003 0.025 10.87 0.0044 
France 0.803 0.026 4.99 0.0824 
Italy 0.876 0.019 5.32 0.0700 
Latvia 0.002 0.006 12.82 0.0016 
Luxembourg 0.252 0.524 1.92 0.3820 
Netherlands 0.661 0.233 1.81 0.4050 
Finland 0.383 0.596 1.14 0.5661 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat data. 
 
                                                          
8 When unemployment changes are used instead of levels, the hypothesis of normality is rejected at the 10% level 
for Denmark, Latvia and the Netherlands in both cases. 
9 An analysis based on unemployment changes reveals that normality is rejected at the 10% level in both cases for 
Denmark and the Netherlands and when the full period is used only for Latvia. 
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Table 9. Normality test using Eurostat data on short-term unemployment (swilk) 
 1990-2014 (N=25) 
 W V z Prob>z 
Belgium 0.96607 0.943 -0.120 0.54792 
Denmark 0.92497 2.085 1.502 0.06655 
France 0.93036 1.935 1.349 0.08860 
Italy 0.93229 1882 1.292 0.09815 
Latvia 0.86887 3.644 2.643 0.00411 
Luxembourg 0.93434 1.824 1.229 0.10950 
Netherlands 0.95469 1.259 0.471 0.31879 
Finland 0.95421 1.272 0.492 0.31127 
 1990-2008 (N=19) 
 W V z Prob>z 
Belgium 0.91270 1.993 1.385 0.08298 
Denmark 0.82608 3.970 2.770 0.00281 
France 0.92820 1.639 0.993 0.16042 
Italy 0.92096 1.804 1.186 0.11789 
Latvia 0.85124 3.396 2.456 0.00703 
Luxembourg 0.93541 1.475 0.780 0.21768 
Netherlands 0.95622 0.999 -0.001 0.50488 
Finland 0.94841 1.178 0.329 0.37116 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat data. 
Finally, in Table 10, countries are classified into groups on the basis of the skewness and kurtosis of the 
total and short-term unemployment rate distributions. In the table, the full period is considered (i.e. 
including the crisis years). As a first step, the countries for which the short-term or total unemployment 
rate is normally distributed are separated from those to which this does not apply. This first group of 
countries has symmetric distributions with normal tails (indicated in the top left cell of the table). Then, 
the second group of countries is further split up according to the skewness (left-skewed or right-skewed) 
and kurtosis (flatter or thicker tails with regard to the normal distribution) of their distributions.  
For the short-term unemployment rate, presented in panel A of the table, four countries had a non-
normal distribution in the period 1990–2014. The distributions of three of these countries are right-
skewed (i.e. positive shocks are more frequent). The distributions of two countries have flatter tails (no 
large shocks). With regard to skewness, the distributions of Denmark and Latvia are significantly 
different from that of the normal distribution (right-skewed, indicated in bold). For kurtosis, there are 
significant differences only for Italy and Latvia (the distribution of Italy has flatter tails; that of Latvia has 
thicker tails, in italics).  
For total unemployment, which is presented in panel B of Table 10, we find seven countries with non-
normal distributions. Three out of seven countries have distributions with significantly flatter tails 
(Ireland, Sweden and the UK, in italics), while the distribution of Greece has significantly thicker tails (i.e. 
larger shocks are more frequent). With regard to the skewness of the distribution, Table 10 suggests 
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that France has a left-skewed distribution, whereas Greece and Portugal have a right-skewed 
distribution (in all cases significantly different from the normal distribution, in bold).10  
Table 10. Classification of countries into groups according to the distribution of short-term 
unemployment and total unemployment 
PANEL A: Classification based on distribution of short-term unemployment (1990–2014) 
 
Symmetric distribution 
Asymmetric distribution 
Left-skewed (negative) Right-skewed (positive) 
Normal Tails BE (-0.32/2.74)  
FR (0.45/2.04)  
NL (0.56/2.81)  
FI (0.14/1.92) 
  
Flatter Tails  IT (-0.10/1.71) LU (0.18/1.69) 
Thicker Tails   DK (0.93/3.73) 
LV (1.36/4.52) 
PANEL B: Classification based on distribution of total unemployment (1980–2014) 
 
Symmetric distribution 
Asymmetric distribution 
Left-skewed (negative) Right-skewed (positive) 
Normal Tails BE (0.24/2.12)  
DK (0.11/2.01)  
DE (-0.10/2.68) 
ES (0.13/2.27)  
IT (0.36/2.32)  
NL (0.56/3.21)  
AT (-0.05/2.76)  
FI (0.79/2.99) 
  
Flatter Tails  IE (-0.39/1.61)  
SE (-0.26/1.66) 
LU (0.61/2.08)  
UK (0.25/1.81) 
Thicker Tails  FR (-0.74/3.58)  GR (1.96/6.35)  
PT (1.20/4.05)  
Note: A country is indicated in bold if skewness (the measure for lack of symmetry) is significantly different from that of the 
normal distribution (skewness = 0) at the 10% level and a country is indicated in italics if kurtosis (the measure of peakedness) 
is significantly different from that of the normal distribution (kurtosis = 3) at the 10% level; the first number between brackets 
is the value for skewness and second number is the value for kurtosis.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on AMECO and Eurostat data. 
4.2. Conclusions on the distribution of unemployment shocks 
In this section, we have focused on the distributions of the short-term and total unemployment rates of 
several countries and country groups. The aim has been to determine whether these unemployment 
measures are normally distributed or not. To this end, we have made use of two datasets obtained from 
AMECO and Eurostat, the latter for short-term and the former for total unemployment, covering a 
sufficiently long time series. We first examined the distributions from a graphical point of view and then 
continued by performing normality tests. In fact, we compared results for different periods (including 
or excluding the recent crisis) and different tests. From our analysis, we conclude that in half of the 
                                                          
10 Besides these analyses, we looked at the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the distributions for each of 
the member states over time and calculated correlations to check whether they move together. Correlations for 
the mean and variance again range from very low to very high, and show both positive and negative signs. 
Correlations for skewness and kurtosis are lower. As before, it is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from these 
results. 
22 | BEBLAVÝ, LENAERTS & MASELLI 
 
countries, in the EU (EU-15) as a whole and in the euro area, shocks are normally distributed. This finding 
for the EU and the euro area is a strong argument in favour of risk sharing across these countries. 
Although it is hard to reject normality, one has to keep in mind that our time series are rather short and 
that including or excluding certain years (such as the period 2009–14) can have an impact on the test 
results. The findings for the euro area and the EU as a whole do not appear to be affected by the period 
considered.  
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5. Analysis of the key policy features of an EUBS 
This section presents a thorough analysis of the key policy features – or the parameters that define each 
– of the 18 potential EUBS. Some of these features will be shared by both the equivalent and the genuine 
unemployment benefit schemes while other features are specific to one of these types. An example of 
the latter would be the trigger, which is a feature of the equivalent EUBS alone. As indicated above, 
equivalent EUBS are those schemes in which financial transfers flow from member states to the 
supranational fund or from the fund to the member states. There are no direct transfers to unemployed 
individuals. This, however, does not preclude indirect flows to unemployed citizens, since national 
governments can transfer the funds received from the supranational fund directly towards their 
unemployed citizens. The first 4 out of the 18 options considered in this report are equivalent schemes. 
The remaining 14 options are genuine EUBS: schemes that are characterised by direct financial transfers 
from the supranational fund to unemployed individuals.  
The following features will be discussed in more depth: the trigger; pay-in, experience rating and claw-
back; the possibility to issue debt; basic versus top-up schemes; cyclical variability; the duration of the 
unemployment benefits; the replacement rate; the reference wage; the eligibility criteria and capping. 
For each of these features we provide a definition and detailed description, we present an operational 
definition and we carefully explain how the parameters in this definition were determined. We also 
discuss related literature and empirical results. In each case, we list what the baseline form of the 
feature is and which alternatives are studied (e.g. the baseline replacement is 50%, with two variants: 
35% in option V9 and 60% in option V10). Where relevant, we also discuss country-specific cases or 
results. For a comprehensive list of definitions for each feature, we refer to the glossary in appendix I. 
5.1. Trigger 
The trigger is the condition determining when financial transfers from the supranational fund towards 
a particular country should occur. It only applies to the equivalent EUBS, because in genuine systems 
the supranational fund is activated by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility requirements. In equivalent 
schemes, a trigger is necessary to define events that activate the supranational fund. A trigger is defined 
by an indicator and a threshold and is activated when the former is larger than the latter. 
A trigger is defined by the choice of an indicator and of a threshold. When the indicator for a specific 
country i at a specific time t exceeds the threshold, then the supranational fund pays the country the 
agreed claim. In our proposal, t refers to quarters and not years.  
For the indicator, we use the short-term unemployment rate of country i at time t (represented by URi,t in 
the equation below). The threshold is based on the sum of the 10-year moving average of the country’s 
short-term unemployment rate (which corresponds to the last 40 quarters, as represented by URi,t-40,...,t-1) 
and τ percentage points. The claim is paid to country i whenever the recorded short-term unemployment 
rate at quarter t minus its average in the last 40 quarters (t–40,…,t–1) exceeds a certain value. This 
condition can be stated as follows:  
𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1 >  𝜏 
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The value of τ depends on the scenario considered: τ is equal to 0.1% in the baseline ‘rainy day’ scenario, 
equal to 1% in the ‘stormy day’ scenario and equal to 2% in the ‘reinsurance’11 scenario. 
Our preferred data series are the seasonally adjusted series from the European Labour Force Survey. 
Because of data limitations, the definition of the trigger will be adapted to yearly data in the simulations 
to be carried out later on in this research project. 
An important methodological note concerns what we mean by the short-term unemployment rate. For 
the purposes of the EUBS, the tender defined the eligible unemployed as those unemployed between 3 
and 12 months. However, for the purposes of historical analysis, such data are not available on a long-
term basis; therefore, we use the short-term unemployment rate (0-12 months) as a proxy instead.12  
 
A trigger is characterised by two parameters: an indicator and a threshold. With regard to the indicator, 
the literature has defined two broad types. The first type of indicator was put forward by Enderlein et 
al. (2013) and is based on the output gap. The output gap is “the difference of a country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) to this country’s potential output – that is, to the highest level of output that is 
sustainable in the long term” (Enderlein et al., 2013, p. 24). The output gap has a very strong conceptual 
appeal as a measure of the economic cycle, because it is immediately related to it: when a country is in 
a negative phase of the economic cycle, the output gap is negative by definition. The second type of 
indicator, which receives much more support in the literature,13 is based on the unemployment rate. 
The reasons for this are that the unemployment rate is a solid indicator, as it is based on a head-count, 
and statistics on unemployment rates are available quarterly (thanks to the European Labour Force 
Survey). Even more importantly, output gap statistics are controversial (as they require estimating the 
‘potential output’) and are often revised, even ex post, which makes them difficult to consider reliable 
in real time (Strauss et al., 2013; Ince and Papell, 2013; Biggs and Mayer, 2010). This means that the 
estimation of the output gap for 2015 calculated in 2015 will hardly coincide with the revisions 
conducted in later years (2016, 2017 and so on). A recent article by Darvas (2015) confirms this in his 
analysis of output gap estimate revisions made by the IMF and the European Commission during 2001 
and 2015. Substantial revisions are made to the previous and current year output gap estimates one 
year later, amounting to 0.5 to 1% of GDP on average across countries (in normal years). Enderlein et 
al. (2013), however, indicate that not only can output gap revisions result from methodological changes 
but also from improvements in future estimates. In addition, the authors find that ex post adjustments 
are highly correlated between countries. Despite these considerations, we follow the majority of earlier 
studies on this topic and therefore select the unemployment rate for the indicator. 
The subsequent decision to be taken is whether to use the short-term or total unemployment rate for 
the indicator. The literature suggests that the short-term unemployment rate is a better indicator than 
the total unemployment rate (Dullien, 2013; Vetter, 2014; Beblavý and Maselli, 2014; Beblavý et al., 
                                                          
11 In the jargon of this study, ‘reinsurance’ refers to V4. In other parts of this work, however, it may be considered 
a synonym for ‘equivalent’.  
12 Note that in the modelling exercises of Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017), this issue is addressed as 
follows. As a first step, information is obtained from Eurostat on the number of the unemployed with different 
durations (this is based on the Labour Force Survey). From this, the share of the short-term unemployed and the 
share of the short-term unemployed with a duration of 3-12 months are calculated. One has to keep in mind, 
however, that in the anonymised Labour Force Survey, the categories of the unemployed by duration are broader 
(e.g. less than 6 months, 6-11 months). 
13 See Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993), Dullien (2007, 2012, 2013), Vetter (2014) and Beblavý and Maselli (2014). 
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2015a). In addition, the above-mentioned literature also emphasises that the difference from a norm 
should be considered rather than the level of the unemployment rate itself. In this way, one could avoid 
the situation in which some countries turn into net payers into the scheme whereas other countries 
become net beneficiaries.  
With regard to the threshold, again there are several elements to keep in mind. The first is the question 
of the ‘norm’, i.e. what should the threshold be based on? In their paper, Beblavý and Maselli (2014) 
propose to use a moving average of the country’s short-term unemployment rate (in a 10-year 
reference period) as the norm. This approach avoids having to use a historical average within a reference 
period that can be too short (and hence too dependent on the cycle) or too long (when it becomes more 
difficult to appreciate structural improvements). Other studies use the yearly growth of unemployment, 
but this approach results in a rather volatile indicator that is highly dependent on the level of 
unemployment one year earlier. Beblavý and Maselli (2014) note that these issues could be resolved by 
using a measure of structural unemployment for the indicator, such as the non-accelerating wage rate 
of unemployment (NAWRU). Yet the NAWRU is more difficult to estimate than the simple 
unemployment rate and is subject to ex post revisions (similar to the output gap). For this reason, we 
prefer to use a moving average as the norm on which the indicator is defined. Following Beblavý and 
Maselli (2014), we consider 10 years to be a reference period, to deal with the trade-off between 
sensitivity to prolonged economic slumps and outdated data. 
The next question concerns what is the difference from this norm that is required to trigger the system. 
Here, the literature points to two possibilities: expressing this difference in terms of standard deviations 
or in terms of percentage points. We summarise all the possible combinations in Table 11 below: 
- the short-term unemployment rate vs total unemployment rate (indicator), and 
- fixed percentages vs standard deviations (threshold). 
Table 11. Overview of different options for the trigger 
 Fixed percentage Standard deviations 
Short-term unemployment rate Option a Option b 
Total unemployment rate Option c Option d 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
We focus on the period 2000–14. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, this allows us to look 
backward: series of short-term unemployment start to be complete from 1996 onwards and therefore 
selecting 2000 as the starting point means that the supposed 10-year average counts at least four data 
points. On the other hand, the 2000–14 period includes both the crisis and the pre-crisis phase. This 
implies that not only can we see how many times the trigger would have been pulled in the recent crisis 
years, but also how many times and, importantly in which countries, the trigger would have been 
activated in other periods of economic downturn. For Germany, for example, this reveals that the trigger 
would also have been pulled in the years 2003–05, when the country was going through a severe crisis. 
To provide further support for our analysis, we present two correlation tables that cover the four 
options listed in Table 11. In both tables, the period 2000–14 is considered for the EU-27 (Croatia is 
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excluded because of data availability issues).14 Table 12 shows the correlations between the different 
series in terms of values (e.g. what the value of the short-term unemployment rate is plus 1% and the 
extent to which is it correlated with the value of the short-term unemployment rate plus two standard 
deviations). Table 13 illustrates the correlations between the different series in terms of the number of 
times the trigger is pulled. Both tables suggest that the correlations generally are high. Table 14 presents 
a brief discussion of the correlations in Table 13. In the remainder of this section, we frequently refer to 
these tables.  
Table 12. Correlations between the different series (unemployment rate values, 2000–14) 
    STU TU 
    0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 
ST
U
 
0.1% 1                       
0.1SD 0.99 1                     
1% 1 0.99 1                   
1SD 0.98 0.99 0.98 1                 
2% 1 0.99 1 0.98 1               
2SD 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.96 1             
TU
 
0.1% 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 1           
0.1SD 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.99 1         
1% 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 1 0.99 1       
1SD 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.99 0.99 0.99 1     
2% 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 1   
2SD 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 1 
Note: STU refers to short-term unemployment, TU to total unemployment and SD to standard deviation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
Table 13. Correlations between the different series (number of times the trigger is pulled, 2000–14) 
    STU TU 
    0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 
ST
U
 
0.1% 1                       
0.1SD 0.99 1                     
1% 0.35 0.28 1                   
1SD 0.69 0.67 0.63 1                 
2% 0.20 0.13 0.79 0.43 1               
2SD 0.45 0.36 0.87 0.72 0.73 1             
TU
 
0.1% 0.75 0.74 0.49 0.69 0.34 0.48 1           
0.1SD 0.81 0.80 0.49 0.70 0.31 0.47 0.97 1         
1% 0.44 0.38 0.86 0.62 0.62 0.73 0.69 0.65 1       
1SD 0.61 0.58 0.75 0.88 0.55 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.82 1     
2% 0.21 0.16 0.87 0.51 0.74 0.72 0.40 0.33 0.87 0.62 1   
2SD 0.33 0.26 0.86 0.69 0.70 0.89 0.46 0.46 0.80 0.77 0.77 1 
Note: STU refers to short-term unemployment, TU to total unemployment and SD to standard deviation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
 
                                                          
14 Note that the data series that were used to come up with these correlation tables are also used for the various 
graphs that are available in appendix II of this report. In this appendix, more details are presented on the cut-off 
values that were ultimately selected. These cut-offs are 0.1%, 1% and 2%. 
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Table 14. Description of correlations between the different series (number of times, 2000–14) 
    STU TU 
    0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 0.1% 0.1SD 1% 1SD 2% 2SD 
ST
U
 
0.1% 
Very high 
correlations 
                    
0.1SD                     
1% Correlations are 
higher for SD than 
for % points High correlations 
                
1SD                 
2% Correlations are 
higher for SD than 
for % points (largest 
difference in table) 
Correlations are 
higher for SD than 
for % points High correlations 
            
2SD             
TU
 
0.1% 
Using the same cut-
off, correlations 
between STU and TU 
are over 0.74 
Correlations 
reasonably high, 
especially for SD  
Much lower 
correlations, as 
these are very 
different (other data 
series, big difference 
in cut-off) 
Very high 
correlations 
        
0.1SD         
1% 
Correlations 
reasonably high, 
especially for SD 
Using the same cut-
off, correlations 
between STU and TU 
are over 0.86 
Correlations 
reasonably high, 
especially for SD 
Correlations are 
higher for SD than 
for % points 
High 
correlations 
    
1SD     
2% Much lower 
correlations, as these 
are very different 
(other data, big 
difference in cut-off) High correlations 
Using the same cut-
off, correlations 
between STU and TU 
are over 0.73 
Smallest 
correlations within 
TU series 
High 
correlations 
High 
correlations 2SD 
Note: STU refers to short-term unemployment, TU to total unemployment and SD to standard deviation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Box 1. How triggers are defined in related studies 
Different approaches have been used to define triggers in the EUBS literature. Below, we present an 
overview of some of the most prominent studies. From this overview, it is clear that many studies recur 
to the unemployment rate. 
Dullien (2013) defines the trigger in three different ways for the three simulation scenarios: 
- an unemployment rate above 7%, an increase above 1 percentage point over past 12 months; 
- an unemployment rate above 5%, an increase above 1 percentage point over past 12 months;  
- and an unemployment rate above 7%, an increase above 15% over past 12 months. 
Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) suggest the following trigger: 
- an increase of the unemployment rate over past 12 months that is positive and greater than the 
average increase over the other members of the European Union. 
Beblavý and Maselli (2014) design the trigger in the following way: 
- the difference between the unemployment rate and NAWRU exceeds 2%. 
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Beblavý et al. (2015a) analyse three different EUBS, with the following triggers: 
- the short-term unemployment rate exceeds the sum between its 10-year average and one-tenth 
of its 10-year standard deviation; 
- the short-term unemployment rate exceeds the sum between its 10-year average and its 10-year 
standard deviation; and 
- the short-term unemployment rate exceeds the sum between its 10-year average and two times 
its 10-year standard deviation. 
 
5.1.1. Why do we opt for short-term instead of total unemployment? 
The first choice to be made concerns which indicator is preferable between short-term and total 
unemployment rates.  
Despite the high correlation between these two series (as illustrated in Table 12), we prefer short-term 
unemployment.  
Our choice is motivated by both economic and political arguments. From the purely economic point of 
view, several studies argue that short-term unemployment is more sensitive to the economic cycle, 
whereas total unemployment also includes structural unemployment. Given that the purpose of the 
insurance is to create a shock-absorption mechanism in case of recession, short-term unemployment is 
better suited to doing that, also because it is more volatile (see for instance, Dullien (2013), Vetter 
(2014), Beblavý and Maselli (2014) and Beblavý et al. (2015a)).  
Moreover, despite the high correlation between the short-term and total unemployment rates shown 
in Table 12, the two series can diverge. This can result in situations in which the short-term 
unemployment rate of a country is decreasing when the country starts to stabilise after a shock, while 
the total unemployment rate at this point can stay at its level or even increase further. This can happen, 
for instance, in case of hysteresis. The six graphs in Figure 4 present examples of countries where this 
issue occurs. In Spain, Greece and Italy, we observe that after the early phases, the total unemployment 
rate continues to increase even when the short-term unemployment rate remains stable.  
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Figure 4. Example countries characterised by a period in which the short-term unemployment rate falls 
while the total unemployment rate remains the same or rises 
  
  
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
From the political point of view, total unemployment, on the other hand, has the advantage that it is 
simple and easier to explain and communicate to a wider public, which is accustomed to reading about 
these figures in the press. While that may be true, we nevertheless regard the advantage as not strong 
enough given that the argument of one country financing the unemployed of another could easily be 
used by populist Eurosceptic parties. In this study, we follow the above-mentioned literature and use 
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the short-term unemployment rate (the ratio of individuals unemployed for less than one year to the 
size of the labour force) as the indicator of unemployment throughout this section.15 
Please note that the entire analysis in this study is based on annual data, but we do recommend using 
quarterly data in practice, should an EUBS be set up anytime in the future. In a number of macro 
simulations, either monthly (Italianer and Vanheukelen, 1993; Dullien, 2013) or yearly (Beblavý and 
Maselli, 2014) unemployment rates are used. We also use yearly data in our study, which is partly driven 
by methodological and data limitations. Annual data, however, should not be used in the EUBS because 
this would result in a scheme that responds rather slowly to changes in unemployment. Monthly data 
would allow a much faster reaction, but these data do not differ much from quarterly data and most 
economic indicators are collected quarterly. We therefore prefer to make use of quarterly, short-term 
unemployment rates. Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) and Dullien (2013) exploit the yearly difference 
to eliminate seasonality in the data. We suggest working with seasonally adjusted data instead. These 
data are routinely produced by Eurostat and allow computing the average that we use as the norm on 
a larger sample size. 
5.1.2. How high is the average short-term unemployment rate and how large is the 
standard deviation?  
In 2007, the 10-year average, short-term unemployment rate was 4.44% in the EU. The average 
standard deviation over the same period was 0.81. Seven years later, the short-term unemployment 
rate was 4.8% with a standard deviation of 1.22. More details on the 10-year average, short-term 
unemployment rate and its standard deviation for both years and each country are provided in Figure 
5 and Figure 6 below. 
Figure 5. 10-year average, short-term unemployment rate and standard deviation in 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
                                                          
15 Notice that in most variants except V7, the EUBS starts paying benefits only after 3 months of unemployment, 
so very short-term unemployment is not covered by the EUBS in this sense. However, when defining the trigger, 
we find it important to have an indicator that reacts quickly to the economic cycle, so we prefer to use short-term 
unemployment from 0 to 11 months. 
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Figure 6. 10-year average, short-term unemployment rate and standard deviation in 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the 10-year moving average and standard deviation of short-term 
unemployment (Figure 7) and total unemployment (Figure 8) in the EU-28.  
Figure 7. Annual 10-year moving average and standard deviation of short-term unemployment in the 
EU-28 during 2000–14 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
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Figure 8. Annual 10-year moving average and standard deviation of total unemployment in the EU-28 
during 2000–14 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
 
5.1.3. Why do we propose using percentage points instead of the standard deviation 
approach and how do we select the cut-off points? 
Our preference is fixed percentages rather than standard deviations. For the pure scientific sake, 
standard deviations would be more appropriate. Yet, this might result in a case in which two countries 
in a given year have the same short-term unemployment rate, but only one of them qualifies. Such a 
situation would be politically unacceptable and has to be avoided. Using a fixed percentage is a more 
transparent mechanism. As can be observed in Table 12, the series are so highly correlated that 
choosing one or the other makes very little difference.  
The second step consists of defining the cut-off points for the rainy day, stormy day and reinsurance 
scenarios. Our understanding from the project ToR is the following: 
- the rainy-day fund needs to be triggered easily, 
- the stormy day fund would have a higher trigger, and 
- the reinsurance is meant for significant shocks.  
We start with a wide range of cut-off points: 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 2.75 and 
3. Then we check how often they would trigger the fund. 
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Figure 9. Number of times the trigger (based on percentage points) is activated during 2000–14 for 
each country and for different cut-off values 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
The challenge is to define fixed percentages that mirror as much as possible the desired values in terms 
of standard deviations. What are these?  
- One should be sufficiently small to be activated often and operational on a nearly continuous 
basis.  
- One should be sufficiently large to trigger only in cases of major events.  
- One should be somewhere in the middle between the two extreme cases.  
Our choices are to a certain extent discretionary but with solid roots in the figures. In defining the cut-
off, we start from the middle case, the stormy day.  
Looking at Figure 9 and Figure 10, one can notice that the long list of cut-off points considered indicates 
three possible cases (further details on these cut-off points are provided in appendix II):  
- A lower-hand trigger. Set at 0.1 or 0.25, the number of cases is very similar since the figures are 
sufficiently low. 
- In the EU-27, the trigger is pulled 197 times between 2000 and 2014 when the cut-off is set at 
0.1 percentage point, 174 times when the cut-off is set at 0.25 percentage points and 132 times 
when the cut-off is set at 0.5 percentage points. We find that setting a low cut-off value is 
particularly important for countries in the north and west of Europe, in comparison with 
countries in the south and east of the continent. Sensitivity analysis suggests that in all countries 
the trigger is pulled at some point during the period 2000–14 when the cut-off value is 0.1, 
whereas Finland would no longer benefit when the cut-off is 0.5. With an even higher cut-off 
level, of for instance 0.75, in four countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland and France) the trigger 
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would never be pulled during 2000–14 and in five other countries it would be pulled only once 
or twice. 
- A higher hand trigger. For this trigger, values above 2 should be excluded since they make the 
number of cases too small, such that countries from the north never benefit from the system. 
- When the cut-off value is set at 2.5, the trigger is activated only 25 times in the EU-27 between 
2000 and 2014. For cut-off values of 2.75 and 3, this number drops further to 21 times and 19 
times. Only a very small number of countries could benefit from the scheme in this case – when 
the cut-off value equals 2.75 or more, only Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Portugal qualify to benefit. Within the range of 1.75-2.25, the differences in terms 
of which countries could benefit and how many times the trigger is activated for each country 
are small (see Figure 9). The value of ‘2’ therefore seems a good candidate as a cut-off value for 
the reinsurance scenario.  
- A middling value. Here a value in between 0.5 and 1.75 should be selected. We prefer 1 because 
it is very close to the average standard deviation, which is equal to 0.94 on average in Europe 
during 2000–14.  
 
Figure 10. Number of times the trigger (based on short-term unemployment) is activated during 2000–
14 in the north, east and south (trigger based on percentage points) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) data. 
Figure 10 presents the number of times the trigger is pulled during the period 2000–14 for a range of 
cut-off values in three regions: the north (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), east (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) and south (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
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Ireland, Malta, Spain and Portugal). The three columns on the left of the figure present the benchmark, 
i.e. how many times the trigger would have been activated if no cut-off had been applied (a cut-off equal 
to zero). For the north and east country groups, in which there are 10 countries in each group, over the 
15-year period this would be 150 times. In the south, this number would be equal to 105 times. When 
a cut-off of 0.1 is used, the trigger is active 71 times in the north, 67 times in the east and 59 times in 
the south. In comparison with the benchmark, this corresponds to 47.3%, 44.7% and 56.2% of the cases 
respectively. When the cut-off is set at 0.25, these percentages decrease to 40.7%, 40% and 50.5%. For 
a cut-off at 0.5, the pattern begins to reverse: in this case the trigger is activated less in the north (28%) 
than in the east (30%). The countries in the east and south of Europe are still entitled to benefits at 
relatively high cut-off levels, whereas this does not apply to the north. 
5.1.4. Conclusions on the trigger 
For a trigger, we suggest using the short-term unemployment rate as an indicator and the 10-year 
moving average plus τ percentage points as a threshold. The trigger is pulled when the value of the 
indicator is higher than that of the threshold. The value of τ depends on the scenario: we suggest using 
0.1 for the rainy day scenario, 1 for the stormy day scenario and 2 for the reinsurance scenario. Based 
on the data shown in the previous pages, we draw the conclusions below. 
Choosing fixed percentages instead of standard deviations does not lead to substantially different 
results. The two series are highly correlated, independently for the three cut-off points chosen, as 
evidenced by Table 12 and Table 13. 
- The correlations between the trigger based on short-term unemployment using percentage 
points (standard deviation) and the trigger based on total unemployment using standard 
deviation (percentage points) for the same cut-off are also quite high (from 0.62 to 0.81).  
- The correlations between the series based on short-term and total unemployment are high for 
the same cut-off, when the trigger is based on percentage points as well as for triggers based 
on standard deviation (over 0.73 for percentage points and over 0.79 for standard deviation). 
We can firmly confirm our preference for a threshold based on fixed percentages.  
- We select three triggers: 0.1%, 1% and 2%.  
- A lower trigger entails that all countries benefit from the system. A higher trigger benefits the 
south and east of Europe more, where unemployment rates appear to be more prone to large 
shocks (see Figure 10). 
5.1.5. Payout disbursed when the trigger is pulled 
When the trigger is pulled for country i, the amount that should be transferred from the EUBS to this 
country remains to be decided. We define this amount on the basis of the same parameters as in the 
baseline option defined in the project ToR. In other words, for the quarter in which the trigger conditions 
are satisfied, country i will receive from the EUBS an amount equivalent to the disbursement that would 
be needed to finance a UBS covering unemployed citizens who worked at least 3 out of the last 12 
months, for a duration of 9 months, at a 50% replacement rate, with capping set at 150% of the median 
national wage. 
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5.2. Basic pay-in 
Another important feature of an EUBS is the financing of the scheme. To be able to pay out 
unemployment benefits, either indirectly through payments to the national governments or directly to 
the unemployed workers, the supranational fund has to acquire a sufficient amount of funding. This 
section therefore focuses on how the supranational fund would be financed. We consider who 
contributes to the supranational fund, how these contributions are calculated, how they could be 
collected and so on. The section also presents the pay-in formulas, which are adjusted in later sections 
to incorporate the experience rating and claw-back mechanisms. 
The contributions of the countries to the supranational fund are determined as outlined below.  
For the equivalent EUBS: Each country contributes x% of its GDP every quarter (multiplied by any national 
extra coefficients as detailed elsewhere in the analysis), until this cumulates to z% of EU GDP, at which 
point countries stop their contributions to the supranational fund. If the balance drops below z% of EU 
GDP, contributions restart (start-and-stop). In these equations, x is equal to 0.1% and z is equal to 0.5%. 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡   𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙 𝑧 % 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑈 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑; 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
For the genuine EUBS: Each worker and employer contributes a/2% of the gross salary every month (so 
that the total sum of the contribution is equal to a% of the gross salary) and multiplied by any national 
extra coefficients as detailed elsewhere in the analysis. The value of x is derived from the models and is 
set to be revenue-neutral. 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ; 𝑥 =
𝑎
2
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
The values of parameters x, z and a were validated by the simulations undertaken for the project. 
 
In their study, Beblavý and Maselli (2014) devote a lot of attention to the revenue side of an EUBS. A 
first issue that they explore is what type of taxation could be used to finance the supranational fund. 
The authors examine three mechanisms: a dedicated tax on consumption or labour, or a contribution 
from national governments that is not directly linked to a specific tax. For the genuine EUBS, they 
propose to use a payroll tax because this generates a clear link between the benefits and the 
contributions of the scheme. A disadvantage of this tax is that it potentially raises the tax wedge on 
labour costs, which is already high in many EU countries. Moreover, when the payroll tax is linear, it 
potentially undermines to some extent non-linear social-security contribution systems (e.g. in which low 
wages are subject to lower social contributions) that exist in some countries. In their simulations, 
Beblavý and Maselli (2014) set the pay-in to the harmonised EUBS equal to 0.5% of nominal 
compensation. This rate was selected because it roughly balances the system. For the reinsurance 
model, the authors suggest a funding mechanism that is based on a contribution by governments rather 
than a dedicated tax.  
A second issue that Beblavý and Maselli (2014) address is whether the supranational fund should be 
pay-as-you-go or funded. The pay-as-you-go system could result in surpluses and deficits, since the 
contributions are proportional to the average, long-term, expected annual expenditure. In this pay-as-
you-go system, surpluses are used to cover potential future deficits. The funded system, in contrast, is 
based on a yearly contribution to be paid until a predetermined amount of funds is gathered. In this 
case, the pay-in used in the simulations is equal to 0.1% of GDP, which has to be paid annually until 0.5% 
of EU GDP is collected. Pay-in is restarted if the supranational fund falls below the 0.5% cut-off. In 
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another recent paper, Beblavý et al. (2015a) use the same parameters to set up the pay-in and also 
propose to halt it when 0.5% of EU GDP is attained. In equivalent systems where the trigger is not too 
low, it would function as a start–stop system. 
In a series of related studies, Dullien (2007; 2012) develops a basic unemployment insurance scheme 
that is financed through a contribution from employees or employers (or both). In the basic case, his 
simulation results suggest that the average annual financing volume would reach €54 billion, which 
could be financed with a payroll tax of 1.75%. When extended benefits are possible, the size of the 
scheme would go up to €62 or 64 billion, which could be financed through a payroll tax of 2.02% and 
2.04% respectively (depending on whether extended benefits are triggered for individual countries or 
at the level of the EMU). Based on their simulations, Dolls et al. (2014) conclude that the average 
benefits granted during 2000–13 (about €49 billion annually) could be covered by a contribution rate of 
1.6% on employment income (a uniform rate across countries). In this scenario, Austria, Germany and 
the Netherlands would have paid the largest net contributions while Latvia and Spain would have 
received the largest net benefits.  
This leads us to the following proposal.16 
The financing of the equivalent EUBS studied in this research project works as follows: each country 
contributes x% of its GDP every quarter (multiplied by national extra coefficients as detailed elsewhere 
in the analysis), until this cumulates to z% of EU GDP, at which point countries stop their contributions 
to the supranational fund. If the balance drops below z% of EU GDP, contributions restart (start-and-
stop). The logic of holding the z% in reserve is to avoid or at least decrease large additional contributions 
by member states precisely during the period of economic malaise. The likelihood of the negative 
balance obviously decreases with higher x and higher z.  
In other studies, we have previously suggested that x = 0.1 and z = 0.5. The appropriateness of these 
coefficients was confirmed by the simulation exercises. 
The financing of genuine EUBS works in a similar, but not identical way: each worker and employer 
contributes a/2% of the gross salary every month (so that the total sum of the contribution is equal to 
a% of the gross salary) and multiplied by national extra coefficients as detailed elsewhere in the analysis.  
We propose that the parameter (a) is set to balance the fund on average. This implies that the fund 
would be in deficit in approximately half of the years in which it would operate and in surplus during the 
other half. If parameter (a) is set to a higher level, then – depending on the calibration – it would both 
create reserves and decrease the percentage of years in which the fund would run an annual deficit. 
Still, to prevent an infinite aggregation of reserves, there would need to be a start–stop mechanism 
similar to the one proposed above for the equivalent schemes, which would make it very complicated 
for the member states and individuals involved. Revenue-neutral contribution rates x are represented 
in Table 15 (derived from the results of Dolls and Lewney (2017)). They range from 0.35 for V8 to 1.36 
for V7 for the EA-19 case and from 0.36 for V8 to 1.34 in V7 for the EU-27 case. 
                                                          
16 One important note here, which also applies to the pay-out, is that we do not account for discounting. In the 
current circumstances, this seems to be a straightforward approach. One may argue, however, that in times of 
high inflation or high interest rates (or both), discounting is important. For more details on how this issue is tackled 
in the simulations, we refer to Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017). 
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Table 15. Revenue-neutral contribution rates x (as a % of employment income) 
Variant EA-19 EU-27 
V5 0.84 0.82 
V6 0.44 0.50 
V7 1.36 1.34 
V8 0.35 0.36 
V9 0.59 0.58 
V10 1.01 0.99 
V11 0.81 0.80 
V12 0.78 0.77 
V13 0.84 0.82 
V14 0.80 0.78 
V15 0.87 0.84 
V16 0.84 0.82 
V17 0.84 0.82 
V18 0.84 0.82 
Note: The revenue-neutral contribution rates are a percentage of employment income without experience rating or claw-back. 
They balance the supranational fund at the EA-19/EU-27 level over the period 1995–2013. 
Source: Dolls and Lewney (2017). 
 
5.3. Experience rating and claw-back  
Experience rating and claw-back are two mechanisms that link the EUBS pay-in to the use of the scheme. 
Their aim is to prevent long-term redistribution among countries. The bulk of the 18 EUBS variants that 
are being considered in this report come with experience rating and claw-back. The remaining schemes 
have either an experience rating mechanism or a claw-back. None of the 18 variants lacks both.  
Experience rating ties the pay-in to the supranational fund to the likelihood of using it, either by taking 
into account how often the fund is used (in the case of the equivalent EUBS variants) or by linking the 
pay-in to a country’s past unemployment record (in the case of the genuine EUBS variants). Claw-back 
has a similar purpose, but achieves it at a slower pace. Claw-back ensures that there are no long-term 
imbalances vis-à-vis the supranational fund by doubling the pay-in (in the case of equivalent schemes) 
or by raising a supplementary contribution of 0.2% of GDP annually (for genuine variants) from countries 
with a negative balance vis-à-vis the fund that exceeds 1% of GDP after three years. Claw-back remains 
active until the balance drops below the 1% of GDP cut-off. 
In the remainder of this section, we present an in-depth analysis of how experience rating and claw-
back can be designed and explain why we made certain design choices. To provide the reader with an 
idea of how experience rating and claw-back are modelled in this report, we provide a brief overview 
below. More technical details are covered in the subsequent sections. 
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 Experience rating Claw-back 
Equivalent 
system 
A single coefficient applies to all contributions (i.e. 
the pay-in) from a given country at a given time: 
Coefficient = 1+ 0.025*Fi,(t-40…t-1) 
Fi,t–40…t–1 is equal to the number of times that the 
system was activated for a given country during the 
last 40 quarters (t–40,…,t–1). The system is activated 
when the unemployment in a given quarter exceeds 
by 0.1%, 1% or 2%, in the rainy day, stormy day and 
reinsurance equivalent EUBS, respectively. 
The coefficient’s range is (1, 2). The maximum value 
2 applies when the system has been used in all 40 
previous quarters (or when claw-back is activated – 
see the next cell in the table). 
In the equivalent system, experience rating and 
claw-back are substitutes and the claw-back 
coefficient is essentially the maximum value that 
experience rating can take. 
It takes the form of a single coefficient applying to all 
contributions (i.e. the pay-in) from a given country 
at a given time:  
Coefficient = 2  
Claw-back applies after three years of more than 1% 
of GDP cumulative negative balance vis-à-vis the 
supranational fund until the balance declines below 
1% of GDP. 
Genuine 
system 
A single coefficient applies to all individual 
contributions (i.e. the pay-in) from a given country 
at a given time: 
Coefficient = 
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐸𝑈𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
 
The coefficient is the ratio of the 10-year national 
average of headline short-term unemployment over 
the 10-year average of headline short-term 
unemployment for the whole EU.  
The coefficient would be updated every three years.  
The coefficient’s range is (0,∞).  
A specific contribution by national governments is 
set as a % of GDP. 
Our suggestion for the contribution is = 0.2% GDP 
annually. 
It applies after three years of more than 1% of GDP 
cumulative negative balance vis-à-vis the 
supranational fund until the balance declines below 
1%.  
The proposal contains two alternatives: 
- an automatic imposition of the claw-back, and 
- the ability of the Council to suspend operation 
of the claw-back. 
 
5.3.1. Background analysis on experience rating and claw-back 
Experience rating 
Experience rating is one of the features that are present in the majority of the 18 potential EUBS 
examined in this section. The mechanism of experience rating ensures that the contributions of the 
payers into the supranational fund (i.e. the pay-in) are based on their past experience with 
unemployment. The idea behind this concept is to differentiate contributions to the supranational fund 
on the basis of the likelihood of recurring to it. By linking the pay-in to the supranational fund to the 
extent to which the fund is used, the scheme avoids permanent redistribution from countries with low 
unemployment to countries with high unemployment. 
In the EUBS literature, the term ‘experience rating’ often refers to countries, but it can also apply to 
employers, as is the case in the US system. In the US, contributions are collected among employers 
through a payroll tax, which is higher for companies that have laid off more workers in the past. In a 
similar way, countries where the short-term unemployment rate is higher or more volatile may be asked 
to pay a higher contribution, relative to their GDP, than other countries. Experience rating is therefore 
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the ex ante remedy against moral hazard and it is built in such a way as to increase the contribution to 
the supranational fund of those countries that are more likely to benefit from it.17 
Claw-back 
Claw-back aims to reduce potential, long-term negative (positive) net contributions by a member state 
by increasing (decreasing) that member state’s pay-in to the supranational fund. The idea of a claw-back 
mechanism was introduced in several early studies on unemployment insurance, such as that by Lin 
(1998). In these studies, however, the concept referred to the possibility for national governments to 
claim back transfers that have been mistakenly operated in favour of some recipients. In the more 
recent literature on EUBS, claw-back serves as a way to address the issue of non-neutral net 
contributions at the country level. In our proposal, the claw-back is activated after three years of more 
than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund and it remains active until 
this balance declines below the 1% level.  
Claw-back mechanisms have been thoroughly analysed in recent work by Beblavý and Maselli (2014), 
Dolls et al. (2014) and Dullien (2014). We will use their simulation results as a guideline for the design 
of the claw-back in our proposal. In his work, Dullien (2014) proposes a system by which country 
contribution rates are changed by 0.3% of GDP, upwards if their net contribution has been negative for 
two consecutive years or downwards if it has been greater than 1% of GDP for two consecutive years. 
The system is further characterised by a floor to the minimal contribution, which implies that a country’s 
contribution to the supranational fund can never be lower than 0.1% of GDP. Dullien’s (2014) simulation 
results indicate that a claw-back reduces the risk of non-neutral net contributions, although it limits the 
stabilisation capacity of the EUBS, at least in long-lasting recessions. Dolls et al. (2014) develop a 
mechanism by which the contribution of each country to the supranational fund is adjusted every three 
years. The new contribution is computed so that, if the country continues to receive the same amount 
of benefits as in the last triennium, the net balance will be reduced by 100% in the next three years (or 
by 50% in the alternative option that the authors explore). Quite surprisingly, the results of their 
                                                          
17 The concept of experience rating has been widely examined in the economic literature. Many of these studies 
deal with the US system of experience rating in which the employers’ tax rate depends on their layoff history. In 
the system, experience rating is introduced to counteract the fact that an unemployment benefit system lowers 
the costs of firing workers (Mongrain and Roberts, 2005). Theoretical work argues that experience rating is 
“perfect” when firms pay the full costs of their layoffs (Beblavý and Maselli, 2014). In this case, the introduction 
of unemployment insurance is not translated into higher levels of unemployment (Topel and Welch, 1980). The 
US system of experience rating is nevertheless incomplete (not perfect), since upper and lower bounds exist. As a 
result, firms with higher levels of employment volatility will be subsidised by firms with lower volatility levels (Wang 
and Williamson, 2002). This incompleteness may also have other implications. In an early theoretical study, 
Feldstein (1976) concluded that a large fraction of temporary layoffs can be attributed to imperfect experience 
rating. Later empirical work by Card and Levine (1994) confirms these results. These authors find a strong negative 
association between the rate of temporary layoff unemployment and the degree of experience rating. They 
estimate that “a move to complete experience-rating would reduce the temporary layoff unemployment rate by 
about 1.0 percentage point (or roughly 50 percent) in the trough of a recession, and by about the same amount 
in the lowest demand months of the year” (Card and Levine, 1994, p. 27). In a number of more recent studies, 
using a variety of different models, the conclusion (again) is that a higher experience rating leads to lower 
unemployment rates (see l’Haridon and Malherbet, 2009) or reduces the amplitude of recessions (Albertini, 2011). 
Finally, Ratner (2013) also reports a strong negative relation between experience rating and job flows: a 5% 
increase in the former is associated with a decrease of the latter by 1.4% on average and a drop of the 
unemployment rate of 0.21 percentage points on average. 
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simulation indicate that neither option is very effective in reducing the risk that some countries will be 
net payers or contributors in the medium term.  
Our proposal is most closely related to the paper by Beblavý and Maselli (2014), who compare two types 
of EUBS: harmonised European unemployment benefits (proposed by Dullien, 2007) and 
unemployment reinsurance (see Beblavý et al., 2015a). The first type consists of an insurance fund 
financed through payroll taxes and spent on unemployment benefits covering all eligible workers. The 
second type, which is based on a reinsurance fund, is only activated in the event of severe recessions. 
For each type, Beblavý and Maselli (2014) consider two options: no long-term country-level budget 
neutrality (option a) and long-term country-level budget neutrality (option b). The latter, option b, can 
be interpreted as a claw-back mechanism. This claw-back is set into motion when countries reach a 
cumulative deficit vis-à-vis the system of at least 1% of GDP and is stopped when the deficit falls below 
this cut-off. In the harmonised unemployment benefit system, a country’s contribution to the 
supranational fund is doubled from 0.5% to 1% of GDP until the cumulative deficit is lower than the 1% 
cut-off. In the reinsurance scenario, a country is subject to a supplementary contribution of 0.2% of GDP 
when the claw-back is activated.  
Beblavý and Maselli (2014) present simulation results for the revenues and expenditures of the 
schemes, as well as for the annual and cumulative balance of each country vis-à-vis the system. As the 
harmonised unemployment system with long-term budget neutrality (type 1, option b) best matches 
our proposal, we only discuss these simulation results here. During the period 1999–2012, the mean 
expenditure by country ranged from 0.11% of GDP (Luxembourg) to 0.71% of GDP (Spain). For nine 
countries, the maximum expenditure exceeded 0.5% of GDP (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Spain). In the same period, the mean revenues varied between 0.16% 
of GDP (Luxembourg) and 0.43% of GDP (Spain). The average contributions paid by countries into the 
system were the smallest in Hungary (0.24% of GDP) and Slovakia (0.23% of GDP), when Luxembourg is 
not considered. The lowest contributions were paid by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland (all at 0.23% of GDP) and Slovakia (0.22% of GDP), again excluding 
Luxembourg. By contrast, the highest contributions paid in any given year during 1999–2012 were found 
in Spain (0.62% of GDP), Latvia (0.49%), Lithuania (0.44%) and Poland (0.53%).  
These high contributions are a result of the annual and cumulative balances of these countries vis-à-vis 
the system. If there was no claw-back mechanism in the system, the average annual balance would be 
negative in 11 countries between 1999 and 2008, with Spain (-0.22% of GDP), Lithuania (-0.11%) and 
Poland (-0.23%) having the largest negative balances. In the years 2009–2012, this number would rise 
to 19 countries. In this case, large negative average annual balances are found in Estonia (-0.25% of 
GDP), Greece (-0.28%), Spain (-0.88%), Latvia (-0.36%) and Lithuania (-0.33%). Note that the average 
annual balances in the 28 countries thus generally appear to be quite small. The cumulative balance is 
negative and larger than 1% of GDP in Greece (-1.16% of 2012 GDP), Spain (-5.36%), Latvia (-1.70%), 
Lithuania (-1.57%) and Poland (-1.65%). As only 5 of the 28 countries reach a negative cumulative 
balance of over 1% of GDP during 1999–2012, this is a rather rare event, although one has to keep in 
mind that this period is relatively short.  
However, if the system does include a claw-back mechanism, the claw-back would be activated in the 
countries with a deficit of more than 1% of GDP. This is reflected in rising contributions, as is clear from 
the fact that the highest revenues are found in these countries. As a result, the average annual balances 
of the countries change: during the period 1999–2008 the balances would be at -0.16% of GDP in Spain, 
-0.10% in Latvia, -0.11% in Lithuania and -0.13% in Poland; between 2009 and 2012 the balances would 
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be -0.58% of GDP in Spain, -0.19% in Latvia, -0.22% in Lithuania and -0.11% in Poland. This results in a 
cumulative balance (expressed as a percentage of 2012 GDP) of -3.54% in Spain, -1.06% in Latvia, -1.14% 
in Lithuania and -1.06% in Poland. These cumulative balances are still above the 1% of GDP cut-off, but 
are much lower than when the system does not have a claw-back. For Spain the difference is between 
5.36% and 3.54% of GDP. 
Difference between experience rating and claw-back 
It is useful to look at the distinction between experience rating and claw-back. This distinction seems of 
a more practical than a conceptual nature, even to the point that in some papers it is difficult to 
understand precisely how the two mechanisms differ (e.g. Dolls et al., 2014).  
Both experience rating and claw-back aim at adjusting the contribution of a country (or payer) to the 
EUBS, so that the net contribution is closer to zero in the medium to long term than it would be without 
these features. The main difference between the concepts is that experience rating is, in principle, set 
up to make these adjustments ex ante, whereas claw-back adjusts the contributions ex post. Andor 
(2014, p. 188) puts it in the following way:  
Experience rating means that the contributor versus beneficiary profile of each member state 
in the scheme is monitored, and the contribution or drawdown parameters can be adjusted at 
the beginning of each period so as to bring the member state closer to a projected balance with 
the scheme over the medium term. Claw-back, on the other hand, neutralises net transfers ex-
post, meaning that member states are allowed to be net beneficiaries for several years, but 
then their contribution and/or drawdown rates are modified so as to compensate for the net 
transfers that had occurred.  
In our proposal, which is discussed in more detail below, the claw-back mechanism is activated after 
three years of being a net beneficiary.  
The time dimension, however, is not strong enough to mark such a distinction between the two 
correcting mechanisms. Moreover, it gave rise to confusing interpretations in the above-mentioned 
literature. Also in our case, in fact, even though experience rating operates ex ante (or rather de facto 
in real time), while claw-back operates ex post, both mechanisms have an ex post dimension to them in 
the sense that the adjustments of countries’ contributions to the supranational fund in both cases are 
based on historical data. The difference between experience rating and claw-back is, in essence, 
qualitative: i) the indicator that triggers the mechanism (unemployment outcomes in the case of 
experience rating and financial outcomes in the case of claw-back); and ii) claw-back is defined on the 
basis of a (financial) objective function, and is thus more ‘stringent’ in terms of the result it produces. 
As is clear from the definitions presented above, changes in the adjustments of the contributions would 
be more frequent in a system with experience rating than in a system with claw-back (one ‘period’ 
typically corresponds to one quarter when talking of a UBS). Another difference between experience 
rating and claw-back is that the former tends to be associated with the country’s historic records in 
terms of unemployment, and not necessarily that of net contributions. An experience rating mechanism 
can therefore be thought of as a mechanism according to which the net contribution of a country is 
updated frequently (every quarter) on the basis of the historical series of short-term unemployment 
within each country. Conversely, a claw-back mechanism is updated less frequently (for example, every 
three years or more) and is based on the historical records of the net contributions to the EUBS. 
In 14 of the options considered in this study, experience rating and claw-back are present at the same 
time (the exceptions are options V1, V4, V16 and V17). This results in an ‘overlap’ between options with 
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similar goals. In addition, including both features in an EUBS also means that the countries’ contributions 
will have to be computed according to a complex set of rules.  
So why is experience rating or claw-back (or both) needed? Assuming that exogenous risks are uniform 
across EU countries, any observed difference in the occurrence of unemployment risks is due to 
‘behaviour’. Eliminating moral hazard with adjustment mechanisms would eliminate the possibility for 
any country to be a net beneficiary of the scheme on average. For this reason, among the 18 options 
considered, there is not a single option with neither experience rating nor claw-back. V16 only has claw-
back and V17 only has experience rating, but all other variants are characterised by both mechanisms.  
The idea behind these correcting mechanisms is to minimise moral hazard and avoid the risk of a 
permanent transfer across countries. It is nonetheless important to note that in every form of 
unemployment insurance a certain degree of transfer exists: from workers with a lower risk of 
unemployment to low-skilled workers in less developed areas. The more one relies on experience rating 
in the genuine EUBS variants, the less ‘genuine’ these schemes become, from the point of view of the 
individual European citizen. The fact that none of the variants considers eliminating such adjustments 
constitutes a shortcoming because it implies that no ‘true’ insurance system will be modelled, in which 
the citizens will insure themselves at a European level without differences by nationality. Such a variant 
would also be useful to compare how experience rating and claw-back perform against the no-
correction variant.  
In addition, one could argue that the need for experience rating or claw-back is not self-evident. Even if 
redistribution is not taken into consideration, if the EUBS is designed with the purpose of protection 
against tail risk (i.e. very large unemployment shocks), then the risk of moral hazard is minimal, since no 
government would be likely to survive a sky-rocketing unemployment rate, independently from 
receiving European funds.  
Despite these considerations, the legal analyses performed as part of this project suggest that 
experience rating and claw-back are essential for the legal feasibility of a scheme. In fact, at the EU level, 
a legal base is found within the existing EU framework in Art. 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) for the equivalent EUBS and in a combination of Arts 175 and 352 TFEU for 
the genuine EUBS. In both cases, the legal base falls within the scope of Art. 125 TFEU, which is also 
known as the ‘no bail-out’ clause. Under this clause, the EU may grant financial assistance to member 
states on the condition that this encourages labour market reforms. Experience rating and claw-back 
are essential tools to ensure the latter. At the same time, this implies that any EUBS without experience 
rating and claw-back would violate the no bail-out clause (and call for a modification or removal of the 
clause in order to be implemented).  
Conclusions from the policy analysis 
There are five conclusions from the analysis. 
First of all, experience rating and claw-back need to be analytically examined together, but they need to 
serve separate functions in order to avoid duplication and fulfil multiple policy objectives. Experience 
rating is an ex ante instrument that should adjust the contribution rate of participants in a given country 
to the level of its utilisation of the system. Claw-back should be an ex post instrument that should 
guarantee that the long-term relationship of any given country with the system is not in (excessive) 
deficit.  
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Second, there is the need to distinguish and differentiate policy design between the equivalent and 
genuine systems. 
Genuine systems require ongoing contributions and pay-outs to individuals, so differences in the long-
term average of short-term unemployment rates between countries need to be included, as they result 
in a different net balance of countries with the system. In other words, if country x has a long-term 
average of short-term unemployment of 2.3% and country y has 5.3%, then the EUBS needs to be 
calibrated to take this into account and experience rating is the best instrument to do that.  
On the other hand, equivalent systems are only activated when a country is in trouble relative to its own 
past performance. Therefore, the issue of comparative difference in the long-term average of short-
term unemployment rates is not relevant there. 
This means that experience rating needs to be set up differently for the genuine and equivalent systems. 
This does not impinge on simplicity requirements, since in reality only one or the other would be 
adopted, so different approaches reflecting different natures of the underlying systems entail 
complexity for policy-makers and analysts in making decisions about which system to adopt, but not for 
users/institutions in implementation. 
Third, there is a need to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks in policy design while 
acknowledging that such a distinction is impossible to make ex ante.  
It is essentially unknowable at the time of the shocks to what extent the shock is temporary/permanent 
and what the policy reaction will be (which has a large influence on how the shock will feed into long-
term growth). Even such pure exogenous shocks as the oil shock of 1973 had very different long-term 
effects on developed economies depending on their policy reactions. Additionally, the employment 
effects even of identical shocks can differ among countries and even the straightforward linkage 
between, for example, the output gap and unemployment, is subject to change in individual countries 
over time and cycle. Therefore, making this distinction is better suited to claw-back as the ex post 
instrument. 
As part of that, the system should be designed to avoid the policy yo-yo that can arise for a country in 
severe and long-term difficulties if the EUBS first delivers substantial and sustained assistance, thus 
building up a high level of country deficit vis-à-vis the EUBS. In the medium term, this can lead to a rapid 
increase in the gross country contribution to the EUBS to ensure that not only is there no continuation 
of an annual deficit, but also to pay back the balance. Such a policy yo-yo can be limited by a combination 
of a gradual, but rapid rise in the experience rating and a gradual claw-back procedure with an option 
to suspend it or slow it down. For these reasons, the policy analysis is based on an experience rating 
that takes into account unemployment developments over the last 10 years and a claw-back procedure 
that starts after 3 years.  
Fourth, one should acknowledge that this policy design, where decision-making on key variables is 
centralised and homogenised as proposed in this document, limits the ability of individual member states 
to manage the expenditure on the EUBS. They would not be able to pay a less generous European benefit. 
However, they would be able to top it up. And, at the same time they would remain free to decide on the 
national benefits.  
Fifth, unlike the US system, our policy analysis does not contain experience rating at the firm level. In the 
US system, a firm’s contributions are dependent on its history – if its employees make more use of the 
system, contributions increase. It should be noted that such firm-level coefficients are not forbidden or 
excluded in the analysis, but they would be left to member states’ discretion. This is due to the tender 
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design. Additionally, given the varying nature of labour market regulation and industrial relations in the 
EU member states, it does not seem appropriate that there should be a uniform regulation on this 
aspect of the labour market regulation system. In only five EU countries – Croatia, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Lithuania and Poland – is the NUBS solely financed by employers’ contributions. In most countries, there 
is a mix of employer and employee financing and in a few cases (e.g. Denmark) the NUBS is only financed 
by workers.  
5.3.2. Experience rating – Proposal 
Experience rating reflects the fact that member states have different long-term averages of (short-term) 
unemployment rates as well as the fact that the way shocks feed through into short-term 
unemployment is also different. It needs to have the following characteristics: 
- simple and robust; 
- rapidly reacting, automatic and non-discretionary; 
- reflect differences between member states in both long-term and short-term trends; 
- lead in general to a balance of the member state contributions and pay-outs; and 
- counter-cyclical. 
Nevertheless, our proposals in this respect so far are based on two observations, which we believe to 
be valid even after our discussions with external experts and the European Commission: 
- the EUBS system needs to be, to the maximum extent possible, non-discretionary; and 
- the EUBS needs to work in real time and provide a rapid response to shocks. 
Therefore, the question is how to reconcile the feedback received in the past months with these 
observations. One part of the answer is better calibration of the experience rating, which should take 
into account the fact that countries have different long-run averages of short-term unemployment rates 
and that the long-run average can change within an individual country owing to various factors.  
Another part is to examine, historically, whether massive permanent shocks led to overshooting in terms 
of growth and whether there is an argument for smoothing changes towards the new growth path even 
if the shock is permanent. If that were the case, then the real issue would be whether to allow for 
‘writing off’ part of the EUBS claw-back if the shock proves to be permanent and GDP is lower for a 
significant period of time.  
As indicated above, one element to consider in the analysis of a potential EUBS is the nature of the 
shocks that hit the European economies. In this regard, a distinction can be made between temporary 
and permanent shocks. Temporary and permanent shocks potentially interact with the EUBS in different 
ways, which is also reflected in the relation between the shocks on the one hand and experience rating 
and the claw-back mechanism on the other.  
The distinction between temporary and permanent shocks and their impact on the economy can further 
be examined on the basis of the following theoretical scenarios. In a country hit by an adverse 
permanent shock, unemployment increases while GDP falls. The country’s economy, however, does not 
necessarily adjust towards a new equilibrium because the EUBS is based on unemployment rates in the 
last 40 quarters and the scheme’s transfers stimulate aggregate demand. To the extent that these 
transfers keep actual unemployment below the new NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment), gross nominal wages and prices will go up (i.e. the Phillips curve effect), which in turn 
raises the unemployment benefit level and induces additional transfers. Such price increases may 
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further result in a loss of competitiveness and higher unemployment. In this scenario, the country’s 
capacity to repay can be strongly affected; this is where the interplay between the shock and the 
experience rating and claw-back becomes relevant. If the country is allowed to pay reduced net 
contributions to account for the gravity of the shock (e.g. by reducing the experience rating coefficient 
or postponing the claw-back), other countries are in fact subsidising the delayed adjustment to this new 
equilibrium. Alternatively, when this is not allowed, the country’s capacity to repay could result in a 
further decrease of GDP and additional transfers from the supranational fund. The scenario of a 
temporary shock is very different from this one, in the sense that this type of shock is not expected to 
affect the country’s capacity to repay (in the long run, assuming no hysteresis effects). The transfers 
from the supranational fund to the country are more limited. Unemployment will likely remain above 
its long-term equilibrium, which lowers wages and stimulates labour demand. In this scenario, 
experience rating may suffice to keep the country’s net GDP balance within the bounds of 1% of GDP 
(claw-back is not activated), or both mechanisms may quickly bring the country back below this cut-off. 
Still, these theoretical scenarios do not necessarily correspond to reality. A first element that supports 
this point is that although the economy would adjust more quickly towards a new equilibrium in the 
absence of unemployment benefits (in the case of a permanent shock), there is a wide body of literature 
that points to downward rigidities in Europe.18 A recent example of this is the case of Spain, where 
wages even increased in 2009. Not having a UBS can thus make a recession harder than necessary.  
A second element to consider is that severe shocks often result in a free-fall: GDP plummets, much more 
than necessary (‘overshooting’). Such major economic downturns often are not anticipated, which 
impedes the assessment of their expected size, duration and transmission through the economy.  
Another important caveat to keep in mind is that at the time of the shock, it is essentially unknowable 
whether the shock is of a temporary or permanent nature. Indeed, shocks do not become permanent 
immediately. A further factor that comes into play in this discussion is what the policy reaction to the 
shock will be, which again is unknowable when the shock hits. As noted above, the policy response has 
a large influence on how the shock will feed into long-term growth. An example of this is the purely 
exogenous oil shock in 1973, which had very different long-term implications for the developed 
economies depending on their policy responses. Furthermore, the employment effects of identical 
shocks can differ among countries and the clear-cut linkage between, for example, unemployment and 
the output gap, is subject to change in individual countries over time and cycle. With these 
considerations in mind, we propose that the EUBS should work in real time, provide a rapid response to 
the shock and be non-discretionary, to the maximum extent possible.  
For equivalent systems, we propose that the experience rating is implemented as a single coefficient 
applying to all contributions from a given country at a given time. The value of the coefficient is 
determined as follows:  
1 + 0.025 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,(𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1) 
where Fi,t–40…t–1 is equal to the number of times that the system was activated for a given country 
during the last 40 quarters (t–40,…,t–1). The system is activated when unemployment in a given quarter 
exceeds by 0.1% (or 1% or 2%), in the rainy day, stormy day and reinsurance equivalent EUBS, 
respectively. The coefficient’s range is (1, 2). The maximum value 2 applies when the system has been 
                                                          
18 See Du Caju et al. (2015), Abbritti and Fahr (2013), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013), Behr and Potter (2010) and 
Babecky et al. (2010). 
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used in all 40 previous quarters (or when claw-back is activated). If we adjust the basic pay-in formula 
for equivalent schemes to take into account the experience rating, it would look as follows:  
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 + 0.025 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,(𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1)) 
The short-term unemployment rate is directly related to the economic cycle and to the expenditure of 
the EUBS. As the activation of the trigger is also determined by a country’s short-term unemployment 
rate, there is a clear link between the use of the supranational fund on the one hand and the 
contributions that a country has to pay on the other hand.  
One has to be aware, however, of the ‘inter-temporal inconsistency’ that experience rating incites: a 
country would see its pay-in increasing at the time when it experiences a recession, arguably needing 
more help. Such ‘inconsistency’ would decrease the usefulness of the scheme, since it would aggravate 
the budget pressure on a country experiencing a crisis. For this reason, we suggest using the long-term 
average of the short-term unemployment rate (i.e. based on the previous 40 quarters). In this way, the 
country’s pay-in would go up immediately, but slowly (by only a small amount), so that it remains a net 
beneficiary. Another potential solution to this problem is to make sure that the adjustment is lagged: 
the adjustment of the pay-in could, for example, be calculated on the basis of quarters t-40 to t-20. In 
this example, a country that receives benefits in 2015 would only see its pay-in to the supranational 
fund change in 2020. 
Note that the value of 0.025 in the equation represents the proportional increase of the country 
contribution due to experience rating. This value is obtained as follows: we first define a ceiling for the 
maximum contribution of a country relative to the base rate, as it seems inequitable to allow a 
difference among countries that is too large. We design the experience rating system in such a way that 
no country can be asked to pay more than twice as large a contribution rate than the base rate. This 
gives us a value equal to 1/40 = 0.025. Hence, the contribution of a country will experience an increase 
equal to 0.025 of the base rate for each quarter in which it received transfers from the supranational 
fund in the last 40 quarters. Similarly, it will experience an increase equal to 0.1 of the base rate for each 
year it received transfers if the system is calibrated on a yearly basis (1/10).  
For genuine systems, we propose that the experience rating is a single coefficient applying to all 
individual contributions from a given country at a given time. The coefficient would have this value: 
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐸𝑈𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
 
where the coefficient is the ratio of the 10-year national average of headline short-term unemployment 
over the 10-year average of headline short-term unemployment for the whole EU. It would be updated 
every 3 years and its range is (0,∞). In other words, if country x had a long-term average of 6% and the 
EU as a whole 4%, the coefficient would be 1.5. Determining the coefficient on the basis of the 10-year 
average of national and EU short-term unemployment would ensure delayed feed through from the 
unemployment rate to the experience rating to avoid pro-cyclicality of the EUBS. Importantly, we 
propose that in the genuine schemes, experience rating should be implemented from the start (i.e. from 
the first year in which the scheme is implemented). If we adjust the basic pay-in formula for genuine 
schemes to take into account the experience rating, it would look as follows:  
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ (
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
𝑈𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐸𝑈𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1
) 
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Through this approach, not only the countries’ past performance but also its performance relative to 
the other countries in Europe is taken into account. Notice that from the point of view of an insured 
European citizen, the introduction of country-level experience rating in a genuine system implies that a 
worker will pay a different price for his/her unemployment insurance than a citizen in another country, 
but he/she receives benefits that are defined in an identical way. 
We propose a fixed experience rating for a period of three years to provide stability to contributions 
paid by tens of millions of businesses and hundreds of millions of workers in the EU. Unlike the 
equivalent system, where only governments are involved and a frequent updating of the experience 
rating is administratively easy, employers and employees cannot reasonably be asked to change their 
contribution rates every quarter or even every year. Therefore, a three-year period appears to be a 
reasonable compromise between stability and an accurate reflection of different situations in member 
states. 
We propose that the financing of the system is equally divided between employers and employees for 
the sake of the simulations. This is the solution adopted by several countries, although given the 
heterogeneity of European models, different options do exist.  
The experience rating is symmetrical in the sense that contributions by member states can be both 
larger and smaller than the basic pay-in depending on their unemployment rates. The tender 
specification states (p. 6) that with experience rating, contributions “to the supranational scheme differ 
by Member State and are related to the past history of (short-term) unemployment of that Member 
State (with some rule for updating)”. This is consistent with a symmetrical approach, but it is also an 
option with which the expert team is most aligned. The symmetrical approach means that no member 
state should accumulate larger and larger positive imbalances vis-à-vis the EUBS fund and thus is an 
important instrument to reassure governments and the public that there will be no large-scale 
permanent transfers. If the symmetry were removed for experience rating, there would be a strong 
pressure to add it for claw-back as an alternative, which would be against the tender specification, but 
– more importantly – much more disruptive and discrete in operation. 
5.3.3. Claw-back – Proposal 
Claw-back is essentially a safety valve in the system that exists to provide a guarantee to member states 
that regardless of circumstances, member states’ contributions and pay-outs should roughly balance 
over the long run. Like the experience rating, claw-back should be simple, robust and counter-cyclical 
(or at least not pro-cyclical). Counter-cyclicality requires both a delayed and a gradual application of the 
claw-back. To ensure the counter-cyclicality, the analysis has proposed a period of three years before 
the claw-back is implemented. This delayed implementation is important to ensure inter-temporal 
consistency. This is a concern that has also been raised by some of the 28 experts consulted for the 
feasibility analyses at the member state level. If claw-back were activated sooner, it would imply a 
substantial burden on member states that are still in recession or in the early stages of recovery. This 
would also affect the credibility of the claw-back mechanism. 
One issue not considered before is whether claw-back should be automatic or discretionary. In other 
words, should claw-back mechanisms be initiated automatically if conditions are met or should they be 
dependent on a decision of an authority (probably a political authority)? Given the terms of reference, 
it should generally be automatic since the purpose of the claw-back is to ensure that no country is a 
major long-term net beneficiary of the mechanism, which the experience rating itself does not 
necessarily guarantee (or guarantees only over a very long-term period of 20–30 years). That being 
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stated, this analysis argues for a well-structured possibility of limitations to claw-back based on a 
discretionary decision by a political authority (e.g. the Council of Ministers).  
Such a possibility would allow a better ex post distinction of permanent and temporary shocks. As 
already argued, the difference is only clear ex post and the possibility of a claw-back reduction could 
mitigate situations in which a permanent shock leads to a combination of lower long-term output and 
high long-term spending on unemployment insurance. It could be tied to structural reforms (or their 
outcomes) and thus incentivise better performance following shocks – the opposite of moral hazard. It 
would not necessarily undermine the ‘no transfer’ guarantee of the claw-back, as the experience rating 
should (more gradually) lead to a similar outcome and the suspension of claw-back could be temporary. 
One caveat in the scenario in which a claw-back could be postponed or cancelled, however, is that this 
has implications for the legal feasibility of the scheme. This would violate the no bail-out clause in Art. 
125 TFEU. As can be read in Beblavý et al. (2017):  
Combining experience rating with claw-back mechanisms and minimum requirements with 
regard to activation policies leads to an overall system that sets enough incentives for national 
labour policies to reform their labour markets. If therefore an EUBS provides for experience 
rating, claw-back and minimum requirements with regard to activation policies, it can be 
considered as not violating Article 125(1) TFEU. It is also worth mentioning at this point that 
the EUBS should not include any kind of mechanism to ease these three elements in case of an 
economic crisis.  
The economic impact of excluding the claw-back becomes visible in the simulations for V17 (this appears 
to be one of the EUBS variants with the highest redistributive effects). The claw-back is asymmetric in 
this proposal in the sense that it is activated for countries that ‘owe’ funds to the EUBS, but not for those 
that have large positive balances. There are two reasons for this. First, the tender states (p. 6) that claw-
back is “an ex-post mechanism aimed at preventing excessively lasting transfers from the scheme 
towards particular Member States” – so that asymmetry was built into the work from the start. 
Additionally, it should be noted that since experience rating is symmetric, countries with a pattern of 
less use will pay less to the supranational fund; they will just not be entitled to receive additional funding 
back.  
For equivalent systems, experience rating and claw-back are substitutes and the claw-back coefficient is 
essentially the maximum value that experience rating can take. It takes the form of a single coefficient 
applying to all contributions by a given country at a given time where the coefficient = 2. It applies after 
three years of more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% of GDP.  
For clarity, we remind the reader that the ‘coefficient’ is depicted by 1 + 0.025 * Fi,t in the pay-in formula. 
Note that the value of this coefficient is equal to 2 when F is equal to 40 (implying that the scheme is 
used in all past 40 quarters). The pay-in formula would then look like this: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 2 
For genuine systems, we suggest that the claw-back is paid by member state governments (which then 
determine the financial source) rather than by employers and employees. Our suggestion is for an 
annual 0.2% GDP contribution that would start to be paid after three years of more than 1% of GDP 
cumulative negative balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund and would continue to be paid until the 
balance drops below 1% of GDP. The appropriateness of this value has been confirmed in the 
simulations performed as part of this project. 
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The reason for this proposal is that if a claw-back is activated, the country is likely to still be in a 
prolonged bout of unemployment or just recovering from it. Employers and employees from such a 
country would already be paying higher contributions after the three-yearly revision of the experience 
rating. An additional automatic and significant increase of labour taxation under such circumstances 
because of a temporary surge in unemployment benefits is not an advisable policy. It would also add to 
the technical complexity of the system for employers and employees. 
The figure 0.2% of GDP was chosen based on a combination of the following: 
- it is the penalty under the stability and growth pact for violation of preventive or corrective 
rules; and 
- given that the average annual size of the gross contributions/payments from the EUBS can be 
estimated in the range of 0.1 to 0.4% of GDP (depending on the version of the system), it should 
be sufficient in all but the most extreme circumstances to bring the imbalance below 1% of GDP 
within a few years. 
5.3.4. Stylised examples of the joint operation of experience rating and claw-back 
This section presents some stylised examples and shows how experience rating and claw-back would 
operate under such circumstances. The reason for doing that is to make it easier for the reader to 
imagine how the proposed system would operate in practice. These stylised examples are based on 
simple calculations and do not replace actual simulations that will be undertaken as a part of this project. 
We present four possible cases: 
- A temporary and short-lived shock that hits the economy. This shock increases the short-term 
unemployment rate and hence raises the country’s use of the EUBS. The experience rating is active; 
the claw-back mechanism is never activated. As the shock is of a temporary and short-lived nature, 
the experience rating suffices to keep the country within the bounds of a negative cumulative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund of 1% of GDP. This scenario therefore singles out what the 
impact of the experience rating could be. 
- A temporary but longer lasting shock. As the shock is longer lasting in this scenario, both the 
experience rating and the claw-back are active. Claw-back is activated after a period of three years 
of a negative cumulative balance exceeding 1% of GDP. When the claw-back is activated, the 
balance quickly falls to below the 1% level, after which claw-back is stopped. This scenario thus has 
the objective of showing how experience rating and claw-back could operate together. 
- A severe temporary or permanent shock. Given the severity and duration of the shock, in such a 
scenario both the experience rating and claw-back would become operational. However, in our 
proposal we mentioned that the claw-back mechanism could be suspended for some time, to avoid 
impeding the economic recovery of countries hit by such shocks (as stated above, suspension 
would be subject to the approval of the Council, in the case of the genuine EUBS). This scenario 
illustrates a case where experience rating is active from the start, but insufficient. Claw-back should 
therefore be activated after three years of a negative cumulative balance larger than 1% of GDP 
but is not because it is suspended for two years. After this period, claw-back becomes active and 
quickly lowers the cumulative balance. 
- A severe temporary or permanent shock. This scenario is similar to the previous one. The main 
difference is that we show that suspensions of the claw-back could also mean that in the end the 
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mechanism is never activated at all. This happens because the experience rating manages to reduce 
the negative cumulative balance to the 1% level after a sufficiently long period. In summary, in this 
scenario the experience rating is the sole mechanism that is operational. 
In each scenario, we start off with a shock that hits the economy in the first quarter of year zero. In each 
graph, we start from a situation in which the country already has a cumulative negative balance vis-à-
vis the supranational fund that takes a value of 0.5% to 0.6% of GDP. This number was chosen in a purely 
arbitrary way, solely for illustration purposes. Still, in the simulation exercises of Beblavý and Maselli 
(2014) (which cover genuine and reinsurance schemes), the negative cumulative balance of several 
countries does in fact reach the 0.5% of GDP level or even surpasses it (examples are Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). In the first scenario, we start from a shock that is small, temporary and 
short-lived. An example of such a shock could be the economic downturn in the US in 2001, which has 
been described as short and shallow (Kliesen, 2003). The downturn lasted for about eight months. Note 
that in the graphs presented below, we explore the potential impact of the shock of the cumulative 
balance of the country vis-à-vis the supranational fund through time; the length of the shock is not 
represented in the figures.19 In Figure 11, we show a potential scenario that may have resulted from a 
small, temporary and short-lived shock. In this scenario, the experience rating on its own is likely to 
suffice to keep the country within the bounds of 1% of GDP net balance, so the claw-back would not be 
activated. This outcome is desirable from the system’s point of view. In the graph, the country’s negative 
net balance increases from the first quarter of year zero until the second quarter of year four, after 
which the balance starts to go down. The country is going through an economic recovery phase.  
                                                          
19 Furthermore, one has to be aware that these graphs were created for the purpose of elucidating how the 
interaction between experience rating and claw-back could work, which means that the timeline presented is likely 
to be longer than it would be in reality. Yet this has allowed us to generate sufficiently large graphs that would 
illustrate our point. 
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Figure 11. Stylised example of a temporary and short-lived shock, in which the experience rating by 
itself is sufficient to keep the country within the bounds of 1% of GDP net balance 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
A second possibility is that the shock that hit the economy was small and temporary, but longer lasting. 
To clarify what ‘longer lasting’ could mean in this case, we draw on the literature. For the US, Labonte 
and Makinen (2002) find that the average length of a recession during the post-World War II period is 
equal to 11 months. Some examples for the US that meet this criterion are the recession of April 1960 
to February 1961 (10 months, with a GDP contraction of 1.6%) and the recession of December 1969 to 
November 1970 (11 months, with a GDP contraction of 0.6%) (Labonte and Makinen, 2002). In these 
cases, the downturn lasted longer than the average, but the impact on GDP could be described as 
relatively limited. We use this scenario as an example of what could happen if the shock were small, 
temporary and longer lasting, but causing the claw-back to become operational. If the shock were 
temporary, but longer lasting, the increasing experience rating might bring the net balance below 1% of 
GDP or it might be somewhat above the threshold after three years. In that case, claw-back would be 
activated and this, together with the experience rating, would be likely to reduce the country’s net 
balance below the 1% of GDP threshold in the following one to two years. This outcome is desirable 
from the system’s point of view. This scenario is depicted in Figure 12. The claw-back is activated after 
three years (in the first quarter of year five), which reduces the cumulative deficit to less than 1% of 
GDP in the last quarter of that year. 
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Figure 12. Stylised example of a temporary and short-lived shock, in which the experience rating by 
itself is insufficient and the claw-back is activated  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The final scenario that we explore is what would happen if the shock were permanent, or even 
temporary but very severe. In the first two scenarios, we also considered temporary shocks, but 
assumed that their impact on the real economy remained limited. One element that needs further 
clarification, therefore, is how we differentiate between non-severe (small/mild) and severe temporary 
shocks. In the case of a severe shock, we assume that although the shock is temporary, it does have a 
strong impact on GDP and unemployment. To shed more light on this issue, we again refer to the work 
of Labonte and Makinen (2002) on the US. According to Labonte and Makinen (2002), the most severe 
recession in their sample is the double-dip crisis of the early 1980s. Between January 1980 and July 
1980, GDP contracted 2.2% while the maximum unemployment rate was 7.8%. Shortly afterwards, 
between July 1981 and November 1982, GDP contracted 2.9% and the maximum unemployment rate 
reached 10.8%. Another severe recession was that between November 1973 and March 1975. Then, 
GDP contracted by 3% and the maximum unemployment rate was 9%. The depth or severity of a 
recession can thus be evaluated on the basis of its impact on GDP growth. For the US, for example, GDP 
fell by 27% during the Great Depression and unemployment peaked at 25%. In more recent recessions, 
the impact on GDP and unemployment has never reached these levels. In the Great Recession, for 
instance, the numbers are 4.3% and 10% for the US, respectively.  
One can imagine that in such a case, a country might find itself high above the cumulative balance of 
1% of GDP, the threshold for claw-back, while at the same time it would be under significant fiscal stress. 
Here a well-structured mechanism would be initiated for deciding whether all or part of the claw-back 
is suspended if needed. The decision would be political in the end, meaning that it would be taken by 
the Council, but it should be based on a proposal by the Commission and on the following estimates: 
- the severity and permanent nature of the shock, and  
- the reforms undertaken or committed by the country to counter the effect of the shock. 
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However, one has to be aware of the potential legal implications of such a suspension (see above). 
Suspension of the claw-back would not suspend the experience rating, so the country would likely 
continue being a net payer for some time to come. This is likely to bring member states frequently below 
the 1% of GDP threshold anyway.  
The final two stylised examples in Figure 13 and Figure 14 below present the case of a severe temporary 
or permanent shock. Some historical examples matching such shocks are the Great Depression of the 
1930s and the transition of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In both stylised examples, we consider what 
might happen if the claw-back mechanism does not become active after three years, as it would 
normally do, but is suspended instead. The scenario in Figure 13 presents a case in which the claw-back 
is activated after five years in the first quarter of year seven (it is suspended for two years), then quickly 
reduces the country’s cumulative net balance to 1% of GDP. The scenario in Figure 14 shows a case in 
which the claw-back initially is suspended for three years (which means that it would become active in 
the first quarter of year eight), but it is never activated as the experience rating suffices to bring the 
cumulative balance of the country back to the 1% of GDP threshold. We again emphasise that these 
figures are presented here to make it easier for the reader to understand how experience rating and 
claw-back could operate under different – hypothetical – circumstances. They are based on simple 
calculations and cannot be considered substitutes for the simulations undertaken by Dolls and Lewney 
(2017) and Jara et al. (2017). 
Figure 13. Stylised example of a severe temporary or a permanent shock, in which the experience rating 
by itself is insufficient, but the claw-back is not activated and remains suspended for two more years 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure 14. Stylised example of a severe temporary or a permanent shock, in which the experience rating 
by itself is insufficient, but claw-back is not activated and remains suspended for three more years  
 
Note: This example implies that the claw-back is never activated as the experience rating closes the gap in this period. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
5.4. Debt-issuing possibility 
In the case of debt-issuing, when the global balance of the EUBS becomes negative, the fund can bring it 
to 0 by borrowing on the market. 
If debt-issuing is not possible, then the resources needed to avoid a negative financial position of the EUBS 
will be contributed by the member states, in proportion to their GDP.  
The proposal is the same for both the equivalent and genuine schemes. 
There are three options for dealing with a potential annual imbalance in the EUBS as a whole: 
- issuing debt to cover the imbalance; 
- adjusting some of the variables of the scheme to achieve balance (the replacement rate, 
eligibility and so on); and 
- requiring some additional contributions by the member states to cover the shortfall (notice that 
in this case the member state may in turn need to borrow the resources to pay these 
contributions to the fund).  
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The authority to issue debt can be capped ex ante, which would be politically more acceptable, but 
would also necessitate provisions for dealing with imbalances exceeding the cap (reducing benefits or 
special contributions by member states). 
One issue that should influence the possibility and the extent of the debt-issuing is the type of shock 
one finds in the EU/euro area. If shocks are asymmetric, then the case for issuing debt is weaker due to 
the fact that at any point in time there will always be a group of countries that contributes and a group 
that borrows from the fund.  
According to Allard et al. (2013), a surprising number of asymmetric shocks have hit European countries 
since the establishment of the European Union. Moreover, common shocks are also likely, as the 2008–
09 crisis and its aftermath made very clear. Hence, while an EUBS without borrowing powers can be 
appealing given that it offers the possibility to insure countries against asymmetric shocks, additional 
benefits could be generated by a debt-issuing EUBS. 
Without debt, the system must be able to deal with the lack of backstopping through a combination of 
the remaining two options. Given the institutional complexity of the EU, the solution should be 
automatic and predetermined rather than left to discretion. It is likely that balancing the EUBS’ reserves 
by reducing the level or duration of individual entitlements during a crisis would lead to bad social 
outcomes, and that it would hit the economy in a moment of crisis. In light of these considerations, we 
suggest that in the cases where debt-issuing is not foreseen the solution comes from paying an 
additional contribution. 
For the equivalent EUBS, there are two options if the supranational fund balance goes below 0. If it is 
allowed to borrow, it borrows from the financial market; if not, it increases the contributions of the 
member states, proportional to their GDP to achieve an annual balance. In other words, member states 
would pay extra contributions as needed to keep the supranational fund afloat. 
For the genuine EUBS, there are three options if the supranational fund balance becomes negative. 
If it is allowed to borrow, it does so from the financial market. Debt-issuing is possible if the 
supranational fund can borrow money from the capital markets in order to cover short-term 
imbalances.  
If the supranational fund is not allowed to borrow, there are two options: 
- increasing individual contributions in all member states by a temporary coefficient; and  
- asking for a special contribution of the member states, proportional to their GDP, which the 
member states would be allowed to raise as they see fit. 
Since the fund’s depletion is likely only when a major symmetric shock hits and increasing individual 
contributions by a temporary coefficient is equivalent to an increase in labour taxes across all member 
states, this does not appear to be an optimal policy combination. Therefore, we propose that the 
funding mix for a special contribution would be determined by the member state governments.  
This option should also be used for any build-up of the fund reserves at its start.  
The technical aspects of both options (borrowing and special member state contributions) are expanded 
in more detail in Repasi (2017). The legal, political and technical challenges connected to implementing 
either option are likely to be substantial, but are not tied to policy analysis of the 18 EUBS options as 
such.  
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5.5. Basic EUBS 
According to the tender specifications, in a basic genuine EUBS, the supranational fund pays out the 
unemployment benefits according to the predefined replacement rate to the unemployed person for a 
predefined number of months. Each country is free to increase the paid amount or the duration at its own 
expense. 
 
Virtually every study on EUBS (with the exception of Delpla, 2012) has recommended this type of EUBS 
(see the next section). 
5.6. Top-up EUBS 
According to the tender specifications, in a top-up genuine scheme, every eligible unemployed person is 
guaranteed a given replacement rate and duration. If the national UBS is generous enough to cover these 
costs, then the supranational fund does not contribute to the unemployment benefit of the unemployed 
citizens. If, however, the national UBS does not meet the minimal duration and replacement rate 
requirements, then the supranational fund supplements the payments of the national fund by the 
necessary amount to meet these requirements. As such, this type of scheme might be better understood 
as filling the gap between the supranational and the national allowance rather than topping up. 
 
The two schemes are similar in one respect: both impose minimal standards for the requirements and 
generosity of unemployment benefits, and leave countries free to implement more generous systems 
at their own cost. One key difference concerns which countries receive money from the supranational 
fund: in the basic scheme, every country can be a beneficiary; in the top-up scheme, countries with a 
UBS more generous than the standard cannot be beneficiaries. Another important difference is in terms 
of the cost of the supranational scheme. The amount of contributions to finance the basic EUBS at the 
supranational level would be much higher than the contributions needed to finance just the top-up 
scheme, as the latter involves paying only for those countries with less generous UBS. 
Hence, in a top-up scheme, countries have an incentive to reduce the generosity of their UBS, as noticed 
by Delpla (2012). In game theory terms, we may say that the top-up scheme is not strategy-proof, in the 
sense that individual countries do not have an incentive to choose what they think is the optimal level 
of generosity for their UBS. Nevertheless, this problem may be mitigated if there is a claw-back or any 
other provision that brings the long-term financial position of countries close to neutrality. 
The majority of papers in the literature that discuss in some depth the functioning of the European 
insurance scheme suggests the basic option (Beblavý and Maselli, 2014; Dullien, 2012, 2013). The only 
paper suggesting something that can be considered a top-up scheme is Delpla (2012). However, the 
author’s proposal is somewhat more complex, as it is based on the idea that workers, when taking a job, 
may decide to sign a European labour contract instead of the national one. The European labour 
contract would be the same as the national one except for a few provisions, among which is a higher 
level of unemployment benefits (although the paper is not very clear in this respect). 
Please note that in the modelling exercise, V6 is the only one that can just be modelled in the forward-
looking analysis. The reason is that EUROMOD does not contain the historical policy rules of national 
unemployment benefit systems (spanning the period 1995–2013), which is why their simulation is not 
possible in the backward-looking analysis. 
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5.7. Cyclical variability 
The cyclical variability of an EUBS is the extent to which some of the parameters defining the EUBS (for 
example, the replacement rate or the duration) are a function of variables related to the economic cycle. 
In this research project, cyclical variability is defined as a dichotomous variable, such that it is only present 
in V15.  
We propose to define cyclical variability as an extension of the unemployment benefits for a maximum 
period of 6 months, in addition to the normal provision, as long as the short-term unemployment rate in 
the previous quarter is higher than the 10-year average, short-term unemployment rate plus 3%. These 
benefits would be financed from the general EU budget. 
 
It is argued in Beblavý et al. (2015a) that in the American system,  
one of the added values of the federal system lies in the possibility to extend benefits in 
exceptional cases of severe recessions in one or more states, i.e. when the stabilisation tool is 
most needed. This takes place via the extended and emergency benefits, with the former 
partially and the latter completely financed at the federal level.[20] Extended benefits are the 
geographically redistributive part of the system. (…) The possibility to top up national systems 
whenever there is no sign of recovery in the economy is certainly an interesting feature. Such 
decisions, however, can be taken in the United States relatively quickly. For additionality to be 
implemented in the EU, automated decision-making would be necessary given the intrinsic 
slow nature of decision-making at the European level.  
As explained in detail by Whittaker and Isaacs (2014), in the US the Extended and Emergency Benefits 
programme is “permanently authorized and applies only to certain states on the basis of state 
unemployment conditions”. The emergency benefits need to be explicitly authorised by Congress, 
which did so eight times in the past: in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002 and 2008 (ibid). The 
Department of Labor produces trigger notices indicating which states qualify for both the extended 
benefits and the emergency benefits, and it provides the beginning and ending dates of payable periods 
for each qualifying state (ibid). The total maximum number of weeks an unemployed worker is eligible 
for benefits is between 40 and 93 weeks – that is, between 10 and 23 months.  
In light of these considerations and taking into account the differences between the EU and the US, we 
propose that, in V15, cyclical variability is implemented in a non-discretionary manner as a part of ex 
ante defined conditions. For a non-discretionary decision, it is therefore necessary to define a triggering 
variable. For this, we propose the short-term unemployment rate, consistent with the selection of the 
trigger in the equivalent system (see section 5.3 for a discussion of why the short-term unemployment 
rate is superior to other indicators).  
One could imagine two forms of cyclical variability: longer benefits and higher benefits. We lean towards 
the former following the rationale of the US system, in which it is the lack of vacancies that makes it 
necessary to help the economy and the unemployed worker in the transition towards a better phase of 
the cycle, more than the generosity of the system. As a result of this discussion, we recommend that 
benefits are extended for a maximum period of 6 months, in addition to the normal provision as long as 
the short-term unemployment rate in the previous quarter is higher than the 10-year average, short-
                                                          
20 During the recent Great Recession, the US federal government paid 100% of the cost for Extended Benefits and 
the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008. 
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term unemployment rate plus 3%. These benefits would be financed from the general EU budget. Had 
cyclical variability been in place since 2000 in this form, it would have been activated 19 times in the EU, 
all of them after 2008. This is consistent with the idea of extending the benefits in case of major 
downturns.  
The additional proposal is to link cyclical variability also to European rather than national cycles and 
therefore to be activated in case of an EU-wide major downturn. We propose, as a definition of a deep 
shock, a recession (defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth) in half+1 of the member 
states simultaneously. Also in this case, unemployment benefits would be granted to the short-term 
unemployed workers for up to 6 additional months.  
With these considerations in mind, we reach the following proposal. At the policy level, we propose to 
have two forms of cyclical variability: one tied to the national level and one tied to the EU level. In both 
cases, cyclical variability is not automatic, and only occurs in exceptional situations. At the EU level, 
cyclical variability would have to be granted. At the national level, member states should have the option 
to ask for an extension of benefits if this were needed.  
We refrain from proposing an automatic, cyclical variability mechanism for a variety of reasons. First of 
all, the duration of the benefits is already relatively long, unlike in the US. Second, in instances where 
benefits were extended automatically, this would imply that countries would have to pay back more in 
the future (which is an additional burden). Moreover, the mechanism is likely to interfere with the 
labour market institutions of the member states and with the idea of a ‘non-transfer’ Union.  
Note that the EU-level cyclical variability will not be part of the modelling exercises, given that it should 
only be used in highly exceptional circumstances. National-level cyclical variability will be modelled, and 
in this case we assume that any country that would ‘qualify’ for an extension of unemployment benefits 
would indeed make use of it. 
5.8. Duration 
The duration is the number of months during which the unemployment benefit is paid out. Throughout 
the ToR, there seems to be the assumption that the replacement rate will not vary by month, although 
this is not necessarily the case in the NUBS. 
According to the tender specifications, the benefits are paid from the beginning of the fourth month after 
losing employment to the end of the twelfth month in the baseline EUBS, from the beginning of the first 
month to the end of the twelfth month in option V7, and from the beginning of the fourth month to the 
end of the sixth month in option V8.21 
 
Within the eurozone, in 2010, the duration was longest in Belgium (with no upper limit) and shortest in 
Malta and Slovakia (6 months). Meanwhile, in about half the countries the duration was between 8 and 
12 months (European Commission, 2013). It seems reasonable to expect that the EUBS maximum 
duration would be between 6 and 12 months. The latter maximum duration would imply that the 
duration of the unemployment benefits would have to be extended in almost half of the countries. In 
                                                          
21 The ToR does not specify if “month 3” means the point at which the third month after losing employment ends 
(and the fourth month begins – which is our interpretation) or the point at which the third month after losing 
employment begins. However, the inclusion of “month 0” in V1 makes this point clear, since the unemployment 
month cannot start before the beginning of the first month. 
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contrast, if the maximum duration were set at 6 months, then no country would need to extend the 
UBS duration. 
Most simulation studies set the maximum duration at 12 months (Dullien, 2007, 2012, 2013; Beblavý 
and Maselli, 2014; Dolls et al., 2014). The micro-simulation study by Jara and Sutherland (2014) 
proposes a slightly different scheme, in which benefits can be paid out until M12, but starting from M4, 
so that the duration is actually 9 months, but the payment is postponed compared with the UBS 
proposed in the rest of the literature and existing in every European country. This is in line with the way 
duration is specified in the tender (except in V7). According to Strauss et al. (2013), this excludes benefits 
for very short-term unemployment (such as unemployment while changing jobs) or for seasonal 
unemployment. This is an important point. A waiting period of 3 months at the beginning of 
unemployment means that many will first receive benefits from the national schemes, and then switch 
to the EUBS. In several countries, the national schemes will be restarted when the EUBS has stopped, 
or alternatively the social assistance system comes into play. This is operationally and administratively 
difficult and it is likely to be associated with considerable fluctuations in the benefit amounts. The 
feasibility analyses therefore suggest starting the EUBS in M0. At the same time, this has to be weighed 
against the fact that the EUBS is not necessarily intended to cover very short-term fluctuations and 
seasonal unemployment, which are not directly related to the functioning of the EMU. 
Economic literature has usually argued, on the basis of both theoretical models and of empirical results, 
that the longer the duration of benefits, the lower the incentives of the unemployed to look for jobs 
(see Card et al., 2007, for a review). This has usually been an argument in favour of shorter benefit 
durations. However, as the results by Card et al. (2007) indicate, the effect of benefits duration on job 
search may be much weaker than previously thought. 
5.9. Replacement rate  
The replacement rate is the proportion of the reference wage that will be paid out as an unemployment 
benefit, so that the unemployment benefit equals the reference wage times the replacement rate. 
The replacement rate is 50% (in the baseline variant), 35% (in V9) or 60% (in V10), and it is applied to the 
gross wage. In the next section, we suggest that national governments can convert the reference wage to 
the net wage by using an appropriate conversion ratio. 
 
A replacement rate can imply a very different benefit level, depending on whether the reference wage 
is gross or net. Given that most countries and simulation studies use the gross wage as the reference 
wage, it is convenient to refer to gross wages in this report as well. Across the EU, “gross replacement 
rates vary greatly between 80 per cent in Luxembourg and 13 per cent in the United Kingdom. Gross 
replacement rates are on average somewhat higher in eurozone countries, around 50 per cent, as 
compared to slightly below 40 per cent in countries outside the common currency” (Esser et al., 2013, 
p. 9). 
Micro-simulation studies on EUBS usually set the replacement rate at 50% (Jara and Sutherland, 2014; 
Dolls et al., 2014). Macro simulation studies cannot compute the benefit at the individual level through 
a replacement rate, but usually decide on a replacement rate and they translate this decision into 
assumptions on the UBS costs. Again, usually the choice falls on a replacement rate of about 50% 
(Dullien, 2007, 2012, 2013), although Beblavý and Maselli (2014) choose a slightly lower replacement 
rate (40%). 
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Replacement rates fixed at this level seem to be a reasonable compromise between the social demand 
for mechanisms that stabilise household income in difficult economic times, and the risk of distortionary 
incentives that over-generous unemployment benefits may have on the job search effort of the 
unemployed (Krueger and Mueller, 2010). Hence, we choose 50% of the gross wage as the replacement 
rate for our EUBS scheme. 
5.10.  Reference wage 
The reference wage is defined as the average wage in the last x months (where x may be equal to 1), 
either net or gross. 
The reference wage is the last gross monthly wage. 
 
However, we propose that national governments have the option to convert this to the net wage in 
such a way that the replacement rate for the net wage would be equivalent to a 50% replacement rate 
for the gross wage for the average worker. We also suggest that national governments in countries with 
flat-rate unemployment benefits could convert the benefit into a flat-rate benefit if the flat-rate benefit 
is equivalent to 50% of the gross average wage.  
In 2013, 11 out of 17 eurozone countries used the gross wage as the reference wage, and 3 used the 
net wage (Austria, Finland and Germany). For the other 3 countries (Ireland, Malta and Greece) the 
distinction was not relevant, because the benefits are flat-rate or structured in a way similar in some 
respects to a flat-rate scheme (Esser et al., 2013). Micro-simulation studies (Jara and Sutherland, 2013; 
Dolls et al., 2014) usually compute benefits using the gross wage as a reference. In macroeconomic 
simulation studies, it is usually not explicitly mentioned whether the EUBS would use gross or net wages 
as the reference wage. One exception is Beblavý and Maselli (2014), who use total compensation, 
meaning the gross wage plus employer social security contributions. These authors make the interesting 
case that the gross wage is not ideal for a supranational UBS, because it includes social contributions 
paid by the employee but not by the employer. Hence, the gross wage can be changed by national 
legislation by moving a part of the social contribution from the employer to the employee (or vice versa), 
while leaving both net wages and social contributions unchanged. This is not possible with nominal 
compensation, which includes social contributions paid by both the employee and the employer. As a 
result, the nominal compensation would seem more robust to strategic decisions of the governments 
aiming at maximising the revenues from the EUBS. Despite this argument, we choose the gross wage as 
the reference wage, following the majority of authors and countries. 
The second element that defines the reference wage is the period over which it is calculated. This can 
be very different across the EU, ranging from the Netherlands, where the reference wage is the last 
salary, to Lithuania, where the average wage over the last 3 years is used instead (Esser et al., 2013). 
Simulation studies often do not explicitly mention the salary period over which the reference wage is 
computed. Usually, the reference wage is equal to the most recent wage (e.g. Jara and Sutherland, 
2014), although in some cases it is equal to an average over more periods (12 months in the study by 
Dullien, 2007). 
In general, there are no compelling arguments for choosing a particular value for x (the number of 
months for which the reference wage is the average). If x is low, the reference wage will typically be 
higher, so the replacement rate will have to be lower to guarantee the same level of benefits compared 
with a scheme where x is higher. Furthermore, if x is low, there will be an advantage for those workers 
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who enjoyed large salary growth in the last months or years. As salary increases are higher among 
younger workers, this means that, from a generational point of view, a low value of x tends to advantage 
the younger generation. We choose x=1, following the choice of many studies and countries, and 
because of the improved intergenerational equity outcome. 
There are also no compelling arguments for choosing between the net or the gross wage. As the income 
tax system is progressive in most countries, using the net wage as the reference wage seems to be more 
progressive, as there are greater differences in gross rather than in net wages. Still, this depends on 
whether unemployment benefits are taxed or not. If they are taxed, then an element of progressivity is 
introduced even if the gross wage is used as a reference. Across Europe, there are countries that tax 
unemployment benefits and collect social contributions from them, countries that do not and countries 
that apply special forms of taxation (Esser et al., 2013). We choose the gross wage because it is 
consistent with the choice of most countries and papers in the literature. 
National conversion of the reference wage from gross to net 
Some countries use the net wage as the reference wage, meaning that the whole operational system 
(including data collection and processing) of their UBS works on the basis of net wages. We believe that 
it would be difficult for these countries to adjust to using gross wages as the reference. One solution to 
this problem could be that the national system defines a new replacement rate to be applied to the net 
wage. The new replacement rate could be chosen (in agreement between the European Commission 
and the member states) in such a way that the unemployment benefit received by the average worker 
remains the same as that using the EUBS replacement rate and the gross wage as the reference. This 
will not affect the simulations carried out in the context of our research project, because it is supposed 
to imply only minor variations in the level of the benefits received by individuals. 
5.11. Eligibility 
Eligibility rules determine which unemployed citizens qualify for unemployment benefits. They define 
some minimum requirements for EUBS coverage, which in turn affect the incentives in place for 
individuals and the stabilisation effect of the EUBS. We call this ‘narrow eligibility’, as it concerns the 
entitlement conditions for the unemployed to qualify for unemployment benefits, and it is therefore 
different from Venn (2012), who includes activation policies.  
According to the tender specifications, eligible workers will be those who became unemployed after 
working (not necessarily consecutively) as employees for 3 (full-time equivalent) months out of the last 12 
in the baseline specification, 3 months out of the last 6 in option V11, and 12 months out of the last 24 in 
option V12. 
 
Eligibility rules indirectly determine the coverage rate, defined by Esser et al. (2013) as the number of 
insured persons as a percentage of the labour force (hence a proxy for the proportion of unemployed 
individuals who qualify for benefits). The coverage rate is about 75% both in the eurozone and in the 
EU as a whole (Esser et al., 2013). At the same time, the rate can be very different from country to 
country, ranging from full coverage (95% or more) in Finland, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden, 
to less than 60% in Spain, Slovakia, Italy, Poland and Romania. This depends on which minimum 
conditions are set in place to be eligible for unemployment benefits. For example, Romania has a very 
low coverage rate because the self-employed are excluded from the UBS, and a large proportion of the 
Romanian workforce is self-employed. Hence, including having worked as an employee as a minimum 
condition for eligibility may reduce the potential of the EUBS to tackle economic shocks by excluding a 
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large proportion of workers from the insurance mechanism, as already noticed by Strauss et al. (2013). 
In other cases, such as Italy or Spain, a low coverage rate may partly be due to restrictive minimum 
conditions in terms of the number of months that the insured worker must have worked in the past 
months. In Italy and Spain this number is 12, as in option V12, which may be expected to produce a 
relatively low coverage rate as a result.  
The coverage rate of a potential EUBS is difficult to determine a priori, because it must be computed 
once the eligibility rules have been defined. Macro simulation studies of the EUBS circumvent this 
problem by defining a ‘pick-up rate’, i.e. by supposing that the eligibility rules will be such that the 
coverage rate will be equal to the pick-up rate that they use in the simulation. For example, Beblavý and 
Maselli (2014) assume a pick-up rate of 75%, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) assume that the pick-up rate will 
be the same under the EUBS as it is in the current NUBS, and Dullien models the pick-up rate as a 
function of short-term unemployment.  
One particularly important eligibility rule determines how many months the citizen must have worked 
in a specified period prior to becoming unemployed, in order to receive unemployment benefits. For 
example, at the moment of becoming unemployed, a citizen may be required to have worked at least 3 
out of the last 12 months to qualify for unemployment benefits (this is the baseline option specified in 
the tender). Hence, this eligibility rule is defined by an employment record needed to qualify (in terms 
of number of months – 3 in the previous example) and a reference period used to assess the 
employment record (12 in the previous example). The ratio between these two gives the implicit 
minimum share of months/time worked needed to qualify (25% in the previous example). In the 
literature reviewed in this section, the relevant variable for eligibility is always the proportion of months 
worked in a given reference period, and the additional requirement that these months have been 
worked consecutively (as is the case in the national legislation of some countries) is never mentioned. 
Therefore, when referring to the number of months worked during a reference period, we do not mean 
consecutive months. Finally, it is to be decided whether these months should be worked full-time or 
not. A number of countries rely on the full-time equivalent number of months (Strauss et al., 2013). We 
choose this indicator for the amount of time worked, because it does not exclude part-time employees 
a priori, but at the same time it excludes those workers who have worked for a relatively long period 
but only a very limited number of hours. 
Within Europe, there is considerable variation in this respect. The implicit minimum share ranges from 
14% (France) to 75% (Latvia), although this share is between 40 and 60% for almost half of the countries. 
The reference period ranges from 3 months (Slovakia) to 60 (Spain), with a large majority of countries 
somewhere in between 18 and 36 months. Also, in the existing literature there is variation with respect 
to the eligibility requirements for the EUBS. For example, Jara and Sutherland (2014) maintain the 
national, implicit minimum share unaltered for every country, whereas Dolls et al. (2014) require that 
the unemployed individual has not had any labour income in the last 12 months, hence setting the 
implicit minimum share very close to 0. 
A second important set of eligibility rules determine which categories of workers are covered. For 
example, these rules determine if self-employed or agricultural workers are eligible to receive the 
benefits. Micro-simulation studies of EUBS usually include the self-employed in the scheme (Jara and 
Sutherland, 2014; Dolls et al., 2014). Indeed, there is no theoretical argument for excluding self-
employed workers from the UBS, and Strauss et al. (2013) write that including the self-employed has 
the potential to increase the stabilisation effect of the EUBS. We would recommend including the self-
employed workers of all European countries in the EUBS, at least for the purposes of our simulation. 
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Yet, including the self-employed in the EUBS may be difficult for administrative reasons, as these 
workers are not necessarily in the main national unemployment schemes, and instead have access to 
different schemes. This would undermine the basic idea of an EUBS that is implemented at minimal cost 
by relying on the existing national administrative structures for collecting payments and operating 
transfers (an idea proposed by virtually all the literature on the topic; see e.g. Dullien 2007, 2012, 2013; 
Andor, 2014; Beblavý and Maselli, 2014; Vetter, 2014). The feasibility of including the self-employed in 
the EUBS should be assessed in light of political and administrative considerations. 
The question of eligibility is in reality more complicated than what has been suggested so far. For 
example, many countries define qualifying periods by reference to insurance or contribution payments, 
rather than employment. They also tend to specify certain periods that are assimilated into employment 
for this purpose, such as child-rearing. Furthermore, some member states exempt certain people from 
the qualifying period or allow the reference period to be extended in some cases. For the simplicity of 
the analysis, we define eligibility in such a way that these arrangements would not apply for establishing 
entitlement to the EUBS.  
5.12. Capping 
An unemployment benefit is capped if it cannot exceed a given proportion of the national average wage. 
For example, if the reference wage of an unemployed citizen is €3,000 and the replacement rate is 70%, 
then the expected unemployment benefit is €2,100. Alternatively, if the average national wage is €1,000 
and there is a capping at 150% of the average national wage, then that individual will receive €1,500. 
According to the tender specifications, capping is set at 150% of the average national gross wage in the 
baseline EUBS, at 100% in option V13, and at 50% in V14. 
 
Capping exists in a number of UBS, such as those of the US and Greece (Dullien, 2007). Dullien (2007) 
puts forward that, although the literature for the US suggests capping the unemployment benefits at 
two-thirds of the average national wage, in Europe it would be more appropriate to cap them at 50% of 
the national wage. The reason is that a European limit of two-thirds of the average national wage would 
mean that many European countries would have to increase the limit that they choose in their national 
legislation. Delpla (2012) suggests capping benefits at €2,000 euro-area wide (with the possibility of 
introducing lower caps for countries where wages are lower than the European average). This would be 
equal to around 100% or 75% of the average European wage, depending on whether the author referred 
to the net or gross wage. 
In terms of the efficacy of the stabilisation mechanism, it seems that per euro spent on the UBS, more 
consumption is generated if the cap is low, because the propensity to consume is higher when the 
income is low. For example, if households are cash-constrained and the cap is set at a very low level, 
say €500, then it is likely that almost every euro spent as a transfer to the household will be spent on 
consumption. From a social point of view, however, introducing a low cap may cause disappointment in 
those households that will see their lifestyle dramatically worsening as a consequence of 
unemployment. Also, if the cap is set very low, the financial flow towards the economy hit by a recession 
may be too low for stabilisation purposes. 
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6. Convergence, minimum requirements, accession criteria and opt-ins/opt-outs 
This section is dedicated to a number of questions that often arise when the idea of a European 
unemployment benefit scheme is discussed. All questions are related, at least to some extent, to the 
design of the scheme and are thus treated here. Some of these issues have also been considered in 
earlier research on an EUBS.  
6.1. EU vs EA?  
The first question is whether a common unemployment benefit scheme should be introduced for the 
EU-28 or only for the euro area. This question, in essence, is of a political nature. Within this project, we 
therefore do not recommend one option over the other but instead provide an overview of the 
arguments in favour or against each of them. We nonetheless make the case for compulsory 
participation, to avoid adverse selection. The key question therefore becomes this: For which group of 
countries should participation be compulsory, the EU or the EA? For the latter, would that imply that 
other EU member states could also join the scheme if they wanted to do so?  
In recent years, much attention has focused on the completion of the EMU. To establish this goal, many 
have called for a supranational automatic stabiliser for Europe. The 2015 Five Presidents’ Report is the 
latest high-level document in which the need for such a stabiliser is emphasised (Juncker et al., 2015). 
The lack of a fiscal capacity in the EMU has widely been recognised as an important threat to the 
sustainability of the system. This evidence seems to suggest that the case for a stabilisation tool is 
particularly strong for the euro area. A similar conclusion is attained on the basis of the Communication 
on the social pillar of the EMU, published on 8 March 2016 (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, 
the banking union also concerns eurozone countries, with the possibility for the remaining EMU 
countries to step in, in light of the fact that non-members of the euro area would also benefit from 
greater stabilisation in the event of an economic shock.  
While we have argued that participation in the EUBS should be compulsory, we do have to point out 
that the consequences of an approach based on voluntariness are not studied in this project. Such an 
approach, in which countries would be free to decide whether to participate in an EUBS, would bring 
specific issues and problems with it (also in relation to the idea of accession criteria, as indicated below). 
Yet during our consultations with experts and networks carried out as part of the project, the question 
of ‘opt-outs’ was raised on several occasions. We therefore present a brief assessment of the 
implications of an opt-out (at the start of the EUBS or when it is already in place) here.  
In principle, there are two opt-out modalities, which could even be combined: 
- involuntary, or 
- voluntary. 
Involuntary opt-out at the start of the EUBS functions in the same way as accession criteria (on which 
more details are provided in the next section). Accession criteria may provide member states that do 
not want to join the EUBS an easy way out: depending on the criteria, they can indefinitely postpone 
their participation by not complying with the criteria (i.e. no explicit opt-out is needed). Involuntary opt-
out during the EUBS functioning comes down to a temporary or permanent suspension of membership 
in the scheme. Since the EUBS is a fiscal instrument, there is no insuperable technical obstacle to 
temporary suspension. From a broader political and economic perspective, there could be two possible 
arguments for temporary suspension: 
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- if the member state very seriously breached its duties under the relevant legislation (e.g. not 
transferring resources, not providing data, etc.); or 
- if the member state’s economic situation were such that its continuing participation could 
threaten the viability of the entire EUBS. 
In both cases, there are alternative remedies – the use of courts or fines in the former, backstopping 
the scheme in the latter. In the latter case, the potential negative political and economic fallout would 
be that the rest of the Union cut off a member state precisely when it is in a situation whereby it is most 
fragile and vulnerable, which could also undermine the stabilisation that the EUBS could bring for severe 
economic disruptions. Voluntary opt-out either at the start or during the functioning of the EUBS would 
bring problems of adverse selection. At the same time, this might make the EUBS more politically 
palatable for countries that would otherwise not agree to participate and potentially block the whole 
undertaking. The possibility of not entering the mechanism but irreversibility once a member state does 
enter therefore has some merits, primarily of a political nature. Opt-out during the course of the 
scheme, in contrast, does not appear to have any such merits and would give rise to severe 
complications in terms of payment of the balance (either negative or positive) and create conditions for 
a variety of highly strategic approaches by member states. 
From the legal point of view, a European unemployment benefit scheme could be implemented either 
within or outside of the current EU legal framework. In case of the former, one has to be aware that in 
principle an EU legal act binds all 28 member states, except for explicit opt-outs in such a legal act. In 
case of the latter, the scheme could be adopted under the rules of enhanced cooperation. Then, the 
EUBS must be compulsory for at least 9 member states and it cannot undermine the internal market or 
economic, social and territorial cohesion.  
6.2. Accession criteria 
Closely related to the previous topic is the issue of accession criteria. It can be read in the Five 
Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015) that the creation of a risk-sharing facility comes only after a 
certain degree of economic convergence: “Such a step should be the culmination of a process that 
requires, as a pre-condition, a significant degree of economic convergence, financial integration and 
further coordination and pooling of decision-making on national budgets, with commensurate 
strengthening of democratic accountability. This is important to avoid moral hazard and ensure joint 
fiscal discipline.” 
Labour markets and welfare systems are highly heterogeneous in Europe and deliver very different 
results in terms of efficiency and equity. There is no doubt that further convergence in both economic 
reality and policy-making would make the functioning of the EUBS (or related mechanisms) easier and 
more politically palatable. A further convergence of policies would most probably have some impact on 
the capacity of national economies to absorb shocks and the size and pattern of net transfers, thus 
reducing the risk of moral hazard.  
Nevertheless, the desirability of convergence should not be confused with the desirability of establishing 
some sort of Maastricht-type of criteria that countries would have to fulfil in order to enter the system. 
Such criteria are neither necessary nor desirable for several reasons. First, the EUBS would be designed 
to avoid permanent net transfers between countries. The existence of correction mechanisms like the 
experience rating and claw-back would be such that countries that use the system more would also 
contribute more to it. In a similar manner, smokers pay a higher premium for their life insurance. The 
experience rating and claw-back are found to be effective – there is no country that is a permanent net 
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beneficiary or contributor across all 18 variants. This means that the insurance works, despite the cross-
country differences, and it does not need convergence criteria. Second, this argument is further 
reinforced by the analysis of the normality of shocks, which shows that unemployment shocks generally 
are normally distributed in Europe. The third argument against convergence criteria is related to the 
political economy of the system. Adverse selection issues would require that the EUBS is compulsory 
for all member states (as also indicated above). Creating convergence criteria could give reluctant 
member states the possibility of delaying indefinitely their participation without an explicit opt-out. 
6.3. Convergence and minimum requirements 
6.3.1. Convergence 
We briefly introduced the subject of convergence in the previous paragraph but, given its importance 
in the current policy debate, we go more in-depth here. Besides stabilisation, a common unemployment 
benefit scheme may contribute to convergence. More specifically, an EUBS may spark an enhancement 
of national unemployment insurance schemes. It could, even without formal obligations, encourage 
member states to align their national systems with the European system to ensure smooth transitions 
between the schemes. The European system generally would be more comprehensive than what is 
currently guaranteed in the member states. For example, the eligibility conditions in the baseline EUBS 
would be easier to meet than those in 26 of the national systems (Figure 15). The EUBS would cover a 
larger portion of unemployed workers, compared with the national schemes.  
Figure 15. Number of countries where eligibility conditions would be more, less or equally stringent in 
the EUBS (in comparison with the NUBS) 
 
 
By the time the EUBS expires, after nine months in the baseline scenario, unemployed workers would 
again be in the hands of the national unemployment benefit system. This transition would typically be 
accompanied by a jump that, depending on the country, would be large or small, and nearly always 
entail workers being entitled to lower benefits (if not zero). In many countries, unemployed workers 
would fall back on social assistance instead (or first on unemployment insurance and later on social 
assistance). This jump would be an undesirable outcome, from the economic as well as from the 
administrative point of view.  
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While the EU cannot force countries to adjust their systems, one can easily imagine that the creation of 
an EUBS would trigger a convergence of national schemes towards the European scheme, to facilitate 
transitions between the safety net of the European scheme and their own.  
Another way to achieve convergence would be to impose minimum requirements. European minimum 
requirements on the quality of unemployment benefits and the quality of activation of the national 
insurance schemes could be introduced. Such minimum requirements would serve twin goals: 
improving national schemes’ stabilisation capacity and mitigating institutional moral hazard. More 
details on this are presented in the next section. 
6.3.2. Minimum requirements for national schemes 
This section introduces the idea of minimum requirements in the analysis of the 18 potential EUBS. As 
stated in the project ToR, both the equivalent and genuine EUBS could be linked to some minimum 
requirement(s) for NUBS and activation policies. Such minimum requirements could, for example, be 
related to the eligibility conditions of the scheme – which shape the quality of unemployment benefits 
(e.g. linked to contributory conditions or vesting period, and covering part-time employment and self-
employed individuals). A careful analysis of minimum requirements in the context of the EUBS can 
therefore be a valuable exercise.  
In this respect, these are the two most important questions: What is the rationale behind the creation 
of minimum standards? What aspects of the labour market policy should they concern? The rationale 
for the creation of standards is based on one main argument – the need to ensure that every national 
system reaches a minimum stabilisation capacity. This implies that minimum requirements are applied 
to features of the EUBS, such as eligibility and generosity. Yet, for technical as well as political reasons, 
the EUBS is likely to be accompanied by a substantial decentralisation of eligibility conditions to member 
states (this also becomes clear in the legal and operational analyses conducted for the project). These 
two necessities clash with each other.  
As far as the stabilisation capacity is concerned, we show in Table 1622 that national systems present 
extremely different features, expressed in terms of gross replacement rates, coverage ratios and 
duration of the benefits. As becomes clear in the modelling exercises for this project, EUBS coverage 
ratios are generally higher than those of the national schemes.23 There are several factors that may 
contribute to this result. Examples are stringent requirements on work history, the exclusion of part-
time workers whose number of hours of work are below a certain threshold or strict eligibility tests 
related to the nature of unemployment.  
                                                          
22 Given that the input data for this exercise are largely covered in other parts of the project, we refer to Coucheir 
et al. (2017). However, this report contains a brief comment on minimal requirements for national schemes that 
is important in terms of simulations performed by Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017). 
23 Our initial concern about the coverage of the 18 EUBS, especially in the case of the genuine schemes, was 
refuted by the results of Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017). Initially, we argued that the EUBS could 
be ineffective when its coverage is low, e.g. when only 40% of the short-term unemployed are actually entitled to 
benefits. A low level of coverage could stem from several factors, such as non-coverage of the self-employed. To 
prevent the EUBS from only having limited coverage, and subsequently a limited stabilisation capacity, we 
proposed that at least 75% of the short-term unemployed should be covered in each country (and that countries 
had to ensure this number was reached – if consistent undershooting occurred, member states would have to 
adjust eligibility conditions). Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017) suggest that this target can easily be 
reached in the different member states. We therefore no longer propose the 75% rule. 
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Table 16. Comparison of proposed EUBS with actual, national unemployment insurance systems, as of 2010 
 
Gross 
replacement rate* 
Nominal compensation 
replacement rate** 
Coverage  
(% of labour force) 
Duration  
(in weeks) 
Austria 0.40 0.32 0.68 30 
Belgium 0.50 0.37 0.66 indefinite 
Bulgaria 0.60 0.52 0.66 40 
Cyprus 0.63 0.55 0.79 26 
Czech Republic 0.56 0.43 0.91 26 
Denmark 0.52 0.47 0.72 105 
Estonia 0.50 0.37 0.74 50 
Finland 0.54 0.44 1.00 100 
France 0.57 0.42 0.61 104 
Germany 0.42 0.34 0.67 50 
Greece 0.58 0.45 1.00 50 
Hungary 0.34 0.27 0.87 40 
Ireland 0.47 0.44 1.00 50 
Italy 0.50 0.37 0.53 34 
Latvia 0.55 0.46 0.75 40 
Lithuania 0.34 0.26 0.67 21 
Luxembourg 0.83 0.71 0.95 50 
Malta 0.20 0.18 0.88 26 
Netherlands 0.75 0.59 0.83 44 
Poland 0.24 0.20 0.54 26 
Portugal 0.65 0.50 0.76 78 
Romania 0.27 0.22 0.43 26 
Slovakia 0.46 0.35 0.57 26 
Slovenia 0.70 0.60 0.80 26 
Spain 0.63 0.49 0.58 102 
Sweden 0.57 0.43 0.96 62 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.11 0.86 26 
* The gross replacement rate is a ratio with a denominator of gross wages (Source: SPIN). 
** This rate is converted into ratio with the total compensation as the denominator (Source: AMECO). 
Sources: European Commission and SPIN database. 
The minimum requirements may concern not only the quality of unemployment benefits, as already 
discussed, but also the quality of activation. Those relevant to the latter are crucial to prevent moral 
hazard. The analysis of the experience of countries with multi-tiered unemployment insurance schemes 
prepared by Vandenbroucke and Luigjes (2017) highlights that such minimum requirements play a 
major role. Many countries have stringent activation policies, which are motivated by a concern for 
individual and institutional moral hazard (or from a broader perspective, embody the quality of social 
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rights). In a multi-tiered unemployment system, a higher level of government may set standards or 
minimum requirements as these are labelled in Vandenbroucke and Luigjes (2017) for the lower level 
of government (when activation is their responsibility). As explained by Vandenbroucke and Luigjes 
(2017), “minimum requirements can be the result of specific inter-institutional agreements (as in 
Belgium, with regard to activation), or of a consensus established among the lower level governments 
(as in the Swiss case, with the non-binding guidelines issued by the inter-cantonal cooperation 
conference)”. Even though Vandenbroucke and Luigjes (2017) suggest that minimum requirements for 
activation play a major role in many countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium and Denmark), the level of detail 
and the strictness of the requirements or standards differs on a case-by-case basis. The introduction of 
an EUBS, genuine or equivalent, should be accompanied by a better coordination of activation policies 
across countries.  
To introduce minimum requirements, however, a strong political consensus would be required. As 
indicated above, these issues could be avoided by allowing for opt-outs, but this would undermine the 
stabilisation capacity of the scheme. Another point relates to the legal and operational dimensions and 
the degree to which member states are free to design their own schemes (stabilisation vs subsidiarity). 
These issues are also discussed elsewhere in this report. A final point is that strong minimum 
requirements would go a long way towards strengthening the stabilisation capacity of national schemes, 
which currently are very different and weak. On the other hand, minimum requirements are politically 
and economically unrealistic without a backstop and an external funding source. Still, and especially 
when needed the most, national governments may have the incentive to scale down their national 
schemes in order to save funds. 
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7. Summarising the results of the project into 18 fiches 
In this section, we reflect on the 18 policy options for an EUBS that are at the heart of our study. While 
exploring the potential design of an EUBS has been one of the tasks to be carried out in our project on 
the “Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, other tasks have 
focused on putting these 18 potential schemes to the test. The work of Coucheir et al. (2017) and Repasi 
(2017), for example, explores the legal and operational options and constraints that each of the 18 EUBS 
variants would face, while Dolls and Lewney (2017) and Jara et al. (2017) analyse their economic value 
added. In this section of the report, we combine the insights gained from these authors and their work 
with our work on the design of the schemes into a set of fiches – one for each variant. 
Each summary fiche shows the features of the variant examined and briefly outlines its economic and its 
legal and operational impacts. A fiche is composed of an easy-to-handle table, which in turn comprises 
four sub-sections. All fiches are based on a common template, which makes it easy to compare different 
variants. In the remainder of this section, we first discuss the template of the fiches in more detail. Then, 
the 18 fiches are displayed.  
More details on the 18 summary fiches 
As indicated above, the main goal of the summary fiches is to provide a clear and concise overview of 
the key features for each of the variants, the results of the economic assessment and those of the legal 
and operational assessment. A summary fiche (i.e. the overview table) is therefore structured into four 
sub-tables, each one dedicated to a single topic:  
- The first sub-table is labelled ‘general remarks’. This sub-table lists the main strengths and 
weaknesses of the variant.  
- The second sub-table is titled ‘features’. This sub-table summarises the main features the 
variant comprises. The features that are discussed include the type of scheme, the trigger, basic 
or top-up, the duration, the replacement rate, eligibility, capping, cyclical variability, experience 
rating, claw-back, debt-issuing possibility, and the reference wage applied in the scheme. 
- The third sub-table is labelled ‘economic impact’. This sub-table presents the results of the 
micro-economic and macroeconomic simulations, discusses the value added of the variant and 
addresses the risk of moral hazard. For the micro-economic simulations, the fiche includes a 
discussion of distributional issues. For the macroeconomic simulations, the variant’s 
macroeconomic stabilisation as a percentage of GDP and net transfers are considered. The 
value added of the scheme is analysed in terms of its impact on labour mobility, on structural 
reforms and on the confidence of markets and economic agents in the economic future of the 
EMU.  
- The fourth sub-table is called ‘legal and operational impacts’. This sub-table consists of two main 
parts. In the first part, the variant’s compatibility with the national laws and practices of the 
member states is evaluated. This part covers the legal side, the operational side, the role of the 
social partners, the ease and speed of implementation, and potential interactions with other 
branches of social policy. The second part deals with the compatibility of the variant with the 
EU legal framework. This part deals with the legal and operational aspects.  
In the second sub-table, three columns are shown. The first column describes the feature of interest 
(e.g. replacement rate). The second column comprises a summary or overview of this feature. More 
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specifically, this column indicates how the feature has been set up or designed (e.g. the replacement 
rate is set at 50% of the last gross wage). The third column contains the main results or a country analysis 
(e.g. a replacement rate of 50% is low compared with the current rate in country x but high in 
comparison with the current rate in country y). In the case of the equivalent schemes, for example, the 
third column would present how many times the trigger would be pulled and in which countries it would 
be activated most, least or not at all. 
The final two sub-tables of the fiche also show these three columns, in addition to a fourth column that 
holds a colour code (red, yellow or green). The idea behind this colour code is to visualise the 
information provided in the first three columns in a clear and intuitive way. This allows the reader to 
quickly gain more insight into the economic and the legal and operational impacts of the variant 
considered. In the fourth column, green implies that the impact is positive (e.g. the variant has a large 
stabilisation capacity) or that potential negative effects are mitigated (e.g. only a limited risk of moral 
hazard), while red reflects the opposite situation (e.g. a small stabilisation capacity or a large risk of 
moral hazard). Yellow represents cases that fall between these extremes, for instance those that are 
potentially problematic for some countries (e.g. a sufficient stabilisation capacity in the most advanced 
economies but not in the east).  
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Fiche V1 – Equivalent EUBS variant, stormy day scenario 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme performs very well in stabilisation terms (especially post-recession); the trigger 
strikes a balance between an EUBS that works continuously and one that only functions in 
severe crises; there is a high level of redistribution; there are few legal or operational barriers; 
it is easy and fast to implement 
Main weaknesses It would breach Art. 125(1) TFEU; there is no experience rating, so claw-back becomes more 
relevant and there are fewer tools to mitigate moral hazard 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Equivalent – 
Trigger The trigger is activated when the short-term 
unemployment rate exceeds its moving 
average of the last 40 quarters plus 1 
percentage point 
The trigger is activated 80 times during 
2000–14, in all years and in 22 countries; it is 
never activated for BE, DE, FR, AT or FI; IE, 
EL, ES, CY, PL, PT and SI benefit 5 times or 
more 
Basic or top-up N/A N/A 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to 
the end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem to 
offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a lot 
depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, MT, 
SK and the UK are generally less generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with rates 
in most countries (only DK, LU, NL and SE 
have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent than 
NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% 
of the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the majority 
of countries (exceptions are AT, ES, LT and 
PL) 
Experience rating No Violates the no bail-out clause, but the 
redistributive impact is more visible 
Claw-back Yes; the pay-in is doubled after 3 years of more 
than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance 
vis-à-vis the supranational fund until the 
balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; activated in FI (2000, 2001), 
LT (2013) and Pl (2005–07); the pay-in is 
equal to 0.2% of GDP in these years 
(backward-looking); forward-looking: claw-
back is activated in countries directly hit by 
macroeconomic shocks, when the shock is 
asymmetric (as in scenarios C and D); claw-
back is activated the most in the case of a 
symmetric shock of a prolonged duration 
(scenario B) 
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Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly wage 
(AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit (IE, MT 
and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 50% of 
the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Backward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are 
0%-1% of GDP in the EA-19 
Forward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions are generally 
positive under different 
hypothetical shocks (0.5% 
to 1% of GDP) except in a 
prolonged symmetric 
shock (scenario B), -1.2% 
of GDP in the EA-19 
Backward-looking forward: 10 EA-19 member 
states are net contributors and 9 EA-19 
member states are net recipients; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients 
Forward-looking: member states directly 
affected by macroeconomic shocks usually 
end up as net recipients; the number of net 
recipients increases in the case of symmetric 
shocks; no country is a permanent net 
recipient; 
Forward-looking: equivalent schemes would 
have a very small effect on poverty and 
inequality reduction because the transfers 
are not targeted directly at households and 
the macroeconomic impact is very small on 
employment   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0%-1.1% of GDP across EA-
19 member states 
It performs well, especially in the post-2007 
recession period, and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates); 
Forward-looking: the same holds in the case 
of hypothetical shocks, the scheme performs 
especially well in post-recession periods   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% 
to 0.2% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
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Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by a trigger and 
has claw-back, but no experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues Few issues No constitutional issues; a few fiscal issues 
may be ahead   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in durations N/A N/A 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Easy to implement Issues lie ahead but they seem manageable   
4) Speed of implementation Fast implementation Constitutional changes may take some time   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
N/A No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; the equivalent 
case in particular is not problematic   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (Art. 
352(1) TFEU) 
It violates the no bail-out clause in Art. 125(1) 
TFEU because the scheme does not have 
experience rating; to implement it, the no 
bail-out clause has to be dropped or modified 
(i.e. a Treaty change)   
2) Operational side Few complications The operational side is largely left to the 
member states   
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Fiche V2 – Equivalent EUBS variant, rainy day scenario with debt-issuing 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths It performs very well in stabilisation terms; there are no permanent net 
contributors/recipients; there are few legal or operational barriers; it is easy and fast to 
implement 
Main weaknesses The scheme has a very low trigger; forward-looking analyses: under symmetric shocks, 
particularly of a long duration, the financing mechanism appears to be insufficient to cover 
the costs of unemployment; the fund ends up with a large deficit 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Equivalent – 
Trigger The trigger is activated when the short-term 
unemployment rate exceeds its moving average 
of the last 40 quarters plus 0.1 percentage point 
The trigger is activated 197 times during 
2000–14, in all years and all countries; BE, 
EL, LU, PT, RO and SE benefit 10 times or 
more; DE, EE, FR, LV, PL, SK and FI benefit 
5 times or less; 
Forward-looking: the trigger is activated 
continuously and for most countries under 
symmetric shocks particularly of a long 
duration (activated in 26 out of 27 
countries when the economy is hit) 
Basic or top-up N/A N/A 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; the pay-in is equal to 0.1% of GDP times 
(1+0.025*F(i,t-40,…,t-1)) (this coefficient equals 
the number of times the scheme was activated 
in the last 40 quarters and is in the range of [1, 
2]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; the coefficient reaches 2 
because of experience rating in LU and PT 
(as funds are activated often) 
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Claw-back Yes; the pay-in is doubled after 3 years of more 
than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance 
vis-à-vis the supranational fund until the 
balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; claw-back is active in FI 
and PT; 
Forward-looking: claw-back is activated in 
most countries in the case of symmetric 
shocks, particularly when these are of a 
long duration 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are 
0%-1% of GDP in the EA-19 
Forward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions are generally 
negative; there is a high 
deficit in the case of 
prolonged symmetric 
shocks (scenario B), -3.6% 
of GDP in the EA-19 
Net contributors: 9 EA-19 member states; 
net recipients: 10 EA-19 member states; 
no member state is a permanent net 
contributor/recipient; 
Forward-looking: member states directly 
affected by macroeconomic shocks usually 
end up as net recipients; the number of 
net recipients increases in the case of 
symmetric shocks; no country is a 
permanent net recipient 
  
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation as 
a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-1.2% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% to 
0.2% of GDP in 1995–2013 
in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are 
mechanisms to prevent permanent 
transfers; structural reforms and fiscal 
policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact – 
  
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with 
high unemployment and a negative 
impact if perceived as a step towards a 
‘transfer Union’  
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Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by a trigger, 
claw-back and experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the national 
laws and practices of member 
states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues Few issues No constitutional issues; a few fiscal issues 
may be ahead   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in replacement 
rates 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in durations N/A N/A 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, 
FR, LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 
other countries); management: BE, DK, FI 
and SE (a medium role in 8 other 
countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Easy to implement Issues lie ahead but they seem 
manageable   
4) Speed of implementation Fast implementation Constitutional changes may take some 
time   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
N/A No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; the 
equivalent case in particular is not 
problematic   
Compatibility with the EU legal 
framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (Art. 
352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side Few complications The operational side is largely left to the 
member states   
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Fiche V3 – Equivalent EUBS variant, rainy day scenario without debt-issuing 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths It performs very well in stabilisation terms; there are few legal or operational barriers; it is 
easy and fast to implement; there are no permanent net contributors/recipients 
Main weaknesses There is no debt-issuing possibility (which reduces the capacity to deal with large symmetric 
shocks); it has a very low trigger 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Equivalent – 
Trigger The trigger is activated when the short-term 
unemployment rate exceeds its moving average 
of the last 40 quarters plus 0.1 percentage point 
The trigger is activated 197 times during 
2000–14, in all years and all countries; BE, 
EL, LU, PT, RO and SE benefit 10 times or 
more; DE, EE, FR, LV, PL, SK and FI benefit 
5 times or less 
Basic or top-up N/A N/A 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; the pay-in is equal to 0.1% of GDP times 
(1+0.025*F(i,t-40,…,t-1)) (this coefficient equals 
the number of times the scheme was activated 
in the last 40 quarters and is in the range of [1, 
2]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; the pay-in is doubled after 3 years of more 
than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance 
vis-à-vis the supranational fund until the 
balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; activated in FI in 2001–03 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
No, if resources are needed to avoid a negative 
financial position of the scheme, the 
supranational fund can call for contributions 
No debt-issuing, so extra contributions 
would be needed; a stark increase in pay-
ins takes place during 1995–98 in the euro 
area and 1995–97 and 2013 in the EU, yet 
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from the member states, in proportion to their 
GDP 
there are no corresponding jumps in the 
experience rating or claw-back 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are 
0%-1% of GDP in the EA-19 
Net contributors: 11 EA-19 member states; 
net recipients: 8 EA-19 member states; no 
member state is a permanent net 
contributor/recipient   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-1.2% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’ 
 
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
There are similarities with the Australian 
UBS, which is characterised by low eligibility 
criteria, low generosity and high controls to 
promote activation; there is redistribution 
because more prosperous areas contribute 
more; the scheme is conditioned by a trigger, 
claw-back and experience rating   
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues Few issues No constitutional issues; a few fiscal issues 
may be ahead   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
N/A N/A 
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Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in durations N/A N/A 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Easy to implement Issues lie ahead but they seem manageable   
4) Speed of implementation Fast implementation Constitutional changes may take some time   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
N/A No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; the equivalent 
case in particular is not problematic   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (Art. 
352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side Few complications The operational side is largely left to the 
member states   
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Fiche V4 – Equivalent EUBS variant, reinsurance scenario 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths There is a higher level of redistribution; there are few legal or operational barriers; it is easy 
and fast to implement; it performs well in stabilisation terms (especially in the post-2007 
recession period) 
Main weaknesses There is no legal base within the existing EU framework; no debt-issuing possibility (which 
reduces the capacity to deal with large symmetric shocks); there is a very high trigger; there 
is no claw-back, so there are fewer tools to mitigate moral hazard; the scheme is less credible 
than the other equivalent EUBS 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Equivalent – 
Trigger The trigger is activated when the short-term 
unemployment rate exceeds its moving average 
of the last 40 quarters plus 2 percentage points 
The trigger is activated 32 times during 
2000–14, in all years except for 2003 and 
the period 2005–08 and in 14 countries; it 
is never activated for BE, BG, CZ, DE, FR, IT, 
MT, NL, AT, RO, SI, FI or UK; EL, ES, CY, PL 
and PT benefit at least 3 times 
Basic or top-up N/A N/A 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; the pay-in is equal to 0.1% of GDP times 
(1+0.025*F(i,t-40,…,t-1)) (this coefficient equals 
the number of times the scheme was activated 
in the last 40 quarters and is in the range of [1, 
2]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; hardly any effect due to 
the low number of times the fund is 
activated 
Claw-back No Violates the no bail-out clause, but the 
redistributive impact is more visible  
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
No, if resources are needed to avoid a negative 
financial position of the scheme, the 
supranational fund can call for contributions 
Activated so little that no additional pay-
ins are required. 
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from the member states, in proportion to their 
GDP 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT, EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
    
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are 
0%-1% of GDP in the EA-
19 
Net contributors: 14 EA-19 member states; 
net recipients: 5 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation as 
a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost 
is 0.1%-1.1% of GDP 
across EA-19 member 
states 
It performs well, especially in the post-2007 
recession period and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% 
to 0.0% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with 
high unemployment and a negative impact 
if perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to 
pay to reap the benefits 
of insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by a trigger and 
experience rating, but no claw-back 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the national 
laws and practices of member 
states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues Few issues No constitutional issues; a few fiscal issues 
may be ahead   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in replacement 
rates 
N/A N/A 
  
Incompatibilities in durations N/A N/A 
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2) Role of social partners Involved in the design 
and management of 
NUBS and can also play a 
role in the EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, 
FR, LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 
other countries); management: BE, DK, FI 
and SE (a medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Easy to implement Issues lie ahead but they seem manageable   
4) Speed of implementation Fast implementation Constitutional changes may take some time   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
N/A No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; the equivalent 
case in particular is not problematic   
Compatibility with the EU legal 
framework 
    
  
1) Legal side No legal base It does not meet the ‘conditionality’ 
requirement in Art. 122(2) TFEU because 
the scheme has no claw-back; thus, a Treaty 
change would be needed   
2) Operational side Few complications The operational side is largely left to the 
member states   
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Fiche V5 – Genuine EUBS variant, most basic form 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths It has a decent performance in terms of stabilisation 
Main weaknesses This is the baseline case, so it incorporates some unfavourable characteristics that other 
EUBS do not have (e.g. a high cap and a 3-month waiting period); it requires many legal 
amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such  
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; activated in LT in 2013, 
MT in 2007–08 and PL in 2006 
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Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
    
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; 
net recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; 
few member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation as 
a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.7% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs decently and clearly 
contributes to stabilisation (reduces 
volatility in GDP growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% to 
0.1% of GDP in 1995–2013 
in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are 
mechanisms to prevent permanent 
transfers; structural reforms and fiscal 
policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with 
high unemployment and a negative 
impact if perceived as a step towards a 
‘transfer Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back 
and experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the national 
laws and practices of member 
states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; 
many operational barriers lie ahead, but 
they are not insurmountable if there is 
enough flexibility for member states; most 
of the changes would be needed in 
member states with a Ghent system,   
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liberal welfare system or less generous 
system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational 
issues   
Incompatibilities in replacement 
rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on 
the case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, 
FR, LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 
other countries); management: BE, DK, FI 
and SE (a medium role in 8 other 
countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, 
liberal welfare system or less generous 
system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it is more 
difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU legal 
framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions 
between the EUBS and NUBS, data and 
information exchange, and supervision of 
national implementation  
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Fiche V6 – Genuine EUBS variant, top-up scheme 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This is a smaller scheme, requiring lower contributions 
Main weaknesses It is the most problematic scheme of all the 18 variants and entails severe issues with respect 
to the political feasibility; legally and operationally it is very complicated at the level of the 
member states and theoretically the stabilisation capacity is low; it is consistently ranked last 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Top-up: if necessary, the supranational fund 
supplements payments of the national funds to 
guarantee a given replacement rate and 
duration to every eligible person 
Requires less funding, but there are severe 
issues related to game-ability and political 
feasibility; member states with generous 
NUBS contribute but do not benefit; it is 
not a basic provision 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 5 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 14 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.8% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs decently and contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% 
to 0.2% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
There are similarities with the Austrian UBS, 
where the top-up is meant to favour low-
wage earners; the scheme is conditioned by 
claw-back and experience rating; without 
minimum requirements, the top-up 
encourages member states to lower their 
replacement rates – which is yet another 
form of institutional moral hazard   
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues Very severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; it 
would be extremely complicated from an   
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administrative perspective; it would entail 
severe political feasibility issues 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation; it would be administratively 
and politically difficult 
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Fiche V7 – Genuine EUBS variant, benefit duration of 12 months 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme has the largest stabilisation capacity of all the genuine EUBS, with a large 
positive impact on GDP; it is a very generous scheme, so there is a high redistributive impact; 
there is no 3-month waiting period; it avoids administrative difficulties and jumps in benefit 
amounts; it is the most favourable genuine EUBS 
Main weaknesses It requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers; it is a larger scheme 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 12 months 
– 
Duration 12 months: benefits are paid from the start of 
the 1st month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M0-M12) 
This scheme has the longest duration of all 
the options  
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; 
Forward-looking (applies to all genuine 
schemes): it gives rise to the political 
question of whether it should start ‘blind’ 
with respect to unemployment history and 
accumulate experience gradually, or it 
should incorporate the known history that 
includes the recent recession and thus 
require higher contributions from the 
countries that have been hardest hit; 
Even with blind starts, the initial 
unemployment conditions of member 
states have an important effect on 
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experience rating; EL, CY and ES would 
have coefficients significantly higher than 
1, while among others DE and AT would 
have coefficients significantly lower than 1  
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Backward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Forward-looking: the 
scheme generally ends up 
with a small deficit under 
different scenarios; the 
accumulated net 
contributions are -0.6% to  
-0.1% of GDP 
 
Backward-looking: 4 EA-19 member states 
are net contributors; 15 EA-19 member 
states are net recipients; few member states 
are permanent net contributors/recipients 
Forward-looking: member states directly 
affected by macroeconomic shocks usually 
end up as net recipients; the number of net 
recipients increases in the case of symmetric 
shocks; few member states are permanent 
net contributors/recipients; 
Forward-looking: in terms of within-country 
distributional effects, the EUBS would have a 
positive effect on poverty and inequality 
reduction; on average, poverty would be 
reduced by 0.35 percentage points in the 
presence of the EUBS, while inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient would be 
reduced by around 0.15 percentage points, in 
the year when short-term unemployment 
rises in most countries;  
Compared with other genuine schemes, 
variant 7 would have a larger effect on 
poverty/inequality reduction than variants 
for which the duration of the unemployment 
benefit is less than 12M;  
The higher the amount of the benefit (more 
generosity), the higher would be the effect 
on poverty/inequality reduction;    
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The less stringent the eligibility conditions, 
the higher would be the effect of the EUBS 
because of the extension in coverage 
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-1.0% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs very well, with the highest impact 
of all the genuine EUBS and clearly 
contributes to stabilisation (reduces volatility 
in GDP growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.3% 
to 0.2% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with many 
countries, key feature is 
This scheme avoids administrative 
difficulties, as the eligible unemployed 
immediately receive EUBS benefits (there is   
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start at first month, very 
favourable scheme 
no switch from NUBS to the EUBS) and after 
the EUBS stops (the NUBS only restart in a 
few countries; its avoids the switch to NUBS 
and then to social assistance) 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V8 – Genuine EUBS variant, benefit duration of 3 months 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This is a smaller scheme yet it has a decent performance in terms of stabilisation 
Main weaknesses The very short duration results in more frequent transitions between the EUBS, NUBS and 
social assistance; operationally it is difficult to manage; there are huge jumps in the benefit 
amounts; it has the lowest stabilisation capacity of all the genuine EUBS variants; there is no 
legal base within the existing framework; it requires many legal amendments and raises 
operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 3 months 
– 
Duration 3 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 6th month (M3-M6) 
This duration is the shortest of all the 18 
options and is very short in comparison 
with most countries (except for CY, CZ, HU, 
LT, MT, SK and the UK)  
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT, EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 3 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 16 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.0%-0.2% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs poorly, with weak stabilisation 
(the weakest of all genuine EUBS) 
  
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: 0% of 
GDP in 1995–2013 in the 
EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –    
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –    
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system   
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Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Very short in comparison 
with most member states 
In 23 countries, the NUBS would restart in all 
or some cases after the EUBS stops; there 
would be more changes between schemes 
and thus it would be very difficult from the 
administrative point of view   
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side There is no legal base 
within the existing 
framework as it does not 
contribute to social 
cohesion 
A Treaty change would be needed 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V9 – Genuine EUBS variant, replacement rate of 35% 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme is in line with many NUBS  
Main weaknesses There is a huge dispersion between the replacement rate and capping (adverse effects); 
there are political feasibility issues; it undermines active labour market policies; the 
stabilisation capacity is limited; there is no legal base within the existing framework; it 
requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 35% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
This is the lowest replacement rate of all 
the 18 options and considerably lower 
than most rates used 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
DESIGN OF A EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SCHEME | 99 
 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.0%-0.5% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs poorly, with weak stabilisation 
(the second weakest of all genuine schemes)  
  
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.1% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
There are similarities with the Australian 
UBS, which is characterised by low eligibility 
criteria, low generosity and high controls to 
promote activation; concerning 
redistribution, more prosperous areas 
contribute more; the scheme is conditioned 
by claw-back and experience rating   
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead; it would be 
politically very difficult given the adverse   
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effects; most of the changes would be 
needed in member states with a Ghent 
system, liberal welfare system or less 
generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
The EUBS rate is much 
lower than in most EU 
countries, yet similar with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Substantially higher rates are used in most 
member states; combined with the high 
capping, it has the adverse effect of providing 
higher/lower benefits to high-/low-income 
earners than the NUBS   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side There is no legal base 
within the existing 
framework as it does not 
contribute to social 
cohesion 
A Treaty change would be needed 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
 
 
  
DESIGN OF A EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SCHEME | 101 
 
Fiche V10 – Genuine EUBS variant, replacement rate of 60% 
General remarks Summary/Overview 
Main strengths This scheme provides a high replacement rate yet is still in line with that of most NUBS; it is a 
generous scheme, so it performs well in terms of redistribution; it has the second highest 
stabilisation capacity of all the genuine EUBS 
Main weaknesses It requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 60% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
It has the highest replacement rate of all 
the options, in line with the rates used in 
most countries (only four countries use 
consistently higher rates, DK, LU, NL and 
SE) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.8% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs very well and clearly contributes 
to stabilisation (the second best of the 
genuine EUBS) (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –    
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –    
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many   
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operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V11 – Genuine EUBS variant, eligibility after having worked 3 out of the last 6 months  
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths It has a decent performance in terms of stabilisation 
Main weaknesses This EUBS has a very short reference period and large discrepancies vis-à-vis the NUBS 
reference periods; there are administrative difficulties; it requires many legal amendments 
and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 6 months (3M out of 6M) 
This is the shortest period of all the 
options; it is easy to qualify for this scheme 
(which is less stringent than the existing 
scheme in 25 of the member states, for 
those with a recent work history, though 
overall it is less easy than the baseline) 
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.7% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs decently and clearly contributes 
to stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are   
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not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
an extremely short 
reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation, for people with a recent work 
history, otherwise it is more difficult), with 
limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V12 – Genuine EUBS variants, eligible after having worked 12 out of the last 24 months 
General remarks Summary/Overview 
Main strengths This scheme has a decent performance in terms of stabilisation 
Main weaknesses It is more difficult to qualify for this scheme than for most NUBS; it has a lower than average 
coverage; it does not contribute to social cohesion; it requires many legal amendments and 
raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 12 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 24 months (12M out of 24M) 
This period is the longest of all the options; 
it is more stringent than most NUBS and 
therefore has no legal base (the NUBS are 
generally less stringent and easier to 
qualify for in 20 countries)  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit (IE, 
MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
    
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.6% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs decently and clearly contributes 
to stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.3% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system   
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Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS is more in line 
with NUBS conditions 
The EUBS is generally more difficult to qualify 
for, thus qualifying fewer people (which 
translates into lower coverage and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible at the 
member state level 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V13 – Genuine EUBS variant, benefits capped at 100% of the national average wage 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This EUBS option performs well in terms of stabilisation, with capping more in line with NUBS 
(it avoids the adverse effects of an excessively high cap and has more political support)  
Main weaknesses It requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 100% of 
the average national gross wage 
The cap is lower than in most other 
options; it may result in a higher 
propensity to consume but could also 
result in a worse lifestyle, yet much more 
in line with reality in most countries and 
preferable to the baseline, which likely has 
adverse effects 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.6% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are   
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not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V14 – Genuine EUBS variant, benefits capped at 50% of the national average wage 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme performs well in terms of stabilisation, with capping much more in line with 
NUBS (it avoids the adverse effects of an excessively high cap and has more political support)  
Main weaknesses There is no legal base within the existing framework; it requires many legal amendments and 
raises operational barriers  
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 50% of 
the average national gross wage 
This cap is lower than in all the other 
options; it may result in a higher 
propensity to consume but could also 
result in a worse lifestyle, yet more in line 
with (although lower than) reality in most 
countries and preferable to the baseline, 
which likely has adverse effects 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 5 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 14 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-05% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact – 
  
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many   
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operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side There is no legal base 
within the existing 
framework as it does not 
contribute to social 
cohesion 
A Treaty change would be needed 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V15 – Genuine EUBS variant, cyclical variability 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme could provide stabilisation when needed the most  
Main weaknesses It interferes with labour market institutions; it clashes with trends towards shortening 
unemployment durations; there are political feasibility issues along with risks of moral hazard 
and a transfer Union; it requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability Yes; an additional 6M of benefits in the case of a 
deep shock in the EU (defined as a recession in 
half + 1 of the member states simultaneously, 
where a recession is 2 consecutive quarters of 
negative growth) plus an additional 6M of 
benefits if the national short-term 
unemployment rate is more than 3% of its 10-
year average (triggered if requested by the 
country)  
This is the only variant with cyclical 
variability; there are no legal or 
operational barriers; it could be a 
substantial burden when countries are still 
in recession or recovering; in the 
simulations, it is used by CY in 2013, EE in 
2010 and 2011, EL in 2012 and 2013, IE in 
2010, LT and LV in 2010 and 2011, PT in 
2013 and ES in every year in 2010–13 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.8% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
There are similarities with the US UBS, where 
a balance is attained between stabilisation 
and redistribution, characterised by cyclical 
variability through Extended and Emergency 
Benefits and minimum requirements; the 
scheme is conditioned by claw-back and 
experience rating   
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
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Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues, 
although cyclical variability 
as such does not pose 
many challenges 
No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V16 – Genuine EUBS variant, no experience rating 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme would have a high redistributive impact; it performs well in stabilisation terms 
Main weaknesses It would breach Art. 125(1) TFEU; there is no experience rating, so claw-back becomes more 
important and there are fewer tools available to mitigate moral hazard; it requires many legal 
amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating No Violates the no bail-out clause, but the 
redistributive impact is more visible 
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; activated in ES (2000–02, 
2012–13), LT (2001, 2005, 2012, 2013), PL 
(2004-2007) and SK (2004, 2005) more 
frequently than in V5 because there is no 
experience rating 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 10 EA-19 member states; 
net recipients: 9 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.0%-0.7% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.2% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact – 
  
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
There are similarities with the Belgian UBS, 
which is characterised by a high risk of moral 
hazard due to the generosity of the scheme 
and the large differences in unemployment 
rates between the regions, and in which 
there is structural redistribution across the 
regions, resulting in political tensions and 
attracting much attention to the issue of 
moral hazard; the scheme is conditioned by 
claw-back     
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many   
DESIGN OF A EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SCHEME | 121 
 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system 
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
can also play a role in the 
EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It violates the no bail-out clause in Art. 125(1) 
TFEU because there is no experience rating; a 
Treaty change would be needed to 
implement the scheme   
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
 
 
  
122 | BEBLAVÝ, LENAERTS & MASELLI 
 
Fiche V17 – Genuine EUBS variant, no claw-back 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This EUBS option would have a high redistributive impact; it has good stabilisation capacity 
Main weaknesses It would breach Art. 125(1) TFEU; there is no claw-back, so there are fewer tools to mitigate 
moral hazard; it requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Claw-back No Violates the no bail-out clause, but the 
redistributive impact is more visible 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
Yes; the supranational fund can borrow money 
from capital markets to cover short-term 
imbalances 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
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Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT and EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Net contributors: 4 EA-19 member states; net 
recipients: 15 EA-19 member states; few 
member states are permanent net 
contributors/recipients   
Results of macro simulations       
1) Macroeconomic stabilisation 
as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost is 
0.1%-0.7% of GDP across 
EA-19 member states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP growth 
rates)   
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the scheme       
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are mechanisms 
to prevent permanent transfers; structural 
reforms and fiscal policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with high 
unemployment and a negative impact if 
perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to pay 
to reap the benefits of 
insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by experience 
rating 
  
        
Legal and operational impacts Summary/overview country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and practices of 
member states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; many 
operational barriers lie ahead, but they are 
not insurmountable if there is enough 
flexibility for member states; most of the 
changes would be needed in member states 
with a Ghent system, liberal welfare system 
or less generous system   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very short 
employment period within 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which   
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a short reference period 
compared with NUBS 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational issues 
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); sometimes 
slightly lower/higher rates depending on the 
case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design and 
management of NUBS and 
also play a role in the EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, FR, 
LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 other 
countries); management: BE, DK, FI and SE (a 
medium role in 8 other countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, liberal 
welfare system or less generous system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the many 
changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would be 
more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme   
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within the 
existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 175(3) 
and 352(1) TFEU) 
It violates the no bail-out clause in Art. 125(1) 
TFEU because there is no claw-back; a Treaty 
change would be needed to implement the 
scheme   
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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Fiche V18 – Genuine EUBS variant, no debt-issuing 
General remarks Summary/overview 
Main strengths This scheme has a good performance in terms of stabilisation 
Main weaknesses It has no debt-issuing possibility (reducing its capacity to deal with large symmetric shocks); it 
requires many legal amendments and raises operational barriers 
      
Features Summary/overview Country analysis/results 
Type Genuine – 
Trigger Continuous; the supranational fund is activated 
by any job loss that fulfils the eligibility 
requirements 
– 
Basic or top-up Basic: the supranational fund pays out 
unemployment benefits according to the 
predefined replacement rate to an eligible 
unemployed person for 9 months 
– 
Duration 9 months: benefits are paid from the beginning 
of the 4th month after losing employment to the 
end of the 12th month (M3-M12) 
Forward-looking: 12 months (M1-M12) 
Baseline case; most member states seem 
to offer benefits for 6 to 12 months, but a 
lot depends on the case; CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, SK and the UK are generally less 
generous 
Replacement rate 50% of the reference wage (the gross wage is 
the default option) 
Baseline case; it is broadly in line with the 
rates in most countries (only DK, LU, NL 
and SE have consistently higher rates) 
Eligibility Workers who became unemployed after having 
worked, not necessarily consecutively, as 
employees for 3 (full-time equivalents) out of 
the last 12 months (3M out of 12M) 
Baseline case; the EUBS is less stringent 
than NUBS in 26 member states  
Capping Unemployment benefits cannot exceed 150% of 
the average national gross wage 
Baseline case; the cap is very high in 
comparison with caps in the majority of 
countries; adverse effects (high-income 
earners are proportionally better off) 
Cyclical variability No Baseline case; this is in line with the 
majority of countries (exceptions are AT, 
ES, LT and PL) 
Experience rating Yes; a coefficient equal to the ratio of the 10-
year average, short-term unemployment rate 
for the country over the 10-year average, short-
term unemployment rate for the whole EU is 
applied to all individual contributions from a 
country (the coefficient is updated every 3 years 
and is in the range of [0,∞]) 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such; 
Forward-looking (for genuine EUBS): it 
gives rise to the political question of 
whether it should start ‘blind’ with respect 
to unemployment history and accumulate 
experience gradually, or it should 
incorporate the known history that 
includes the recent recession and thus 
require higher contributions from the 
countries that have been hardest hit; 
Even with blind starts, the initial 
unemployment conditions of member 
states have an important effect on 
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experience rating; EL, CY and ES would 
have coefficients significantly higher than 
1, while among others DE and AT would 
have coefficients significantly lower than 1  
Claw-back Yes; a contribution paid by governments equal 
to 0.2% of GDP annually applies after 3 years of 
more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative 
balance vis-à-vis the supranational fund until 
the balance declines below 1% 
Does not pose any legal or operational 
barriers as such 
Debt-issuing 
possibility 
No; if resources are needed to avoid a negative 
financial position of the scheme, the 
supranational fund can call for contributions 
from the member states, in proportion to their 
GDP 
Additional contributions are needed in the 
EU in 1995–99 (1998 for the euro area 
case) and 2013; claw-back becomes less 
important than in other variants 
Reference wage Last gross monthly wage Countries may use the last net monthly 
wage (AT, FI and DE) or flat-rate benefit 
(IE, MT, EL) instead if it is equivalent to 
50% of the average gross wage 
 
Economic impact Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Results of micro simulations       
1) Distributional effects Backward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions in 2013 are  
-0.34%-0.07% of GDP in 
the EA-19 
Forward-looking: 
accumulated net 
contributions are between 
0.01% and 0.15% of GDP 
under different scenarios 
Backward-looking: 4 EA-19 member states 
are net contributors; 15 EA-19 member 
states are net recipients; few member states 
are permanent net contributors/recipients 
Forward-looking: member states directly 
affected by macroeconomic shocks usually 
end up as net recipients; the number of net 
recipients increases in the case of symmetric 
shocks; few member states are permanent 
net contributors/recipients; 
In terms of within-country distributional 
effects, the effects on poverty and inequality 
reduction would be very similar to those of 
variant 7, because the additional payments 
required due to the no-debt constraint are 
not made through employee contributions   
Results of macro 
simulations 
    
  
1) Macroeconomic 
stabilisation as a % of GDP 
The highest annual boost 
is 0.1%-0.7% of GDP 
across EA-19 member 
states 
It performs well and clearly contributes to 
stabilisation (reduces volatility in GDP 
growth rates) 
  
2) Net transfers Net EUBS receipts: -0.2% 
to 0.1% of GDP in 1995–
2013 in the EA-19 
– 
  
Value added of the 
scheme 
    
  
1) Labour mobility Limited impact  –   
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2) Structural reforms The EUBS does not run 
counter to structural 
reforms 
On the condition that there are 
mechanisms to prevent permanent 
transfers; structural reforms and fiscal 
policy are not substitutes   
3) Markets’ confidence  Small positive impact –   
4) Citizens’ confidence Impact unclear Likely a positive impact in countries with 
high unemployment and a negative impact 
if perceived as a step towards a ‘transfer 
Union’  
Risk of moral hazard Inevitable – a price to 
pay to reap the benefits 
of insurance 
The scheme is conditioned by claw-back 
and experience rating 
  
        
Legal and operational 
impacts Summary/overview Country analysis/results Code 
Compatibility with the 
national laws and 
practices of member 
states 
    
  
1) Legal/operational issues More severe issues No constitutional issues yet legal changes 
would be needed in all member states; 
many operational barriers lie ahead, but 
they are not insurmountable if there is 
enough flexibility for member states; most 
of the changes would be needed in 
member states with a Ghent system, 
liberal welfare system or less generous 
system   
Incompatibilities in eligibility 
conditions 
The EUBS has a very 
short employment period 
within a short reference 
period compared with 
NUBS 
The EUBS is generally easier to qualify for, 
thus qualifying more people (which 
translates into higher coverage rates and 
stabilisation), with limited operational 
issues   
Incompatibilities in 
replacement rates 
Broadly in line with most 
EU countries, also with 
respect to the calculation 
method and basis 
Consistently higher rates in DK (90%), LU 
(80%), SE (75%) and NL (70%); 
sometimes slightly lower/higher rates 
depending on the case (e.g. in EE, ES, SI 
and PT)   
Incompatibilities in durations Broadly in line with most 
EU countries 
CY, CZ, HU, LT, MT, SK and the UK are 
generally less generous 
 
2) Role of social partners Involved in the design 
and management of 
NUBS and can also play a 
role in the EUBS 
Design: a strong role in AT, BE, BG, DE, FI, 
FR, LU, NL, PT and SI (a medium role in 10 
other countries); management: BE, DK, FI 
and SE (a medium role in 8 other 
countries)   
3) Ease of implementation Difficult to implement, yet 
not impossible 
Most of the difficulties ahead would be in 
countries with a very different NUBS: 
member states with a Ghent system, 
liberal welfare system or less generous 
system   
4) Speed of implementation Implementation would 
take time, given the 
many changes needed 
The slowest implementation would be in 
member states with a very different NUBS 
(Ghent system or liberal welfare system)   
5) Potential interactions with 
other branches of social 
policy 
Interactions with social 
assistance and other 
branches (pensions, 
sickness, etc.) 
No legal or insurmountable operational 
barriers, especially if this is left to the 
discretion of the member states; it would 
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be more difficult in the genuine than in the 
equivalent scheme 
Compatibility with the EU 
legal framework 
    
  
1) Legal side The legal base is within 
the existing framework (a 
combination of Arts 
175(3) and 352(1) TFEU) 
It does not violate the no bail-out clause in 
Art. 125(1) TFEU 
  
2) Operational side It involves more 
complications than the 
equivalent scheme, but is 
still feasible 
There would be more interactions between 
the EUBS and NUBS, data and information 
exchange, and supervision of national 
implementation 
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8. Concluding remarks 
With the Great Recession still in mind, policy-makers have relaunched the search for a supranational 
automatic stabilisation mechanism for the EMU that, similar to the powerful automatic stabilisers that 
can be found in many member states, would serve as an important instrument to prevent economic 
shocks and mitigate their impact on employment and incomes. One of the potential stabilisation 
mechanisms under consideration is a common European unemployment insurance scheme. While this 
idea was first discussed in the 1970s, literature on the topic still is rather limited. 
This report, which has been prepared as part of a comprehensive study on the “Feasibility and Added 
Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, has aimed at contributing to this literature. 
Specifically, it has shed light on how an EUBS could be designed by exploring 18 EUBS variants, which 
are sub-divided into genuine and equivalent schemes. For each of these 18 variants, the report has 
explored different design features, some of which can also be found in national unemployment benefit 
schemes (e.g. the replacement rate or benefit duration), while others are more specific to the EUBS 
context (e.g. claw-back or cyclical variability). The report has sought to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the 18 EUBS variants, drawing on other work that has been carried out as part of 
the project (Beblavý et al. (2015b), Coucheir et al. (2017), Dolls and Lewney (2017), Jara et al. (2017) 
and Vandenbroucke and Luigjes (2016) are the most prominent examples). This information is 
summarised into 18 fiches, one for each scheme. The report has further stressed key policy issues, such 
as convergence, minimum requirements and accession criteria, which could substantially affect the 
design and implementation of the schemes. In this way, we aspire to inform policy-makers on the factors 
to take into consideration when designing an EUBS, if they decide to do so. 
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Appendix I. Glossary 
In this glossary, we give a summary definition of the features that characterise each equivalent and 
genuine scheme.  
Basic EUBS. In a basic genuine EUBS, the supranational fund pays out the unemployment benefits 
according to the predefined replacement rate to the eligible, unemployed persons for a 
predefined number of months. Each country is free to increase the paid amount or the duration 
at its own expense. 
Capping. An unemployment benefit is capped if it cannot exceed a given proportion of the national 
average wage. For example, if the reference wage of an unemployed citizen is €3,000 and the 
replacement rate is 70%, then the expected unemployment benefit is €2,100. Alternatively, if the 
average national wage is €1,000 and there is a capping at 150% of the average national wage, 
then that individual will receive €1,500. 
Claw-back. Claw-back is a mechanism that reduces a potential, long-term negative (positive) net 
contributions by a member state by increasing (decreasing) the amount that the member state 
has to pay into the supranational fund. For example, say that the Netherlands comes to be a net 
beneficiary of the supranational fund after a number of years in which the system is in place, 
meaning that this country has paid into the system less than what it has received. Then, the Dutch 
contribution to the supranational fund would be increased as a result. 
Cyclical variability. This term refers to the extent to which some of the parameters defining the EUBS 
(for example, the replacement rate or the duration) are a function of variables related to the 
economic cycle. An example of an unemployment benefit scheme exhibiting a certain degree of 
cyclical variability is that of the US, where if the recession is particularly severe, there are several 
options for providing unemployed citizens with ‘extended benefits’ (i.e. increasing the duration 
of the unemployment benefits). 
Debt-issuing possibility. Debt-issuing is possible if the supranational fund can borrow money from the 
capital markets in order to cover short-term imbalances.  
Duration. In this report, duration refers to the number of months during which the unemployment 
benefit is paid out. In the project tender, there seemed to be the assumption that the 
replacement rate would not vary by month, although this is not necessarily the case in the NUBS. 
Eligibility. Eligibility rules determine which unemployed citizens qualify for unemployment benefits. One 
particularly important eligibility rule determines how many months the citizen must have worked 
in a specified period prior to becoming unemployed, in order to receive unemployment benefits. 
For example, at the time of becoming unemployed, a citizen may be required to have worked at 
least 3 out the last 12 months to qualify for unemployment benefits (this is the baseline option 
specified in the tender). Eligibility conditions define some minimum requirements for EUBS 
coverage, which in turn affect the incentives in place for individuals and the stabilisation effect of 
the EUBS. 
Equivalent EUBS. Equivalent EUBS are those in which financial transfers from the supranational fund 
occur only from and towards member states, and not directly towards unemployed individuals. 
The transfers may still reach unemployed individuals indirectly, through a process whereby the 
supranational fund pays the national state, which in turn directs the funds towards its 
unemployed citizens.  
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Experience rating. In a system with experience rating, the payers into the system contribute to a 
different degree depending on their past experience with unemployment. For example, in the US, 
where the payers are the employers, the tax due to finance the unemployment benefit scheme 
is higher for companies that have laid off more workers in the past. In a similar way, countries 
where the short-term unemployment rate is higher or more volatile may be requested to pay a 
higher contribution, relative to their GDP, than other countries. 
Genuine EUBS. Genuine EUBS are those in which financial transfers from the supranational fund directly 
target unemployed individuals.  
Reference wage. The reference wage is defined as the average wage in the last x months (where x may 
be equal to 1), either net or gross. 
Replacement rate. The replacement rate is the proportion of the reference wage that will be paid out 
as an unemployment benefit, so that the unemployment benefit equals the reference wage times 
the replacement rate. 
Top-up EUBS. In a top-up genuine scheme, every eligible unemployed person is guaranteed a given 
replacement rate and duration. If the NUBS is generous enough to cover these costs, then the 
supranational fund does not contribute to the unemployment benefits of the unemployed 
citizens. If, however, the NUBS does not meet the minimal duration and replacement rate 
requirements, then the supranational fund supplements the payments of the national fund by 
the necessary amount to meet these requirements. (Notice that this implies that countries with 
a generous system pay into the EUBS, but are less likely to receive any contributions.) 
Trigger. The trigger is the condition determining when financial transfers from the supranational fund 
towards a particular country should occur. A trigger is defined by the choice of an indicator and 
of a threshold. When the indicator for a particular country exceeds the threshold, then the 
supranational fund pays the country the agreed claim. 
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Appendix II: Additional details on the selection of the cut-off points in the design of the 
trigger 
This appendix complements our discussion of the trigger in section 5.2, as it presents six figures to 
further illustrate the differences between a threshold based on percentage points and one based on 
standard deviations. For each of the cut-off points that we selected (0.1, 1 and 2), we provide two 
graphs. The first graph shows the values of the short-term unemployment rate when the cut-off is added 
(e.g. the short-term unemployment rate plus 0.1% vs the short-term unemployment rate plus 0.1 times 
the standard deviation). The second graph reveals the number of times the trigger is pulled in both 
cases.  
10-year moving average + 1 (percentage points or standard deviation) 
In Figure 16, we compare what the average values of a short-term unemployment rate plus 1% vs plus 
1 standard deviation. In most cases these values are similar. Moreover, the two series are highly 
correlated (the correlation coefficient equals 0.98). The value of 1 is our ‘stormy day’ scenario.  
In Figure 17, we use the same values to count how many times the scheme would be triggered by each 
of the two options. The number of events is the same in 10 out of 27 countries. It differs by 1 event in 
5 countries. When the differences are larger, such as for Belgium, Germany, France, Austria and 
Portugal, the standard deviation-based scheme generally triggers more easily. In some cases, the trigger 
is not activated at all (e.g. Belgium, Germany, France, Austria or Finland). Note that even in the years 
before 2000, the trigger would not have been activated in Belgium, Germany or Austria (neither when 
the percentage-points approach is used, nor in the case of standard deviations). In France, it would have 
been triggered in 1993 and 1994 for the percentage-points approach as well. In Finland, the trigger 
would have been pulled each year during 1994–98 when the percentage-points approach is used and 
during 1994–97 when the standard-deviations approach is taken.  
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Figure 16. Values for the trigger based on short-term unemployment during 2000–14 (1 percentage 
point vs 1 standard deviation) 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Number of times the trigger is activated during 2000–14 (1 percentage point vs 1 standard 
deviation) 
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We then repeat the same exercise with 0.1 and 2 standard deviations. These values can be considered 
proper cut-off points respectively for the ‘rainy day’ fund (0.1) and for the ‘reinsurance’ (2).  
10-year moving average + 0.1 (percentage points or standard deviation) 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the values and the number of times the trigger is pulled when 0.1 is used 
as a value instead of 1. This value covers our rainy day scenario. Figure 18 again shows that in terms of 
values, both approaches yield similar results. The pattern detected in Figure 19 is similar to that found 
before. The graph also illustrates that in this case the trigger is activated many times and it is activated 
at least once in every country. Interestingly, by setting the trigger this low, all countries benefit from the 
scheme. Many shocks are covered.  
For some countries, a very high trigger would still enable them to benefit, whereas for other countries 
the possibility to benefit is much lower. This is also clear from the analysis based on a value of 2 
(percentage points or standard deviations) below. 
Figure 18. Values for the trigger based on short-term unemployment during 2000–14 (0.1 percentage 
point vs 0.1 standard deviation) 
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Figure 19. Number of times the trigger is activated during 2000–14 (0.1 percentage point vs 0.1 
standard deviation) 
 
 
10-year moving average + 2 (percentage points or standard deviation) 
The final scenario that we consider is reinsurance, and the results are displayed in Figure 20 and Figure 
21. In this case, the differences in values appear to be somewhat larger than before, but for many 
countries they remain quite close. The number of times the trigger is activated, however, has gone down 
substantially. When the trigger is based on percentage points, it is activated only 32 times during 2000–
14 in the EU-27. When it is based on the standard deviation, this number increases to 44. Several 
countries cannot benefit in any of the cases in any of the years. Other countries, especially in the east 
and south of Europe, still qualify. Although many of them appear to qualify for benefits in both cases, 
some countries only benefit when the trigger is based on the standard deviation (as was noted before). 
Many of the countries that can benefit when the cut-off is set at ‘2’ will still benefit if it is much higher 
(e.g. 3). This is also clear from Figure 9, which presents on overview of different cut-offs for each of the 
countries in the period 2000–14.  
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Figure 20. Values for the trigger based on short-term unemployment during 2000–14 (2 percentage 
points vs 2 standard deviations) 
 
 
Figure 21. Number of times the trigger is activated during 2000–14 (2 percentage points vs 2 standard 
deviations) 
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